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Global Social Security:
How the Rules are Changing in Certain Countries
Robert J. Myers*

Abstract
Social security programs (i.e., national pension systems) differ widely between
countries. This is only natural, and desirable, because of varying social and economic
conditions and philosophies.
This paper discusses some of the general worldwide trends, such as the equal
treatment of men and women, increases in the normal retirement age, projection of
future costs, and the different philosophies of social security. Some of the interesting
and unique changes recently made in selected countries-Canada, Chile, Eastern
European countries, Germany, Japan, People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and United States-are described.
Key words and phrases: global social security, social security, national pension systems,

phzlosophies of SOCIal security

1 Introduction
There have been several interesting and significant developments
that recently have occurred in social security around the world. Some
of these suggest worldwide trends, whereas others are unique to particular nations. This paper describes such developments in several
selected countries.
The term social security as used here means only the limited concept of a national pension system. It does not include programs such as
unemployment insurance, family allowances, workers' compensation,
and health care that some persons consider to be branches of social
security.

2 Worldwide Major Developments
In recent years two major developments in social security have
occurred in most countries. The first one is equal treatment for men
* Robert J. Myers, F.5.A., M.A.A.A., F.C.A., held various actuarial positions with the
Social Security Administration beginning in 1934 and was Chief Actuary from 19471970. In 1981, he was named Deputy Commissioner of Social Security and became
Executive Director of the 1982-1983 National Commission on Social Security Reform.
He is Professor of Actuarial Science Emeritus at Temple University.
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and women. This is an easy concept to understand. If a higher retirement age applies for men than for women (often a difference of five
years), for example, this is not equal treatment. Also, many differences occur where women have been treated less favorably than men:
survivor benefits, for example, have been available in some countries
for male workers, but not for female workers. Many technical difficulties arise, however, in implementing equal treatment.
The second major development in many countries is the likely
future financing problem as the population
popUlation ages; in other words, as
there are relatively more persons at retirement age compared to persons of working age. This growing proportion of older persons creates
(or can create) financial problems, especially if a country does not
recognize that financing problems are likely to occur in the future.
Some years ago, few countries did any serious forecasting of what
their social security programs would cost 20, 30, or even 75 years
hence. Many countries merely looked ahead a year or two. This
worked well for some years, but as the aging of the population has
continued, the financial burden has become heavier. In contrast, some
countries (such as the United States) have made long-range projections for many years.
Projecting 50 to 75 years into the future cannot be done with great
precision, any more than one can predict with precision what the
weather will be in several weeks. But just as with the weather, one
does know that, if it is summer and winter is coming in about six
months, it will be colder then. One may not know exactly how much
colder, though. Long-range projections have given many countries some
indication of the problems that will be coming. In recent years more
countries have become concerned about the long-range future costs of
their social security programs.

3 Role of Visiting Experts
Next I will discuss some of the most interesting specific developments in several countries with which I am familiar. Obviously, one
article cannot describe what is happening in all countries!
When a person travels to another country as a consultant in the
field of social security (or, for that matter, any other field), he or
she should not use what is done in his or her own country as an absolute guide for what other countries ought to do. Instead, technical
experts should consider what the particular situation is in a country
as compared not only with their native land, but also with countries
throughout the world. What operates well and is desirable in one
country frequently may have just the opposite outcome in another
6
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country. There is no one perfect way of doing things; there are many
different alternatives. The choice of which alternative to take is
often not merely financial, actuarial, or economic, but is also dependent upon the political or psychological characteristics of the country.

4 United Kingdom
Now let us take a tour around the world, going eastward from the
Americas. The first country I will discuss is the United Kingdom,
which faces a serious problem concerning equal treatment by sex. This
problem has been especially acute since the United Kingdom joined
the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). The U.K. has had a five
year differential in the minimum retirement ages for men and women
in its social security program (60 for women and 65 for men). The benefits for women with similar earnings records often are higher in
order to make up for the fact that their contribution period or service
period is shorter. The E.E.c., however, believes that there should be
equal treatment of men and women in all respects-social security,
pensions, and so forth.
The U.K. has a dilemma because private pension plans must
have equal treatment; if they do not, legal suits can be brought in
E.E.c. courts. On the other hand, the E.E.C. doctrine on equal treatment does not control social security systems completely. At this time
an employer in the U.K. with a private pension plan must provide
equal treatment; if women can retire at age 60 with a certain amount
of pension, men must have the same amount at that age. At the same
time, however, the social security system does not pay the same benefit to men as to women, especially at ages 60 to 64. The employer
cannot bridge the gap by providing a temporary benefit to men to
equalize treatment in the aggregate between men and women because
it would be unfair discrimination against women; men would have
larger benefits from the private pension plan!
The real solution to this problem is to have the social security
system also provide equal treatment. The U.K. government is struggling with this matter. One difficulty with equalizing retirement
ages between men and women by lowering the age for men is the
greatly increased cost of the program. But if the age for women is
raised, many female workers will be extremely dissatisfied, especially those now near the current retirement age. In the end, however, this equalization must be done. Probably the best way to
equalize treatment of men and women is not suddenly, but with a
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gradual transition. In any event, the U.K. has a difficult problem in
this area.
Another interesting development in the u.K. is connected to individuals opting out of the social security system. The U.K. system is
composed of two parts: a flat benefit and an earnings-related benefit.
For many years, employers have been able to opt out of the earningsrelated benefit portion if they provide at least equivalent benefits.
Although this makes the system complicated, it has been working
reasonably well. Over the past two or three years, however, changes
in the system have allowed persons in a plan that had opted out of
the earnings-related benefit portion to opt out of the plan individually if they provide their own retirement protection. Also, persons
whose employers do not opt out can opt out individually. Individual
opting-out is undesirable, because it will be difficult to prevent
adverse selection and the resulting increased costs. At the same time,
the principle of social solidarity is violated.

5 Former Soviet Union
The next country is the former Soviet Union, which has the same
problem as the United Kingdom: unequal retirement ages for men and
women (namely, 55 for women and 60 for men). A Russian colleague of
mine informed me that this is a great concern. Their experts know
that they should have equal ages by sex, but this is difficult to
achieve from a political standpoint. With all of the other problems
facing the former Soviet Union, however, this one is undoubtedly not
high on the list of priorities.
Another problem in the former Soviet Union is that pensions are
low. For many years I attended international conferences on social
security where Soviet delegates would proclaim that they had the
most wonderful social security system. They asserted that it took care
of all the needs of all their people and that it was paid for entirely
by employing entities and by government and not at all by workers.
The level of benefits of the social security program relative to
earnings in the Soviet Union a few years ago was close to that in the
United States. As in the United States, the benefits are graded, i.e.,
relatively higher for low income persons and relatively lower for
high income persons. For example, for a worker in the United States
with average earnings over the working lifetime, the benefit is about
42 percent of final wages. For the low paid worker, the benefit is 55
percent to 60 percent of final wages. For the highest paid worker (up
to the maximum earnings considered for benefit purposes), the benefit
is 25 percent to 27 percent of final wages.
8
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In the former Soviet Union, the mInImUm retirement ages are
lower than in the U.S. Their level of total retirement income is relatively low, however, because the social security benefits are the only
source of retirement income in most cases. In contrast, many persons in
the U.S. have private pensions in addition to Social Security benefits, as well as more private savings, home ownership, and so forth.
The total retirement-benefit level in the former Soviet Union is low,
and its policy makers are concerned about the situation. With the
recent horrendous inflation, the purchasing value of benefits has
dropped sharply despite month by month ad hoc adjustments (which
essentially merely raise the minimum pension so that virtually all
beneficiaries receive the same amount).
A surprising development occurred in the social security field in
the Soviet Union in 1988. The former Soviet Union then had only one
insurance company, Gosstrakh, which was owned by the government
(although some individually owned companies now are being established). Gosstrakh sells insurance policies of the standard forms that
life insurance companies in any country sell, although it tends to specialize in short-term endowment policies of five to ten years. These
policies are sold by agents, as in other countries. The premium rates
are determined actuarially, so that all policyholders are paid an
equitable amount, and the system costs the government nothing. The
government probably even makes a profit on it.
In 1988, Gosstrakh began writing individual deferred-annuity
policies, under which individuals could buy a certain unit of monthly
pension (such as ten rubles), beginning at age 60 for men and age 55 for
women. Although these policies were sold by agents, the premiums
were collected through payroll deduction. This was unlike their life
insurance policies, under which agents usually came to the home to
collect premiums.
The basic reason for this new plan, as stated in the decree that
established it, was that social security benefits were too low, particularly for workers at average and higher earnings levels. In this
way, those in this economic category could provide more adequate
retirement incomes for themselves on a voluntary basis.
The premium rates, unlike those for the life insurance policies,
were not established on an actuarial basis. Rather, the premium
rates reflected a considerable government subsidy. Thus, this plan
involved a government policy to increase individual retirement
income, but to have individuals partially pay for it directly.
To an actuary, it seems strange that the same premium rate was
charged for men and women for a given amount of pension that was
deferred for a prescribed number of years in spite of the fact that
9
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women live longer. Further, the premium rate for a woman age x who
received the benefit 30 years later (at age x + 30) was the same as
the premium rate for a man age x + 5 who did not receive the benefit
until age x + 35. A double action was present, which resulted in bargain rates to women because of their favorable mortality and because
of the earlier age at which they received the pension.
The rates were graded actuarially by age at issue, however. If
one bought a benefit of ten rubles a month at retirement age, the premium was much higher if the policy were bought a short time before
retirement age was reached than if a longer period of deferment was
involved.
Considerable interest in the new voluntary-annuity program was
expressed when it began operating in 1988. A reported 400,000 policies were sold in the first year. By 1989, when extensive liberalizations in the social security benefits were proposed by the government,
however, interest in the voluntary annuities plummeted. Thus, most
of the policies were allowed to lapse, and few new policies were
written. An interesting (and amazing) development apparently came
to an end and is unlikely to be resurrected, considering the political
and economic upheaval in the Soviet Union in 1990 to 1991. (This
upheaval also made existing policies virtually worthless as a result
of inflation.)
The dissolution of the Soviet Union into separate independent
nations has created many problems in the social security field.
Whether each of the nations will establish new systems, how such
systems will be funded, how the new nations will divide the old system and its assets, and how they will deal with persons who worked
in different former republics are unresolved questions facing the new
countries of the former Soviet Union.

6 Germany
Germany is experiencing just the opposite situation. But the reunification of Germany, essentially a merger of East Germany into West
Germany, presents many of the same problems in the social security
area. West Germany essentially has absorbed the East Germans into
their social security system and will pay the extra costs involved.
The system for the reunified Germany will be much like (if not
entirely the same as) the previous system for West Germany.
Nonetheless, some transitional problems will be present, particularly
in areas where the East German program provisions were more liberal.

10
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7 Eastern European Countries
The Eastern European countries have problems with their social
security programs that are similar, in some ways, to those in the
former Soviet Union, as well as some uniquely different problems.
Their retirement ages vary by sex and are also very low, which
results in high contribution rates. Unlike the former Soviet Union,
their benefit levels are high, further resulting in high contribution
rates. Their disability experience is high, in part due to loose administration. Coverage compliance has deteriorated as the societies in
Eastern European countries have become freer.
Some economic planners within the Eastern European countriesas well as visiting experts from other nations-seek to privatize, in
whole or in part, their social security programs along the Chilean
line (as discussed later). At the same time, they would like to turn
over to the new system some of the assets of former nationalized
industries and companies. From another point of view, however,
experienced administrators of the social security programs seem to
believe that solutions to their problems can be found within the traditional framework of social insurance.
In any event, it seems likely that the level of benefits under some
of the Eastern European systems will be lowered somewhat. At the
same time, private pension plans (along traditional lines, including
private sector investments) are expected to develop.

8 Saudi Arabia
Let us next go south and east to Saudi Arabia. This country has a
traditional social insurance system, with contribution rates of 8 percent from the employer and 5 percent from the employee. The pension
is related to the individual's most recent salary. Initially there was
a very liberal vesting provision, so that persons who worked just a
few years and then left the country were eligible for a partial pension payable when retirement age was reached.
Many foreign workers come to Saudi Arabia for short periods.
These workers are not only from the United States and Europe, but
from many other countries throughout the world, such as Korea and
the Philippines. In many ways, this liberal treatment for foreign
workers said, in essence, "You'll get a partial retirement pension
when you reach retirement age, which will be sent to you in your
home country, even though you have been out of Saudi Arabia for
some years."

11
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Several years ago, the law was changed. Persons who are not living in Saudi Arabia at the time when they reach retirement age no
longer can obtain these vested pensions. Instead, they receive only a
refund of employee contributions without interest. This has helped
the financing of the Saudi system greatly, because all employer contributions and investment earnings on employee contributions remain
within the system. One difficulty in the Saudi system is tracking the
location of foreign workers over time. As with many social security
systems, when individuals seek benefits, they must go to the system
and ask for them. There are many persons who have worked in Saudi
Arabia over the last 20 or 30 years who may forget that they have
vested pensions coming from the Saudi system when they reach
retirement age. It is unlikely that they have heard that the only
thing that they can receive is the refund of their contributions.

9 People's Republic of China
Our next stop is China. For the 90 percent of its huge population
in rural areas, no national pension system or social security program
exists. For workers in industry, commerce, and government, however,
legislation has required each establishment to set up a pension plan
of a more or less standard type for some years. For example, a steel
mill must have a pension plan for its employees. These pension plans
usually have a retirement age of 60 for men and 55 for women-again,
the problem of unequal treatment by sex-and they pay benefits of
about 70 percent of final wages for a lifetime of employment. The
plans are financed entirely by the employing establishment, completely on a pay-as-you-go (or current-cost) basis. In other words,
there has been no funding (or even establishment of reserves) for persons who currently are retired. Another problem is that individuals
are required to be in service when they reach retirement age. Thus, if
they move from job to job, almost all pension rights are lost.
In the past five years, the Chinese government has been more concerned about matters relating to economic development. The government has decided that the previous employment system (under which
once a person was hired for a job, it was a lifetime one) is not desirable. It now believes that there could be more productivity if there
were freedom of movement from one type of employment to another.
But the difficulty with this change is that pensions often would not
be available because of the lack of vesting.
Another economic development problem is that companies or
establishments that have been operating for many years have a relatively high pension cost because current pensions are paid with cur12
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rent income. A similar establishment that has just begun operations
has no current pension costs and, therefore, can produce at a much
lower cost. Thus, the older establishments are at an economic disadvantage.
The Chinese government is concerned about how pay-as-you-go
financing of private pension plans affects their economic development. As a result, government officials have been thinking about
having a national system to equalize the cost between new and old
establishments. Naturally, the new establishments (and the
provinces where the establishments are mostly new ones) prefer the
status quo because it results in lower costs for them. They do not want
to share the higher pension costs of Shanghai or Beijing. This is currently a difficult political, as well as technical, problem in China.

10 Japan
Next let us turn to Japan, which currently has the lowest mortality in the world (in other words, the greatest longevity). This, in
turn, means high social security and penSion
pension costs. The Japanese government has recognized for some years this coming trend and gradually has increased the minimum retirement ages.
Japan has two national pension systems. One provides flat benefits for the entire general population: not only employees, but also
self-employed persons (farmers, operators of small businesses, and so
forth). The other is an earnings-related program that applies in
manufacturing and commercial industries. In the flat-benefit plan, the
minimum retirement age has been increased to 65 for the normal pension for both men and women, but individuals may retire as early as
age 60 and receive a reduced pension. On the other hand, persons can
retire later, up to age 70, and receive an increased pension.
In the earnings-related plan, the retirement ages at one time were
60 for men and 55 for women, but they are being increased by five
years for women on a gradual transitional basis (reaching age 60 for
those born after April 1, 1941), which eventually will solve the
problem of unequal treatment by sex. The Japanese are concerned
about the relatively low retirement ages; some persons in the government want to increase the age for both men and women to 65 in
order to solve the problem of high cost that will occur as the population ages. Although the government wants to make this change, the
situation is difficult politically. When this change is made, it will
be phased in gradually; at the moment, however, it has been put
aside until some more propitious time when the government hopes
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there will be fewer complaints from both men and women about raising the retirement age.
Another interesting feature in the Japanese system-one that is
surprising and one that the authorities now have become aware ofis the factors that are used to adjust benefit amounts for early and
late retirement in the flat-benefit plan. Decreases are made because
of early retirement and increases because of late retirement.
Despite the technical and actuarial expertise available in Japan,
somebody erred when the adjustment factors were established. For a
person retiring at age 60, the reduction for not waiting until age 65 to
receive benefits should be generally about 30 percent. In the Japanese
plan, however, the reduction is 42 percent, a very bad deal from an
actuarial standpoint. Thus, if persons can avoid filing for benefits at
age 60 and wait until age 65, they are in a much better financial
position. Also, rather surprisingly, there is no graduation in the provision. The factor depends on integral years of age; in other words,
there is only one reduction factor applicable if retirement occurs
between ages 60 and 61, but another smaller factor-35 percentapplies for retirement at age 61. It would seem more reasonable if the
reduction factors moved smoothly from age 60 to age 65, with
monthly changes.
The beneficiaries involved are aware of this situation; almost
everybody takes the benefit at an exact age. The surprising thing is
that so many persons take benefits at age 60. Some undoubtedly have
to because they do not have other resources, but there are many others who would not have to take benefits. Many persons are disadvantaged by not realizing that a bad deal exists!
At the other end of the retirement band, if instead of taking the
benefit at age 65, persons wait until age 70, the actuarial increase
should be 40 percent to 50 percent. In this system, however, this differential is 80 percent. Anybody in good health who had the advice
of an actuary would not take the pension until age 70! In actual experience, very few persons do.

11 Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
Next let us go to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, otherwise known as Micronesia which has a population of about 200,000.
This is a group of islands in the Central Pacific that the United
States received as a trust from the United Nations after World War
II. In 1986, the Trust Territory was divided into four parts, three of
which are now independent nations-the Republic of Palau, the
Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall
14
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Islands. The fourth part, the Northern Mariana Islands, voted to
become part of the United States (just as is Guam, which in essence is
the Southern Mariana Islands).
The Trust Territory established a social security system in 1967 at
the request of the United Nations, which held that a good trustee
should develop a social security system for such a territory. (The
author worked on this project, and the system was established and
operated successfully thereafter.)
When the Trust Territory was divided, a unique problem arose:
how to divide a social security system equitably among different geographical regions. A subdivision was made, and each entity received
an equitable share of the assets (and of the future liabilities, too).
The Northern Mariana Islands system merely joined the U.S. system,
and credit was given for all prior service as though it had been performed in the continental United States. The three new independent
countries started with the existing system, but undoubtedly they will
modify it in the future. Many persons there think that a retirement
age of 60 is too high and they want to lower it. These individuals
may not realize that the long-run high costs of such a move will be
difficult to bear.

12 Canada
Next we come to Canada. One small change made in 1991 greatly
affected the underlying philosophy of its social security system.
Canada, like the United Kingdom, has two plans. One is called Old
Age Security, under which a flat amount is payable to every person in
the country age 65 or older who meets certain residence and citizenship requirements. The other is an earnings-related system, called
the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan. The combination of these two plans
produces a weighted-benefits structure, just as prevails in the U.S.
system. With the flat benefit and an earnings-related benefit, lower
paid persons receive relatively higher benefits than do higher paid
ones. The combined level of benefits in Canada is about the same as
that in the U.s.
U.S.
The small change in Canadian policy was made considering only
budget effects and not the long-range social effects. The government
introduced what some persons refer to as the Claw-Back. This is analogous to a lobster clawing money back!
Under this provision, individuals with moderately high income,
roughly C$50,000 a year or more, must return part of the flat pension.
This provision is to be phased in over several years. After some
years, the benefit under the Old Age Security system will not be
15
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available to the highest income Canadians. The income limit at
which this applies is only partially indexed; as time goes by, more
persons will be affected by the provision. The system will become
more a public assistance (or social assistance) system instead of a
social insurance or demogrant program. This has been a significant
change in the philosophy of the Canadian system. It is not clear
whether the change was intentional.

13 Chile
The new Chilean system, which was established in 1981,
involves privatization and individual defined-contribution accounts
that are determined in real terms (Le., indexed for inflation). It represents one of the most interesting and important developments in
social security in the last decade or so. Many countries around the
world-not just North, Central, and South American countries, but
also some European countries-are interested in this emerging pension
system.
Many observers do not realize that the system involves mores
than privatized individual accounts. The government also must make
mammoth transfer payments from general revenues to meet the cost of
prior service credits and large minimum-benefit guarantees. Further,
much of the investments of the private funds are in government bonds,
which probably were issued to meet the foregoing costs-a circular
effect! Although this large cost to the government might be acceptable in Chile (which would have had equally high, or even larger,
costs under its previous system), this might not be acceptable in other
countries.
The Chilean system is now 12 years old, and it seems to be operating well. A cautious actuary must say, "Twelve years is a short
time in the life of any sort of pension plan." Not that any catastrophe is likely to occur, but its experience may not be as favorable as
its supporters anticipate. In particular, the real interest rate earned
by the various privatized funds may not be nearly as high over the
long run as is expected. The purchased annuities would not be as large
as is now anticipated.

14 United States of America
We come finally to the United States. Two major issues are present in its social security program (officially known as the Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance program). One is the controversy
about the so-called retirement earnings test, under which persons who
16
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are at least the normal retirement age (currently 65) but not yet age
70 receive reduced benefits when they have earnings that exceed a
certain limit. If earnings are sufficiently high, all benefits are lost.
The test is not applicable at age 70 and over, and it applies on a
more stringent basis to beneficiaries under the normal retirement age.
When benefits are received in later years, increases are given to
reflect the benefits that are lost, but such increases currently are
lower than those needed to provide actuarial equivalence. In 1993,
such persons can earn up to $10,560 a year and still receive full benefits. But for every $3 of earnings above this limit $1 of benefits is
lost.
A delayed-retirement credit (ORC) is given to individuals who
lose benefits in this way, either because of not claiming benefits or
because benefits are reduced thereby. For persons who reach age 65 in
1992 and 1993, the ORC is 4 percent per year of delay, pro-rated on a
monthly basis. Under present law, the ORC gradually will be raised
until it will reach 8 percent a year (which is about the actuarial
equivalent) for persons who attain the normal retirement age in 2009
(then age 66). In other words, a person who then does not take benefits at the normal retirement age of 66 and waits until age 70 gets a
32 percent increase. This is about the same increase that a private
insurance company would give under similar circumstances to a person
who buys an annuity.
This test is unpopular with many persons. Critics say that it discourages persons from working and that, therefore, it is undesirable
because work incentives are reduced. For many years, the author was
a strong supporter of this test, under the simple but logical principle
that retirement pensions should not be paid to persons who are not
retired. After long deliberation about this matter and looking closely
at the experience, it became evident that persons who had earnings
of anywhere from about 50 percent to 150 percent of the average wage
(currently, about $23,000 a year) receive little in their take-home
pay if they continue working after age 65. Of course, for highly paid
professionals who earn $100,000 or more per year, this is a different
matter. But persons who earn $12,000 to $35,000 a year have great
disincentives to work because the net additional income in their
pockets from working is so small.
Therefore, it is clear that something should be done about this
provision. The test should be eliminated for persons who are above
the normal retirement age (currently 65), but under age 70, although
they still should receive larger benefits if they continue working and
do not collect benefits. They should receive 8 percent more per year in
their eventual benefits under such circumstances. It is true that this
17
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change would result in higher program costs, but only with respect to
persons who attain the normal retirement age before 2008. (This is a
low cost period for the program.) When measured over the long
range, the average increase in cost is small (and can be met in several
ways, none being especially painful-for example a temporary
increase in the maximum taxable earnings base or, when changing the
financing to a pay-as-you-go basis, not reducing the payroll-tax rates
in the next two decades as much).
Next consider briefly the current financial situation of the U.S.
Social Security program. Some say that it is going bankrupt, that it
is in terrible financial condition, etc. Many in the United States
think so, because they have heard or read about it somewhere. It is
difficult to correct such misinformation. The program did have severe
financial problems in the early 1980s, but these have been solved
reasonably well.
At the end of 1992 the trust-fund balance was $331 billion; this is
almost equal to one year's benefit outgo. The trust fund is building
rapidly, some $60 billion to $70 billion a year in the next few years
and increasingly larger amounts for the next 15 years. From the shortrange standpoint, the system is financially strong. But, as stated previously, one has to look beyond 20 years, because that is a short time
in the life of a social insurance or pension program. Under the present
method of financing, a large fund balance will be built over the next
three decades according to the intermediate cost estimate in the 1993
Trustees Report. And it will reach a level of about $5 trillion in
about 30 years. After then, however, it will decrease rapidly. In
another ten years, it will be exhausted.
In the long run (after the year 2035), the system will have financial problems according to the current estimates under the intermediate assumptions. These can be solved at some time in the future,
either by raising the contribution rates somewhat or by raising the
normal retirement age (or both). There already has been a move in
the latter direction. The normal retirement age slowly will increase
under current law from the present age 65 (which has been in effect in
the 56 years of operation of the system), beginning in 2003, to age 67
in 2027. An increase even to age 68 would have a significant financial
effect.
The difficulty with the financing procedure for the U.S. system is
that it is faulty in building a large fund and then drawing it down.
Also-at least in this type of program and in the prevailing political process-building a large fund is undesirable. This may seem a
strange thing for an actuary to say! Usually, if one is the actuary for
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a pension plan, it would seem that the more money that one has, the
better is the situation.
In this case, three good reasons exist why the procedure of building a large fund is undesirable. First, under the manner in which the
federal budget is reported, the enormity of the deficit is hidden, to
some extent, by the annual excesses of income over outgo of the trust
funds. Second, the ready availability of these excesses for general
purpose borrowing by the federal government could cause Congress and
the executive branch to be less frugal than would be the case if borrowing were necessary from the private marketplace. Third, the
mammoth size of the fund could cause irresistible pressures from the
beneficiaries to overliberalize current benefits, thereby creating
insupportable long-range costs.
Nonetheless, the amount of the present fund balance is needed as
a contingency reserve in case an economic recession occurs. That balance (about one year's outgo) probably would get the system through
any sort of business recession, even though income to the trust funds
may be smaller than currently is projected.
The program has two trust funds, the Old-Age and Survivors
Insurance Trust Fund and the Disability Insurance Trust Fund. These
two funds usually are considered in combination when the financial
status of the program is analyzed. The current estimates
(intermediate) indicate that the combined funds will be exhausted in
2036, with the OASI fund lasting until 2044, but the DI fund only
until 1995. This is not a significant problem, however, because the
allocation of the OASDI tax rate can be changed slightly-as has
been done several times in the past-to show both funds being
exhausted at about the same time. Such reallocation would not have
any effect on the taxes paid by workers and employers in the aggregate.
The foregoing discussion has not related to the Medicare program,
which consists of hospital insurance (HI) and supplementary medical
insurance (SMI). The former is financed by payroll taxes on almost
the same persons as OASDI covers, while the latter is financed by
premiums on the enrolled beneficiaries and by general revenues
(which currently bear 75 percent of the cost). The HI program is
estimated to have financial difficulties in the next ten years, its
trust fund being exhausted in 1999 under the intermediate estimate.
The SMI program rates are established in the law for years through
1995 at an apparently more than adequate level, and thereafter they
can be adjusted by promulgations of the executive branch on the basis
of experience.
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Although the HI program has great financing problems over the
long range, so too does the diverse health insurance system for the
working population and its dependents. The solution to both sets of
problems must be found simultaneously, perhaps by a radical change
in the method of financing health care (which could mean the elimination of the Medicare program by the substitution of a universal system).
The solution to the foregoing problem of roller-coaster financing of
the OASDI program is to change to responsible pay-as-you-go financing. Such a procedure was followed from the mid-1950s until the 1977
amendments. For more details on this matter, see Myers (1989).
The change to pay-as-you-go financing could be accomplished by
lowering immediately the combined employer/employee tax rate by 1
percent for the next ten to fifteen years and then having the rate
slowly increase over the years. Ultimately, the rate would have to
be about 5 percent above the present 12.4 percent rate-just as would
be necessary under present law after the trust funds are exhausted. As
an alternative to such higher ultimate rates, the benefit costs could
be reduced (e.g., by increasing the normal retirement age more than is
provided for under present law). For more details on pay-as-you-go
financing and its advantages, see Myers (1991).
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On Becoming a Cost Effective Company
Robert D. Shapiro 1 and Barton H. Clennon 2

Abstract
The 1990s financial services environment requires each life company to identify its
distinct capabilities and competitive strengths and to build its future direction from
these features. This demands a fundamental rethinking of traditional approaches to
planning, organization, and financial management.
Key words and phrases: visio11, quality, competitive adva11tages

1 Introduction
The realities of the 1990s operating environment have become
painfully evident to life insurance company executives. The often-conflicting demands for strength, capital, service, and attractive prices
are here to stay. Future survival requires the full complement of
financial solidity, quality service, controlled expenses, and competitive prices. The increasing emphasis on full value requires that these
factors be perceived favorably from the eyes of customers and agents
and not merely reflect the hopes of management.
Because most life companies currently have expense levels that
exceed pricing assumptions and have had expense excesses for many
years, fundamental organizational structuring is necessary.
Whether such cost management and organizational restructuring
initiatives destroy or enhance a company's value and long-term soundness depends largely on the strength of three factors:

1 Robert D. Shapiro, FSA, CLU is president of The Shapiro Network, Inc. which was
formed in 1987. Mr. Shapiro has been a consultant and investment banker to the
insurance industry since 1965. He has extensive experience in strategic management,
mergers and acqUisitions, and financial management.
2 Barton H. Clennon, FSA, MAAA is president of Clennon and Associates, Inc. Mr.
Clennon was a partner in Milliman and Robertson, Inc., an international consulting
actuarial firm. He has considerable experience in life insurance company financial
reporting, appraisals,
apprai~a.l~, and mergers. His present interest is in life insurance company
mergers ana acqUisItions.
acquisitions.
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Cost Effective Companies

Vision;
Fit; and
Commitment.

2 Articulating the Vision
Every successful company needs a clear vision, i.e., a picture of
what it wants to become. Corporate vision must focus the company's
limited capital and human resources in a manner that exploits the
company's strengths and competitive potentials, emphasizes its commitment to quality and to success, and energizes its employees.
Vision is a "concrete description of where the company should be
in five to ten years" (Shapiro, 1992). This definition emphasizes
painting a picture, clear enough for all employees, agents, and competitors to see, of how the company will look after the company
implements its plans. It provides a consistent framework within
which all employees can make critical strategic and organizational
decisions.
How will the vision shape a company's cost management
approach? First, it determines where and how the company must
compete. This determines required price levels, which, in turn, drive
allowable expenses. To compete and meet targeted profit goals, the
company must shape its organization and related costs to live within
the defined allowable expenses.

3 Fitting Company Capabilities
Each company needs to fit its skills and capabilities with the
requirements of its vision and related product/service commitments.
Different companies have the potential to excel at different things.
For example, one company may emphasize innovative product/service
features, while another may stress financial strength and safe, predictable returns. Each point of emphasis may demand different capabilities and management approaches, however, and may be valued by
customers and agents in different ways. These differences in turn
determine the specific level of expense that can be covered in prices.
If the vision is underpinned by special capabilities that provide
distinct competitive advantages, the required value-added pricing
(and related expense allowances) can be defined and tracked. To warrant the value-added pricing and costing required to reimburse the
company for maintaining special capabilities, customers must appreciate these capabilities sufficiently to be willing to pay for them.
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4 Commitment to Quality and Success
Although most insurers would argue that they have a strong commitment to quality and success, few have institutionalized this commitment. For example, quality efforts and rhetoric often are reflected
in narrowly conceived projects with at best a temporary impact (much
like many strategic planning retreats, mission definition sessions, and
culture enhancement workshops!).
What does it mean to be committed to quality and success and to
the related organizational focus needed to maximize marketing and
service effectiveness and minimize costs? First, board level buy-in to
the effort is essential to establish needed actions as long-term
requirements that transcend current managerial personnel and
employee agendas. Second, performance standards must be changed at
all levels (Le., corporate, unit, and individual employee levels).
New performance standards (and consistently modified performance
appraisal and compensation practices) send loud and clear messages
that what is important has changed! Each employee ultimately will
change what (and how) he or she does as it becomes clear what is
important.
Commitment, like the definition of special capabilities, needs to
be linked to vision. Without such linkage, there is no consistent
framework for defining quality and managing the commitment to it.
The result will be a shallow implementation program that will have
limited impact and likely will disappear after a while.
When the vision linkage is present, the focus of commitment is to
excel in the special capabilities that drive vision achievement. No
company can be the best there is in all areas. Each has to establish
its basis of competition and the core of its quality efforts based on
the capabilities that can differentiate the firm in the marketplace.

5 Effective Expense Reduction
The narrow, meat-ax approach of many expense reduction actions
taken by insurers in recent years has provided only painful, shortterm fixes. Lost morale and paranoia may paralyze companies from
doing the right things after the temporarily removed bloat returns.
The insurance literature is filled with comparisons of ratios of
expenses to premium bases and ratios of expenses to the number of
policies in force and unit costs. Although interesting and occasionally
informative, these numbers provide life companies with little direction about the appropriate level of expenses and how to reduce costs
to this level.
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Horror stories of 10 percent to 20 percent across-the-board expense
cut programs abound in the insurance industry. Because these expense
cuts are generally arbitrary (and are perceived to be arbitrary),
employee morale typically plunges and paralysis sets in as cuts are
implemented. Productivity drops. Soon the company needs to fix some
things to get the growth they seek. Staff is added, often in the same
areas where it originally was cut. Costs rise, and the same competitive pressures that led to the original staff cuts reappear. A consultant is hired, expense cuts again are recommended ... and the cycle
repeats.
Expenses cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. The framework for
reducing expenses must encompass broader planning, financial, and
pricing issues. The framework must be linked to the corporate vision
to be understood and accepted by employees. Only within this
broader framework can expenses be reduced without damaging the
company and with an expectation that the reduced expense levels can
be maintained.
The framework for effective expense reduction requires that the
insurance company first:

•

•
•
•

Establish clear, consistent profit and surplus objectives;
Define target markets, distribution, and products/services;
Identify future (not past) key competitors and how the company
intends to compete against them; and
Agree on the required level of price competitiveness and related
sales expectations over the next four to five years.

Once this framework is clarified, the company's allowable expenses
can be defined and the organization can be reshaped to provide the
required service within established expense standards. Normally a
one to three year period is required to migrate from the existing
expense infrastructure to a new one. The costs of organizational
reengineering and related investments in new capabilities are key
reasons why actual expenses will run in excess of allowable expenses
for a period of time.

6 An Expense Model
Every company must balance what it spends against the price customers/agents are willing to pay for the company's products and services. An insurance company's expenses can be considered in this way:
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TABLE 1
Total Insurance Company Expenses

The shaded areas represent expenses that must be eliminated by the
company for expenses to cover prices. Stated another way, an insurance company only can afford to spend on extra services what customers and agents are willing to pay for such services. There are some
costs such as regulatory compliance, of course, that may not be appreciated by customers and agents but that can not be eliminated. These
costs generally would be mandated for all insurance companies and
hence would be reflected in expenses of a low cost insurance company.
Although this broad analysis may seem obvious, it is difficult to
identify and cost the specific value-added services that are provided
by the company. Insurance companies typically analyze costs at
department or function levels and not by process or task. Further, most
companies continue to define what they do without substantial analysis of what customers and agents really want and need. Hence, the
data needed to determine and eliminate the cost of unappreciated
extra services provided by the company are not available.
Nonetheless, each company needs to push its way through this
exercise as best it can. While this value-added quantification and
analysis is being developed, those existing tasks and operations that
are ineffective or duplicative can be eliminated. Hence, the expense
reduction process can achieve some immediate successes while the
reQuctions is being established.
foundation for more fundamental requctions

7 Refocusing the Organization
It is difficult, if not impossible, to reach full potential in providing valued service without a clear vision of what the company wants
to be. A coherent vision will articulate target markets, expected key
competitors, required financial standards (e.g., price levels and
allowable expenses), and desired operating approaches. The vision
also will define activities that must be accomplished in order for the
company to be successful.
An insurance company's organizational structure must be reshaped
to focus on these critical activities. New priorities and new employee
by employee daily agendas must be established. Activities that are
not consistent with the vision must be eliminated.
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For example, let's say the vision demands that the company be
the leader in serving the insurance needs of small employers. Assume
further that the company historically has organized its operations in
life, annuity, health, and group segments. The vision undoubtedly
places great value on activities that will capture and serve small
employers. It likely devalues other activities that fit the historical
operation segmentation (such as stockbroker sales promotions within
the annuity line) but that are not within the concentrated focus of
the small employer vision. Similarly, many activities that historically were developed within one or more of the life, annuity, health,
or group segments need to be reconceived and streamlined within the
new vision.
Reshaping operations to provide targeted, quality products and
services demands clear articulation of where the company must have
the highest quality to achieve the vision. Each current activity
should be analyzed by asking the following questions:

•
•
•
•

•
•
•

•

Is the activity essential to the role of the unit in which it is
being performed? Are the unit and the activity vision consistent?
Could the frequency, scope, or precision of the activity be reduced
without a significant negative impact on the ability to manage or
operate?
Could the company eliminate, simplify or move all or part of the
activity?
Could the company reduce the cost of performing the activity?
Could the company improve control methods?
Are functions and activities grouped in the most effective way,
given the stated vision?
Are jobs designed for efficient performance of assigned tasks?
Who pays for the activity, e.g., existing policyholders, future
policyholders, surplus, etc.?

8 An Example
Let's take a simple example. Assume we have a life insurance
company (ABC Life) that writes only $100,000 face amount life
insurance policies, each with an annual premium of $1,000. Assume
further that ABC Life has 100,000 policies in force, writes 20,000 new
policies per year, incurs noncommission expenses of $20 million per
year, prices for noncommission expenses using $500 per policy first
year and $50 per policy in renewal years, and has clear profit and
surplus goals.
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The annual expenses allowed by current prices in the current year
amount to $15,000,000 (Le., 100,000 x $50 + 20,000 x $500). Hence,
ABC Life's noncommission expenses are running 133 percent (Le.,
$20,000,000 + $15,000,000) of the expenses allowed for in its pricing ...
or $5,000,000 per year of excess expenses.
What can ABC Life do? Three of its options are:
1.

Increase prices to allow for 33 percent more in expense. For example, the prices could be increased to allow for $668 per policy
First year and $67 in renewal years. Issues include:
• Will prices still be competitive enough to write 20,000 new
policies each year?
• Can existing policyholders be charged $67/policy? If so, will
they continue their policies if their price is Increased?
2. Cut 25 percent of expenses (from $20 million per year to $15 million per year). Issues include:
• How and where should the expenses be cut?
• Can servicing and support activities be maintained at a high
enough level to keep customers and agents happy (and persistent)?
3. Sell more business. If ABC Life can get to where it writes 27,000
policies a year and has 135,000 policies in force, its current pricing expense allowance would provide over $20 million per year
(133,000 x $50 + 27,000 x $500).
How should ABC Life proceed? Many companies make a judgment
to take one (or a combination) of these options, relying more on hope
than solid action plans that customers will continue to buy, expenses
can be cut, and/
or more sales can be developed. The demands of
and/or
today's complex marketplace will require proactive, well-planned
actions even in companies that have a track record of success.
History tells us that hope rarely brings success. During the 1980s
the majority of life companies had general expenses that were in
excess of those allowed in their pricing. Many of these companies
embarked on one or more plans to bring expenses in line with allowables, yet most of these plans failed to meet expectations. The main
reason for failure was that extrapolated growth and/ or cost reduction
projections. were not realistic in an environment characterized by
intense competition, increasing capital pressure, and proliferating
regulatory and administrative demands.
Given the above options, the place for ABC Life to begin is at
the intersection of ABC Life corporate potential with the opportunities and realities of the expected future financial services marketplace. Where can or should ABC Life compete? Who will its com27
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petitors be? What price levels will be required in this market? How
much money will these required prices allow ABC Life to spend? To
answer this last question, ABC Life must make a judgment about the
anticipated relationship between price (and related expense allowabIes) and sales levels to determine specific price and sales objectives.
Once the target price and sales levels are established, the allowable expenses are determined. Let's hypothesize that ABC Life's
analysis determines that:
•
•

•

Its vision requires it to keep its prices at current levels. Hence,
current expense allowances need to be maintained;
By refocusing its marketing and product approaches to be consistent with its vision, it can write 25,000 new policies per year
(with inforce stabilizing at 125,000 policies per year in five
years); and
Current expenses would be reduced from $20,000,000 per year to
$16,100,000 per year if the organization were reshaped to eliminate inefficiencies and support modified operations more effectively. It will take three years to reshape the organization,
however.

A (simplified) five year quantification of ABC Life's new future
expectations might look like this:
TABLE 2
ABC Life's Five Year Future Expectations

(1 )

Year
1
2
3
4
5

(2)

Expected
Policies
Inforce
New
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000
25,000

105,000
110,000
115,000
120,000
125,000

(3)

(4)

Allowable
Expenses

Actual
Expenses'

$17,750,000
18,000,000
18,250,000
18,500,000
18,750,000

$19,200,000
18,400,000
17,600,000
18,100,000
18,600,000

(5)
Excess of Actual
Over Allowable
Expenses
(4) - (3)
$1,450,000
400,000

to,ooOl

400,000
150,000)

•'A
A simplified approximation reflecting potential basic cost reductions, re-engineering costs, and
inflation.

ABC Life expects to bring its expenses in line with prices and
sales within three years. Current inflation expectations will create
another expense deficiency after five years, however, unless something else is adjusted. ABC Life may have to wait a year or two to
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reexamine the results of its restructuring and changes in the competitive environment for additional ideas.

9 Conclusion
The 1990s require that each life company look deep into its corporate soul to find its distinct key to future success. Shallow pricing and
sales gimmicks will not work and can undermine or destroy a company
quickly.
Few companies can afford to dissipate value (which is equivalent
to capital). Unless a direction can be sculpted that is anchored in a
company's special capabilities and aligned with the realities of the
competitive marketplace, the company runs an unacceptable risk of
self destruction. For most companies, a fundamental rethinking and an
approach to planning, organization, and financial management similar to that described in this article are necessary for long-term financial health and viability.
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The Process of Pension Forecasting
Michael Sze*

Abstract
This paper explains the process of pension forecasting. It discusses the common
purposes and uses of pension forecasts, the major steps involved, and the principal limitations of these forecasts.
Some insights into each stage of the forecasting process are provided. Among the
stages discussed are: the background research to be performed; the selection of scenario
assumptions; shortcuts used in the actual performance of the forecast; review of the
forecast results; and communication of the forecast findings.
Key words and phrases: projection, simulation, stochastic modeling, scenario

1 Introduction
Funding retirement obligations has become a significant part of
corporate financing. It is not unusual for a plan providing rich retirement benefits with indexation or one with substantial unfunded past
service liability to require an annual contribution in excess of 15 percent of payroll. The unfunded liabilities of some companies' pension
programs are equal to a sizable portion of their net worth. Union
negotiation settlements hinge more and more on pension agreements.
As a result, many companies include a pension forecast 1 in their regular financial planning process.
The responsibility for providing such a pension forecast typically
is delegated to the actuary. Most actuaries are familiar with the
* Michael Sze is a Fellow of both the Society of Actuaries and the Canadian Institute
of Actuaries. He received his Ph.D. degree in mathematics from the Ohio State
University and currently is a partner of Hewitt Associates. He is the chair of the
Society of Actuaries Retirement Systems Research Committee, as well as a member of
the Canadian Institute of Actuaries Investment Practice Committee. While the author
takes full responsibilitY' for any errors in this article, he would like to acknowledge,
with gratitude, the valuable comments provided by Ms. Rita Lawlor, Ms. Milena
Francia, Ms. Megan Duke, and Mrs. Elsie Sze in the preparation of this article, as well
as many helpful suggestions by the referees.
1 The terms projection and forecast are used interchangeably in this paper and in the
pension actuarial literature in general.

31

Michael Sze

Pension Forecasting

basic mathematics involved in a pension forecast because of their
training and education. Many inexperienced actuaries, however, are
not familiar with the actual process of a pension forecast. In fact,
some pension valuation actuaries actually have difficulties making
forecasts, primarily due to the fact that they do not fully recognize
the difference in emphasis between an actuarial valuation and a
forecast. The former focuses on the present; its aim is to provide an
accurate assessment of the funded status and cost of a pension plan
under the current legal and accounting environments. The latter is
directed toward the future trend of pension costs under varying economic or demographic scenarios.
The consequence of not understanding the forecasting process fully
can be costly. At best, the actuary may have difficulty explaining
the cause and effect of some economic variables. At worst, faulty
assumptions or logic can lead to erroneous conclusions with detrimental effects to the company. Because there are many variables
involved in the process, there is a real danger that errors often are
not detected until the damage has been done.
The purpose of this paper is to share some of my experiences in
pension forecasting, to provide some insights regarding the process,
and to point out some possible pitfalls. Because of the complex nature
of a pension forecast, it is impossible to cover every possible situation. This article, however, can be used to assist in more diligent
planning of each forecast; it is not a cookbook to be followed in every
step of the process. Readers are assumed to be familiar with the
basic techniques and mathematics of the projection process.2
This article is organized into six sections, each of which is
briefly described below.
•

•

•

Preparation for a Forecast: This section discusses the major considerations and background research that must be performed
before embarking on the forecast. Most problems confronted in
pension projection originate from insufficient preparation;
Choice of Scenario Assumptions: This section covers some basic
considerations underlying the choice of scenario assumptions.
These assumptions represent management's best guess of future
economic events. Sucl,. assumptions control the projected results
and must reflect the principal objective of the projection;
Performing the Forecast: This section discusses the choice of the
projection method. The purpose and needs of the sponsor determine the scope of the forecast;

2 Readers interested in the details of the pension forecasting process may refer to
Lorisz (1993), Sze (1997), or Schnitzer (1977).
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Review of Forecast Results: This section proposes a criterion for
making such a judgment and provides some -hints on the review
process. It sometimes requires a lot of experience and intuition to
Judge whether forecast results are reasonable;
Communication of Forecast Findings: Forecasting is as much an
educational process as a technical process. Forecast findings are of
no use unless they are understood. This section provides some
insights on the communication of the projection results; and
Other Considerations: This section compares the forecasting and
actuarial valuation processes and outlines some limitations of
forecasting.

2 Preparation for a Forecast
The importance of preparation cannot be overemphasized. Even
the most experienced actuary must have on hand a detailed preparation of what he or she plans to accomplish with the forecast. A
detailed preparation should consider: (1) the purpose of the forecast;
(2) the sponsor, the industry, and the economic environment; (3) the
demographics of the population; (4) the pension plan, the valuation
methods, and the actuarial assumptions; and (5) past plan experience
and the funded status of the plan.

2.1 Purpose of the Forecast
Unlike funding and expensing valuations which are required by
governmental regulations, there are no legal or accounting rules
requiring pension projections. The request to perform a pension projection study usually originates from plan sponsors who need answers to
specific questions concerning their pension plans. Before the actuary
begins the study, it is important that he or she knows what those
questions are and the reasons for the questions. Knowing the purpose
of the forecast will lead to a better understanding of the sponsor's
funding and expensing expectations and the sponsor's risk tolerance.
An integral part of the forecast is the testing of the achievability of
the sponsor's objectives under legal, accounting, and economic constraints. Understanding the sponsor's expectations and risk tolerance
also will provide guidance on the choice of scenario assumptions, the
scope of the study, and the best way to communicate the forecast's
findings.
The emphasis of a forecast depends a great deal on its purpose. A
forecast that is part of the regular corporate financial planning process may have as its goal one of the following: (1) to determine the
stability of pension contributions and expenses; (2) to devise funding
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and investment strategies that will minimize unexpected fluctuations
in contributions and expenses; or (3) to devise an asset/liability
matching strategy to minimize undesirable deterioration in the
funded status of the plan.
A few examples may illustrate some of the considerations
involved:
•

•

Downsizing: In a downsizing operation, the forecast should
anticipate significant aging of the group, the possibility of an
employer-initiated early retirement program, and a decrease in
population size. The chance of plan terminations typically cannot
be ruled out. There is a need to monitor the risk of having to fund
the entire plan deficiency over a short period of time. The alternatives that should be considered are amortization and bond
immunization. 3 In one such study, a sponsor had to consider the
impact of the timing of plan termination after a downsizing process. Figure 1 shows the funding impact of plan termination in
different years, assuming that plan termination deficiency is
amortized over five years. It further demonstrates that the funding pattern is practically the same (except the incidence of payments), irrespective of the timing of the plan termination decision. The actuary in this case was instructed to monitor interest
rates for the sl?onsor. An annuity contract was placed at an opportune time whIch allowed the sponsor to save millions of dollars
on the plan termination cost;
Changing Employment Pattern: As a result of the demographic
pattern of aging shown in the United States and Canada, many
retail companies have experienced a significant shift in hiring
patterns. Companies often want to know the impact of such demographic changes on future pension costs. In such a study, the
emphasis must be to balance the need for adequate retirement
benefits for the employees with the need for staole pension contributions and expense for the employer. The alternatives that
should be considered are plan design changes (such as a change
from a defined benefit plan to a defined contribution plan) and
funding basis changes (such as changes in retirement age and
turnover assumptions). The scenario assumptions used must reflect
age and sex distributions of new employees as well as more realistic pay and termination patterns for these employees.
In the early 1980s, a major department store expected that
new hires would be substantially older and would include a
larger percentage of females. Many of the new hires would be the
secondary wage earner of the family and might net be as careeraggressive as were previous employees. A forecast study was
commissioned to study the pension cost impact of these
demographic changes as well as to suggest alternative plan
designs. The plan had a sizable funding surp1us, so the contribu-

3 Readers interested in the theory and application of bond immunization should see
Redington (1952), Tilley (1980), and Bader (1983).
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Figure 1
XYZ Corporation Retirement Plan Impact of Shutdown
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•

•

ion pattern was not a major concern. The cost considerations were
directed to the trend of pension expense as a percentage of payroll. The study analyzed the net cost increase after taking into
account the offsetting impact of aging, a more moderate rate of
salary increases, and a higher turnover rate. The expense increase
was moderate and was considered to be manageable by the plan
sponsor. The defined contribution alternative, while helpful in
stabilizing pension cost, was considered to be too drastic and was
deemed to provide unsatisfactory retirement income for employees. In the end, no major plan design changes were made. There
were, however, some changes in actuarial valuation assumptions
to reflect more realistic expectations of salary progression and
turnover pattern;
Financial Planning to Stabilize Pension Expenses: Financial
Accounting Standard No. 87 requires that the discount rate used
to determine pension liabilities and service cost must be based on
the current market interest rate. Plan sponsors feel vulnerable to
unpredictable shifts in economic situations, especially given the
volatility of market interest rates in recent years. Also, the fluctuating Investment returns of pension funds add to the uncertainty
of the pension cost. A forecasting study may be ordered to determine a stable projected pension expense trend. The alternatives
considered tYEically include asset/liability matching. Numerous
other articles have covered asset/liability matching and immunization. 4
Many forecasts have been prompted by investment advisors.
The actuary is asked to provide the liability and cash flow
trends of the pension fund. A forecast is performed to test investment policies against the deterministic liability:
liabilit:~T trend in order to
find the investment mix that best protects the surplus of the
plan. These forecasts often result in a recommendation for a
higher investment concentration in bonds.
This approach to projection misses the interplay between
assets and liabilities. A detailed stochastic projection involving
both assets and liabilities (usually referred to as asset/liability
modeling) will tend to produce substantially different results. For
example, an inflationary environment will impact both wage
increases and investment returns simultaneously. Only an
asset/liability modeling process will be able to capture the correlated events between assets and liabilities; see Beekman (1980),
Redington (1952), and Tilley (1980); and
Postretirement Medical Benefits Forecast: Many companies are
interested in investigating the immediate and continuing impact
of FAS 106 rules. These rules require companies to book liabilities
and expenses for postretirement medical and other benefits.
Because of the scarCity of background information, many attempts

4 A discussion of asset/liability matching and immunization is beyond the scope of
this article. For more information on this topic, see Beekman (1980), Tilley (1980), and
Redington (1952). For more on immunization and how it may help to stabilize pension
cost, see Daskais and LeSueur (1983) and Sze (1993).
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to forecast the impact of FAS 106 have been performed that treat
the postretirement medical benefit payments
pay'ments as a stream of escalating annuity payments during the life of the beneficiaries, with
the escalation reflecting medical inflation. The present value of
these payments usually is determined by using expected investment returns and the mortality and termination decrements used
in pension valuations. Other considerations usually include alternative expensing bases and benefit designs. s
There are two potential flaws to forecasts performed in the
manner described in the last paragraph. First, the pattern of
postretirement medical benefit payments is different from that of
an escalating annuity. A major portion of medical expenses are
incurred during the last few years of a person's life; see Riley and
Lubitz (1989).6 Second, the present value calculations in many
FAS 106 projections are based on mortality and termination rates
used in pension valuations. Mortality rates used in a pension valuation often overstate actual experience, while termination rates
typically understate actual experience. Such discrepancies may
have a significant impact on the liability and service costs calculated. 7
Aside from the flaws in many FAS 106 studies, the forecast
results still may present valuable information to plan sponsors.
After the initial shock of the drastic cost impact of providing
these benefits, many plan sponsors would explore other plan
design alternatives such as requiring employee contributions,
establishing maximum benefit limits, or replacing welfare benefits by additional pension benefits.
Advance funaing of this obligation may be considered.
Funding alternatives often investigated include funding through
the pension plan based on Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section
401(h) or establishing a separate trust under IRC Section 501(c)9.
Under some restrictive conditions, IRC Section 401(h) allows
funding of such postretirement health benefits in a pension plan.
IRC Section 501(c)9 allows prefunding of welfare benefits under
limited conditions; see Hess, Becker, and Snyder (1991) and Kra
and Resse (1992). Expensing alternatives include immediate
recognition of past service liability or amortizing this liability
over the expected future service of the employees.
The above examples illustrate the need for the forecast to reflect
the purpose of study. It is important to note that because each project
is initiated to address a specific problem, the actuary should provide
S For more on funding postretirement medical benefits, see Roccas, Sobel, and Ullman
(1990) and Veach, Cotter, and Meyers (1992).
6 Further research is needed to determine the actual pattern of payments and the
impact of the proper cost attribution. Studies in these areas are currently being
unaertaken by the Society of Actuaries.
7 See Vaughn (1992) for more on realistic termination experience.
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not only an explanation of the cause and effect of the issue in question, but also alternatives for solving the problem. It is this last
requirement that makes a forecasting study more challenging to the
actuary and valuable to the sponsor than a regular funding or expensing valuation.

2.2 Sponsor, Industry, and Economic Environment
Forecasting studies never are performed in a vacuum. They are
performed in the context of other economic events. A trend of escalating pension costs may be tolerable for a utility company. The rates
that a utility company charges its consumers typically are fixed on a
cost-pIus-margin basis. Thus, any increase in operating cost is passed
to the consumers. On the other hand, the same cost trend may be
detrimental to a manufacturing company undergoing severe downsizing in a recessionary economic environment. In such an economic
climate, the revenue is limited by price competition. Severe downsizing, however, typically entails sizable escalation in pension cost.
Before beginning a projection study of a pension plan, it is important to understand the financial strength of the plan sponsor, as well
as the significance of the pension cost in the operating budget of the
company. A company with ample resources may be able to tolerate
more fluctuation in the pension cost, so the funding time horizon may
be longer. Thus, the goal may be to achieve the most favorable longterm financial results, even if it means taking more risks in the
interim. On the other hand, for a company with limited resources or
whose pension cost is a significant portion of its total budget, care
must be taken to ensure acceptability at each forecast year. An unexpectedly high cost at any point may be unacceptable to the company,
requiring immediate management attention, which often results in
funding and/ or investment changes. The constraints for such a forecast
are much tighter, and results for each forecast year must be examined
carefully.
It is important to understand the business of the plan sponsor.
This often dictates the hiring, promotion, and termination patterns of
the company. Knowledge of the industry in which the plan sponsor
operates provides insights into the growth or retrenchment pattern of
the overall employee population, as well as the volatility of such a
pattern. Such knowledge determines the choice of demographic scenario assumptions.
Many forecasts are commissioned when the sponsor has a problem
that needs addressing. Often these forecasts are performed in times of
economic downturn. The future economic outlook is critical is assessing
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a plan sponsor's tolerance for cost fluctuations. For a plan sponsor
with a severe cash flow constraint, it is of paramount importance
that the forecast addresses both the current economic outlook and the
consequence of further economic downturn.

2.3 Demographics of the Population
The demographics of the employee population determine not only
the current year's cost of the pension plan, they also dictate the
future retirement and termination patterns of the plan. Where the
cash flow forecast is critical, a careful study of the demographics of
the current employee population is vital. Furthermore, a less mature
employee population does not have as much pending pension obligation as a more mature population and may have greater tolerance for
economic fluctuations. A careful study of the population demographics provides much insight into the trend of the future costs of
the plan.

2.4 Pension Plan Valuation Methods and Actuarial
Assumptions
The impact of economic factors on the future pension cost depends
on the plan's valuation methods and actuarial assumptions. Thus, it
is important to review these valuation bases before embarking on the
forecasting process. For example, the company's contribution,
expressed as a percentage of salary for a defined contribution plan, is
insensitive to salary changes. The pension cost of a final average
salary defined benefit plan, however, is affected greatly by salary
experience, especially if the pension plan benefit is integrated with
Social Security. The pension cost of a career average salary defined
benefit plan is less volatile with respect to salary experience.
Pension costs under aggregate cost methods are typically less sensitive to the effect of aging populations than are pension costs under
individual cost methods. 8 The entry age cost method (among individual cost methods) tends to provide a more stable cost pattern with
respect to an aging population than does the unit credit cost method.
Unit credit normal cost represents the present value of benefits earned
during the valuation year. As the population ages, the normal cost
escalates. Entry age normal cost represents the average of such nor-

8 For a detailed analysis of pension costs methods, see the texts by Anderson (1990)
and Berin (1989).
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mal costs over the career of the participant. It is more stable relative
to the aging process of the population.
A more aggressive actuarial valuation interest assumption anticipates higher investment returns and thus provides less opportunity
for asset gains. A higher valuation salary scale assumption anticipates higher cost increases due to pay increases and, therefore, provides greater opportunity for pay gains.

2.5 Past Experience and Funded Status of the Pension
Plan
Some economic variables are difficult to predict because their
behavior is independent of the past. Many pension plan variables
(such as turnover and promotion patterns), however, are not independent of past experience and can be projected with a certain degree of
accuracy. A study of past experience of these variables thus provides
valuable information for the future. Overall, ignoring past experience
in a forecast study is likely to lead to worthless results.
Temporary investment and other experience setbacks may be tolerable for plans that have huge funding surpluses. The experience
impact on a plan's funding requirement can be drastic for plans that
are only marginally over funded; therefore, pension forecasts must recognize the funded status in the selection of scenario assumptions.

3 Choice of Scenario Assumptions
Because scenario assumptions control the occurrence of certain key
economic events that may impact future pension cost, the proper
choice of assumptions is vital to the usefulness of the forecast. These
assumptions must echo the purpose of the study, recognize both the
of
plan's and the sponsor's characteristics, and reflect past experience 6f
the plan.
The choice of scenario assumptions must be a joint effort between
the actuary and the plan sponsor. The plan sponsor's input is critical
because scenario assumptions should reflect management's best estimate of future economic events. Furthermore, the sponsor has the best
understanding of the needs of the company, the financial risks that it
can tolerate, and the company's objectives. The sponsor may not have
analyzed past experience as carefully as the actuary, however, and
may not have ready access to economic and investment data or have
as much understanding of the implications of the choice of some
assumptions as does the actuary. Furthermore, the bias of the plan
sponsor, whether intentional or not, may prejudice the objectivity of
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the analysis. Thus, it is the responsibility of the actuary to provide
guidance on the cause and effect of the choices. Where there are
doubts about some selected scenario assumptions, alternative assumptions should be tested.
During the process of choosing scenario assumptions, an often
asked question is: "What is the valuation assumption?" Such a question usually reflects a lack of understanding of the basic purpose of
these two types of assumptions. It is the actuary's responsibility to
explain the difference between forecast scenario assumptions and actuarial valuation assumptions. 9 Actuarial valuation assumptions typically contain a margin of conservation that should be removed in the
choice of scenario assumptions for forecasting. For instance, the commonly used valuation mortality table (e.g., 1983 Group Annuity
Mortality Table) provides mortality rates that are 10 percent lower
than the underlying experience obtained by mortality studies of the
population over the same period; see Committee on Annuities (1983
and 1987). Similarly, typical withdrawal tables provide turnover
rates that are lower than actual experience; see Vaughn (1992).
These subtle differences often are not explained clearly to the plan
sponsor. As a result, valuation turnover assumptions often are chosen
pllms where
by default to be the scenario assumptions. For pension pilms
the death benefit is comparable to the projected retirement benefit,
using a valuation mortality assumption for the scenario mortality
rate may not distort future pension cost greatly. Where death benefits are payable in a lump sum, the cash flow pattern will be understated if the actual number of deaths exceeds the expected number of
deaths. The distortions introduced by conservative turnover assumptions, however, may be even more significant, as the turnover rate is
typically much higher than the mortality rate.
The set of scenario assumptions should include the following
groups of assumptions: demographic, economic, and simulation
assumptions. This article will not provide a detailed explanation of
each scenario assumption. (Interested readers should see Sze (1987)
for details.) We will provide, however, a few critical comments on
some of them.

3.1 Demographic Assumptions
Demographic assumptions are used to project future employee
populations. Such assumptions include the mortality, disability, ter-

9 See Lorisz (1993) and Sze (1987) for more detailed discussions.
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mination and retirement patterns and the number and distribution of
new entrants with respect to sex, age, and pay.
Usually mortality and disability scenario assumptions are only
age specific. The termination assumption, however, should vary by
age and duration and should show a higher turnover pattern during
the earlier years of the employees' careers. The retirement pattern
should be distributed over the eligible retirement ages. Although the
number of new entrants may differ from year to year, the distribution
by sex, age, and pay usually is assumed to be the same during the
projection period; see Jackson, Haley, and Wendt (1989) and Sze
(1987).
For a small pension plan, a significant demographic change
would produce a major impact on the trend of pension costs. The
assumption of such demographic changes usually is specified by the
sponsor.

3.2 Economic Assumptions
Economic assumptions are used to project and determine the assets
and liabilities of the plan during the forecast period. These assumptions include: an inflation rate; real or nominal investment rate of
return; a salary increase; flat dollar benefit rate increases; and government benefit increases.
Actuaries traditionally assume that the real investment returns
and the real rate of salary increases are constant throughout the forecast period. Thus, nominal returns on assets and projected pay
increases only fluctuate with inflation. In addition, investment
returns and salary increases always move in the same direction.
Salary losses consequently are compensated by investment gains and
vice versa. In the end, the projected pension cost is more stable than
may be expected. In reality, nominal investment returns often are correlated negatively with inflation. (See Table 1.) In times of high
inflation, real salary increases may be close to zero. Under such circumstances, pay losses resulting from high inflation rates may be coupled with substantial investment losses. It would be imprudent for
actuaries to ignore this worst case scenario.

3.3 Simulation Assumptions
Simulation assumptions are needed to perform stochastic
asset/liability simulations. They typically include the economic
assumptions discussed above; the real rate of return and the standard
deviation for each asset class; the real salary and real benefit
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increases and their standard deviations; and the correlation between
each pair of variables, as well as the correlation of each variable
with inflation.
Many of these assumptions, especially the correlation factors,
often are chosen arbitrarily, mainly because both the actuary and the
plan sponsor may not have a good feel for the significance of these
assumptions. Improper choice of assumptions, however, may distort
and invalidate forecast results. Actuaries who wish to develop their
expertise in asset/liability simulations are advised to test alternative assumptions to build their intuition in this area.
The following is a correlation matrix of inflation and the real
returns of some common asset classes in the United States from 1926 to
1988:
TABLE 1
Inflation and Real Returns, 1926 to 1988

Correlation Matrix
CPI
1.00
-0.72
-0.55
-0.24

CPI
T-Bill
LTBond
S&P500

T-Bill
-0.72
1.00
0.57
0.14

LTBonds
-0.55
0.57
1.00
0.22

S&P500
-0.24
0.14
0.22
1.00

Sources:
Consumer Price Index (CPI-U)
Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor
Three Month U.S. Treasury Bill Yield
1926-1941 Homer Sydney. A History of Interest Rates: 2,000 B.C.
B. C. to Present, Table
51, Part II
1942-1976 Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, and 1977
Business Statistics

1977-1983

Standard & Poor's Statistical Service: Current Statistics, Interest Rates,

p.4

1984 on
Federal ReseNe Bulletin, Table 1.35, Interest Rates, Line 18
Long-Term U.S. Government Bond Return
1926-1941
Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-1941, Table 128, p. 468, The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 1943
1942-1953 Banking
BankingandMonetaryStatistics,
and Monetary Statistics, 1941-1970, Table 12.12, p. 720. The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, September 1976
1954-1977 20 Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yield Percent, Average of Daily
Figures, Federal ReseNe Bulletin, Table 1.35, Interest Rates
1978-1985 Selected Interest Rates, pp. 10-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
1986 on
30 Year Treasury Constant Maturity Yield Percent, Average of Daily
Figures, Federal ReseNe Bulletin, Table 1.35, Interest Rates
Standard & Poor's Composite Return
Standard & Poor's Statistics Service: Security Price Index Record
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4 Performing the Forecast
A critical decision in performing a forecast study is the choice of
forecasting method. 10 The reader is assumed to be familiar with the
mechanics of the following common forecasting methods:
•
•
•
•

The simplified forecast (also called the back of the envelop
approach:) ;
The seriatim forecast;
The forecast based on group data; and
The stochastic asset/liability simulation.

Instead of reviewing the details of each method, we will provide
some hints on the choice of the method.
Over the years I found that almost three quarters of all projections may be performed using the simplified approach. The simplified approach is quick and easy to do and provides reasonable results
that reflect the intuition of the actuary. Because of repeated iterations involved in this process, however, inherent estimation errors
escalate geometrically. For instance, a 5 percent overestimation of
liability each year will compound to over a 60 percent error in ten
years. These projection results are typically not reliable after the
first five to ten years, depending on the experience of the actuary.
Furthermore, the method does not capture the impact of demographic
changes readily. Nor is it capable of ascertaining the subtle effect of
the application of individual benefit limits. Finally, because this
approach is based on the intuition of the actuary, the results must be
reviewed carefully by an experienced actuary. The real danger lies in
the fact that an inexperienced actuary may produce misleading
results without realizing the mistake.
Where detailed results are required, a seriatim or group data
forecast is recommended. Because a detailed seriatim forecast is
costly, some data grouping usually is deemed necessary. Grouping into
age/service/pay cells typically is satisfactory. Highly paid employees and employees close to retirement should be identified separately, however. The termination/retirement patterns for these
groups of employees must be handled separately because of their
potential impact on pension cost and cash flow of the plan.
10 It is not the intention of this article to provide a detailed explanation of the
various projection methods or the background mathematics. Interested readers are
encouraged to study Schnitzer (1977); Jackson, Haley, and Wendt (1989); Lorisz (1993);
and Sze (1987).
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Asset/liability simulation is used mostly in the process of establishing an investment policy. This type of simulation is very good for
analyzing the risk factors involved in a funding or expensing policy.
Through numerous asset/liability simulations, one can test a policy
under different economic situations. Based on the simulated outcome,
the sponsor better may understand the down side of the policy decision. A major difficulty in this type of forecast, though, is in establishing the input assumptions. The actuary should try different sets
of input assumptions to gain insight into the effects of the different
choices. Another difficulty with these forecasts is the volume of output information generated. The actuary should study the outcome
generated carefully and distill these results to the bare essentials
before attempting to provide meaningful communication.

5 Review of Forecast Results
The review is the most important technical step of the forecasting process. As mentioned above, the voluminous output generated by
this process requires that the actuary diligently sort the results to
make sure they make sense and that they address the questions
asked.
An important criterion to bear in mind in the review process is
simplicity.
Something must have been wrong if there are no simple
explanations for the forecast results. Probably some important factors have been overlooked or have been included
improperly in the forecast.
A useful tool to check for reasonableness is to perform a projection of
pension liabilities and cost using a simplified projection performed
under the same scenario assumptions.
A careful review of the simplified projection's results typically
will reveal details that have been overlooked or some alternative
perspective that warrants further considerations. The full projection
then must be revised to reflect these requirements. This cycle of forecast, review, and refinement usually is repeated several times until
the actuary is satisfied that all results make sense and the different
perspectives have been analyzed.
To date, there is no completely objective criterion for judging the
validity of the forecast results. The following are some helpful hints
on checking the internal consistency of forecast results:
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Under each funding or expensing basis, the ratio between any pair
of the following items is usually rather stable: valuation payroll, normal cost, present value of future compensation, and present value of future normal cost. There is a slightly less stable
relationship between each pair of the following items: active
accrued liability, active accrued benefit value, ana active vested
benefit value;
The relationship between the normal cost and the accrued liability usually shows a stable trend, reflecting gradual increases or
decreases in the average age and service of the group;
For a mature population, the ratio of the inactive accrued liability to the active accrued liability is usually quite stable. On the
other hand, for an immature population, tnat ratio tends to
increase over the projection period;
When comparing results under different funding or expensing
bases, note the following relationships:
• The ratios of corresponding items under the different bases
should remain stable;
• Normal cost increases are more sensitive to the aging pattern
of the population under the unit credit cost metnoa than
under tFte entry age normal cost method; and
• For a final average pay plan, the increases in the accrued
benefit value reflect the total pay increase while the
increase in the accrued liability only reflects the actual pay
increase in excess of the salary scale assumption.

6 Communication of Forecast Findings
From the plan sponsor's perspective, communicating the finding
may be the most critical step of the entire process. The actuary must
be careful not to confuse the sponsor with the endless stream of numbers from a forecast report. It is important for the actuary to understand forecast results through the review process and essential that
he or she be able to share this understanding with the client.
The actuary may believe at the end of a project that the conclusions of the study are self evident. But the forecast findings become
obvious to the actuary only as a result of weeks of work and self-education. The final challenge is to educate the audience in the course of
a one or two hour meeting.
A useful suggestion is to stay focused on the initial questions
asked. Even though millions of numbers are produced, only those relevant to the purpose of the projection should be presented. The fewer
the details shown, the more the concept will be absorbed by the listener.
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Many actuaries experienced in pension forecasting have told stories of how they were trapped years after a forecast into explaining
why their forecast results differed from actual valuation results. It is
easy to blame the sponsor's ignorance of the estimations involved in
the forecast process. Knowing the limited precision of the results,
however, we question why such details ever were communicated in
the first place. Were the actuaries unaware of the imprecision
involved? Were the actuaries trying to attribute too much exactness
to the process?
In spite of the high volume of output data, the principal purpose
of the forecast is to analyze trends under various scenarios. Both the
trends and the comparisons are easiest to visualize through the use of
graphs. Forecasters should experiment with different ways to graphically present their results.

7 Other Considerations
Although both pension actuarial valuations and forecasts are
based on the same mathematical principles, the uses of their calculations are quite different. The purpose of an actuarial valuation is to
establish the funding and expensing requirements for the year. It is
performed under regulatory or accounting rules. The basis of an actuarial valuation tends to be conservative. The results provided often
are considered to be exact. On the other hand, the purpose of a pension forecast is to test the future cost impact of some expected or proposed changes. The emphasis is on the future trend of the cost. The
important result is the cost comparison under different scenarios. This
difference in the basic purpose of the two process is reflected in several factors:
•
•
•
•

•

Assumptions: Valuation assumptions have margins of conservation. Forecast scenario assumptions tend to be realistic;
Results: Valuation results often are used to derive exact funding
and expensing requirements. Forecast results should be shown as
estimates;
Time Horizon: Valuation results are only applicable to the current year. Forecast results may cover ten or more years;
Alternatives: Valuations provide pension cost under specific sets
of conditions. Pension forecasting usually is performed to compare
pension costs under several alternatives. The goal is to choose the
alternative that best reflects the objectives of the sponsor;
Variation: Because of the extended outlook and additional alternatives considered in a forecast, there tend to be more variations
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in this process. The forecast is certainly more challenging and
more interesting (to me, at least) than a valuation;
Estimates: Forecasting has its limitations. It is important for
actuaries not only to understand these limitations, but to communicate them clearly to the plan sponsor. Because of the many
shortcuts that the actuary takes in the process, forecast results
are estimates. Each individual item (e.g., liabilities, benefit
payments, assets, etc.) may differ greatly from that produced by
a subsequent valuation. Because of the compensating effect of various actuarial items, however, the aggre~ate results obtained
may still be reliable. Furthermore, compansons of the trends of
pension cost under different alternatives may be valid even when
each alternative set of results is slightly off;
Scenario Assumptions: The forecast results directly reflect the
scenario assumptions. Because there is no certainty in the input
scenario assumptions, the outcome of a forecast has a sizable
margin of error. Forecast results should be presented as a range of
possible outcomes. The results of a stochastic simulation, especially, should be presented in a probabilistic manner. Cost patterns should be presented probabilistically, i.e., they should
communicate boHi the expected cost trend and the confidence
level for such a cost trend through the forecast period; and
Forecast Report: Because forecast results may vary by the process used, a forecast report should state clearly the methodoIogy
and assumptions, the data approximation, and other estimations
employed. It is not necessary, and is often misleading, to provide
detailed results for each forecast year. On the other hand, it is
useful for the report to include an executive summary section that
addresses the questions asked and provides concise conclusions of
the study. Graphs should be used where appropriate to summarize cost trends and provide visual comparison of the alternatives.

In conclusion, forecasting is still more of an art than a science.
Actuaries should not be uncomfortable about the estimations involved
in the process. Even with all its limitations, however, forecasting is
still one of the best tools available to help sponsors make financial
decisions concerning their pension plans. Corporate executives need to
make financial projections regularly, and they may find pension forecast results to be far more reliable than many of the other estimates
used in corporate planning. Readers are encouraged to pursue the subject further.
In the end, forecasts are typically very exciting projects. Forecast
findings usually receive much greater attention than do regular actuarial valuation results.
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Cost-Based Pricing of Individual Automobile Risk
Transfer: Car-Mile Exposure Unit Analysis
Patrick Butler*

Abstract
Every mile traveled by a car transfers risk to its insurer. This paper posits that
the product of a cents-per-mile rate based on class experience and the miles recorded on
the car's odometer appropriately earns prepaid premium while the car is driven.
Operation of a practical car-mile system is described briefly. To test the competing
idea that driver-record pricing responds to known large differences in risk transfer, a
model used to validate claim free discounts is reexamined with the car-mile as the
measure of individ ual cost. Driver-record pricing is found to inflate car-year price-tocost differences. Consequences of accident rate variability for a car-mile system are
reviewed. The per mile cost of individual risk transfer is a class property because of
the random nature of accidents. Driver-record pricing attempted on a per mile basis
would amplify differences within classes.
Key words and phrases: Per mile insurance, accident rate, risk classification, driver record
model, merit rating

1 Introduction
Cost-based pricing of individual risk is a key ratemaking principle promulgated by the Casualty Actuarial Society (CAS). The principle states that "A rate provides for the costs associated with an
individual risk transfer;" see CAS (1993). The question for automobile insurance is how the cost of individual driving risk should be
measured. When a car is not being driven, its owner has no risk to
transfer for driving coverage (for all losses as a direct consequence of
the car's being driven) so the cost to its insurer is zero. Every mile a
car is driven adds to its risk of accident; the total cost of risk transfer
increases mile by mile. Both conditions point to adoption of the carmile (as opposed to the car-year that currently is used) as the unit of
* Patrick Butler holds a Ph.D. in geochemistry from Harvard University. The author
is currently director of the National Organization for Women's insurance project and
formerly was a National Aeronautics and Space Administration research scientist,
principal investigator, and the Curator of Lunar Samples. He has published papers on
geochemistry, lunar science, and automobile insurance pricing.
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risk transfer, that is, the exposure unit. Conversion of class rates from
dollars per car-year to cents per car-mile for driving coverages would
be required by a one sentence amendment to rate regulatory law proposed in several states.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the car-mile
exposure unit is essential to cost-based pricing of individual risk
transfer. The effect of driver-record pricing on individuals is analyzed with the car-mile unit as the objective measure of cost.

2 Car-Mile Exposure Unit
The entire entry on the exposure unit in the CAS statement of
ratemaking principles is: "The determination of an appropriate unit
or premium basis is essential. It is desirable that the exposure unit
vary with the hazard and be practical and verifiable." The currently accepted assessment of the car-mile exposure unit for automobile insurance seems to have been established by Dorweiler (1929).
Regarding the variation-with-hazard requirement, Dorweiler states:
"The mileage exposure medium is superior to the car-year medium in
yielding an exposure that varies with the hazard, as it responds
more to the actual usage of the car." Note that Dorweiler's phrase
"responds more" obscures the fact that the car-year does not respond
to actual use of the car. In addition, suspension of coverage during
periods of no use requires administrative intervention. Dorweiler further states that "[t]he devices and records necessary for the introduction of [the car-mile] medium make it impractical under present
conditions," and that while the car-year "measures the exposure
prospectively, the [car-mile] require[s] a final adjustment which
would be determined retrospectively."
Despite Dorweiler's assessment of superiority of the car-mile
exposure unit over the car-year unit in a fundamental characteristic
and his qualified judgment concerning its practicality, no substantive
actuarial reassessment has been published. Bouska (1989) updates
Dorweiler's paper and notes without comment that conversion to the
car-mile unit has been advocated by the National Organization for
Women. In a discussion of Bouska's paper, Diamantoukos (1991)
observes only that the car-mile exposure unit is "perhrps a theoretically superior one in some respects" to the car-year unit.
The National Organization for Women completed a 1992 stud y 1
for Pennsylvania legislators on operation of a car-mile system which

1 National Organization for Women. Operation of an Alldited-Mile/Year Automobile
Insurance System Under Pennsylvania Law. Washington, DC: NOW, 1992, reprinted in
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suggests that such a system would follow the odometer-limit and nontampering conditions used in mechanical breakdown insurance policies, but otherwise would not differ much from current practice. The
study follows transactions involving an example car, including a
midyear sale, for four policy years. Premium payment in advance
would be required to keep insurance protection in force. The premium
for driving coverage at car-mile rates is prepaid in mile amounts and
at times chosen by the car owner. Administrative expense and a premium for nondriving coverages are based on yearly rates and are prepaid at each policy-year renewal. Premium would be earned by the
car's insurer by the day for non driving coverages, as is currently done
for all coverages, and by the mile recorded on the odometer for driving coverages. The car's insurance ID card displays the odometer-mile
and date limits at which protection lapses pending further premium
prepayment.
Policy renewal under this plan would be conditional on taking
the car to a garage designated by the company for an annual odometer audit. The odometer would be inspected and read, and tamperevident seals would be applied at the initial audit. Theft of insurance protection is controlled because tampering with the odometeralready a federal crime-automatically voids the policy. Driving
with the cable unhooked does not steal insurance protection, because
tampering usually would be detected after an accident, and tampering
voids protection. The cents per car-mile rate would depend on coverage and the car's classification as appropriate by territory, use,
driver, and other categories.

3 Driver-Record Pricing
Advertisements such as those promIsmg "good rates for good
drivers" lead consumers to believe that accidents can be avoided and
that the important condition in individual risk of accident is how a
car is driven, not how it much it is driven. This belief is encouraged
through the use of merit ratings by automobile insurers to raise or
lower individual prices at policy renewal time.
The actuarial literature has neglected to examine the effect of
driver-record pricing on individual price-to-cost ratios where the
claim rate average for the class is taken as the price and defined
individual claim rates are taken as the costs of hypothetical individuals composing the class. Recent studies of driver records have
The Casualty Actuarial Society Forum (Summer 1993): 307-338. This study is available
from NOW, 1000 16th Street, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20036.
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focused on general questions of variation in individual risk without
reference to pricing or cost. For example, Mahler (1991) examines the
state accident records of drivers for variation in individual risk over
time (14 years), but does not discuss how the information could be
applied to pricing automobile risk transfer. An earlier actuarial
study done for insurance regulators, however, provides information on
individual price-to-cost effects.
A widely circulated 1979 report on risk classification by insurance
company actuaries on the industry Advisory Committee to the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners contains a section on
driver-record pricing. The report describes the issue of pricing individual risk transfer: "Many accidents are the result of chance. The
problem becomes-how can insurers identify the 'bad' drivers from
the 'good' drivers who were unlucky?" The impossibility of solving
this problem through driver records, although downplayed in the
report, is illustrated with a compound Poisson model composed of
specified numbers of drivers defined to have uniform high and low
annual rates of accident involvement.
In a subsequent study of driver-record pricing, Butler and Butler
(1989) analyze the high and low accident rate model in terms of the
car-mile exposure unit. They value the price-to-cost ratio for individual cars in terms of cents per mile and conclude that pricing based on
accident, claim, or traffic violation records greatly increases the
existing overpricing for unlucky owners of cars driven less than the
annual average for their risk class.
Continuing justification for driver-record pricing, however, relies
on the fact that cars whose drivers have had recent accidents (or
traffic convictions) average more accidents in a subsequent year than
do cars identically classified whose drivers have not had a recent
accident. A simplified explanation for this fact-in terms of a uniform claim rate per mile-is presented below through reinterpreta':..
tion of a classic model for a claim free discount plan. Assumption of a
cents-per-mile cost for all cars of the model provides a base for analyzing the price-to-cost effects of driver-record pricing on individual
cars. This article also considers the variation in claim rates per mile
and its consequences for classification and driver-record pricing under
a car-mile system in place of the assumed uniform claim rate per
mile.

4 Bailey & Simon Model for Claim-Record Experience
The CAS paper "An Actuarial Note on the Credibility of
Experience of a Single Private Passenger Car," by Bailey and Simon
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(1959) is the chief reference on the CAS examination syllabus which
shows and models the application of driver-record pricing to insurance for individual cars. Familiarity with its method of calculating
Poisson models is required for questions on the CAS exam on advanced
ratemaking; see Murdza (1992).
Bailey and Simon examine the Canadian liability claims experience of about 4 million insured car-years. The claim rate of the undivided class for each of five classes defined by car use and driver type
is compared with the rates calculated for four subclasses created by
sorting the records according to how many full years have elapsed
since the last claim was incurred by the car's drivers.
The relative effects of sorting cars by the prior claim records of
their drivers are similar for all five classes and are not affected significantly by a correction for territorial class differences. The experience for the largest Canadian class, Class 1, is shown in Table 1. The
recalculated rate relative to the claim rate for the undivided class
was 9 percent lower for the three year claim free subclass and
progressively higher with decreasing time since the last prior claim.
TABLE 1
1957-1959 Canadian Automobile Claim Data by Prior Claim Records·

Class 1
Pleasure-No Male Operator Under 25
Class
(undivided)
Number of
Claims Incurred
Car-Years
Insured
Claims Per
Car-Year

Years Since Last Prior Claim
2
1

3+

o

288,019

217,151

13,792

19,346

37,730

3,325,714

2,757,520

130,706

163,544

273,944

0.087

0.079

0.105

0.118

0.138

* Source: Bailey and Simon (1959); claim rate calculated

As part of their examination of the statistical justification for
claim free discounts, Bailey and Simon structure a model that reproduces the decrease in the claim rate observed in the Canadian data.
The model comprises cars with three annual amounts of risk transfer
representing a fourfold range in annual claim rates: 100,000 cars with
a uniform risk transfer rate of 0.05 claims per car-year (Amount I);
100,000 cars with a uniform rate of 0.10 claims per car-year (Amount
II); and 50,000 cars with a uniform rate of 0.20 claims per car-year
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(Amount III). The average claim rate of the model class is 0.10
claims per car-year. Bailey and Simon calculate the number of cars
that would be claim free with a Poisson distribution after three
years and combine them into a claim free subclass for each of the
defined risk transfer rates. They calculate that the average claim
rate for the new mix of the three defined rates would be 8 percent
less than the class average. A subclass reduction in claim rates
requires an offsetting claim-rate increase, however, to maintain the
overall class average.
Because the present study concerns how all cars are affected individually by the pricing of risk transfer, the Bailey and Simon model
calculations are extended here to include the subclasses with more
recent prior claims. The results are compared with the Canadian
experience in Figure 1. (Table 2 shows the calculated distribution of
cars with the three defined risk transfer rates among the four claimrecord subclasses.)
The extended model reproduces the general features of the
Canadian claim data. (Bailey and Simon point out that further
adjustment of model parameters would achieve more detailed agreement of the model with the Canadian data. For the present purposes,
however, such adjustment would add to complexity but not to understanding.) If claim rates are taken as a measure of relative insurance
prices:
•
•

The price level for the claim free majority: of cars decreases
below the rate that the undivided class would pay; and
This relatively small decrease is balanced by sharp price
increases for the minority subclasses with recent claims.

The Bailey and Simon model, by reproducing empirical claim
record insurance experience, shows the large variation in individual
risk transfer that exists within automobile insurance price classes.
Individuals in the same class are charged different prices for the
same amount of risk transfer. The Amount I cars (0.05 claims per caryear) are charged four pure premiums and Amount II cars (0.10 claims
per car-year) are charged two pure premiums for the same amount of
risk transfer that costs the Amount III cars (0.20 claims per car-year)
only one year's pure premium.

5 Risk Transfer and Miles Driven
Bailey and Simon (1960) consider reasons for the large variation
in annual risk transfer within single price classes as indicated by the
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Figure 1-Claim Rates of Prior-Claim Subclasses
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Canadian claim record experience and posited in the Bailey and
Simon 1959 model for the experience. They note that driver-record
and class plans are "quite ineffective in separating the better risks
from the poorer risks," and conclude that:
[W]e have reached the point where we may state that the still
unanalyzed cause (or causes) of variation among individual risks:
(1) has a wide dispersion, (2) varies significantly from year to
year for an individual risk, and (3) is measured only to a limited
extent by the class plan and the merit rating plan. Annual
mileage, which has long been felt to be an important measure of
hazara, fits all these requirements better than any other single
cause.
The first characteristic-dispersion of cars by annual miles
driven-is corroborated by the U. S. Department of Transportation's
nationwide personal transportation surveys. In 1977 one in five household cars was driven less than 3,000 miles, and one in ten was driven
more than 20,000 miles; see Butler, Butler, and Williams (1988, p.
376).

The second characteristic-significant individual year-to-year
variation in miles driven-is one that can be measured only by the
car's odometer. Nevertheless, Bailey and Simon do not note a need
for the car-mile exposure measure, but seem to view mileage as a
lump sum class definition from which experienced car-year cost averages are used prospectively to set base price multipliers.
The third characteristic implies that variation in risk transfer
amounts among individual cars resulting from differences in miles
driven can be measured by class and driver-record plans. Modern class
plans continue to show narrow distributions of cars by base price multiplier, in contrast to the range in miles driven; see Butler, Butler,
and Williams (1988).

6 Bailey & Simon Model With Uniform Claim Rate Per Mile
Within-class variation in individual amounts of risk transfer per
year can be seen as variation in the product of a rate variable and an
exposure variable for each car; that is, variation in the product of a
hypothetical average claim rate per mile for a car over the course of
a year and the number of miles the car is driven. The current practice
of charging annual rates for risk transfer implicitly assumes that the
two variables cannot be resolved. In a car-mile system, however, the
value of the exposure variable is recorded by each car's odometer.
The following analysis of the Bailey and Simon model assumes that
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all of the model cars share the same average risk-transfer rate,
0.00001 claims per mile. (The effect of presumed within-class differences in individual average claim rates per mile is considered later.)
The model differences in annual risk transfer amount, therefore, are
measured by the exposure variable.
The adopted claim rate per mile defines the miles per year
driven for the model's three risk amounts. For Amount I cars, 0.05
claims per year means 5,000 miles exposure per year; for Amount II
cars, 0.10 claims per year means 10,000 miles exposure per year; and
for Amount III cars, 0.20 claims per year means 20,000 miles exposure
per year. The total risk transferred at the end of 20,000 miles
traveled is the same for all cars.
TABLE 2
Model Distribution of Mile-Amount Cars by Claim-Record Subclass
Amount
of Risk
Transfer

Years Since Last Claim
MileslYear
(Each Car)

Class
(Undivided)

5,000
10,000
20,000

100,000
100,000
50,000

86,071
74,082
27,441

4,413
7,791
6,075

4,639
8,611
7,421

4,877
9,516
9,063

250,000

187,594

18,279

20,671

23,456

Avg. Miles per Car-Year

10,000

9,169

12,118

12,468

12,824

Avg. Claims per Car-Year at
0.00001 Claims per Car-Mile

0.1000

0.0917

0.1218

0.1247

0.1282

2

3+'

0

Number of Cars

I
II
III
Total cars

, Number of cars in subclass from Bailey and Simon (1959)

Bailey and Simon use their model to examine the mix of risks in
the claim free subclass. The present study extends the analysis to
obtain distributions of cars transferring the three risk amounts in the
other three claim-record subclasses, as shown in Table 2. (As only the
most recent claim is recognized by the plan, the claim-record distribution of the cars is calculated working back in time with a declining
balance of claim free cars eligible to have a claim that counts. For
example, of the 100,000 Amount I cars eligible in the 0 year, 4,877
have claims by the Poisson distribution at a 0.05 rate. The claim free
balance of 95,123 cars similarly is reduced in past year 1 and so on for
three years.) The miles-per-car-year average for each subclass is
determined by the mix of Amount I, II, and III cars.
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Although the number of cars transferring each risk amount (I, II,
and III) increases with claim recency (from 2 to 1 to 0 years since the
last claim), the number of highest mile cars (20,000 miles) increases
most rapidly. Therefore, the average miles driven is highest (12,824
miles) in the most recent claim subclass (0 years). The average of the
claim free subclass (3+ years) concurrently decreases from the class
average of 10,000 miles to 9,169 miles.

7 Accidents as Random Sampling
If it is assumed that each class has uniform average claim rates
per mile, automobile accidents in the Bailey and Simon model can be
envisioned as a random sampling of the class population on the road.
Accidents can sample only what is exposed. (Bias in the accident
sampling of real car-mile class populations that results from differences in the average driving conditions encountered by individual cars
is examined later in the paper.) Cars driven many miles and cars
driven few miles are included in the random accident sample of the
car-miles driven by the cars in the class. Because cars driven more
than the class average put more miles on the road, they are overrepresented in the accident sample. Cars driven less than average are
underrepresented in this sample relative to their proportion in the
class. The average miles per car of the recent claim subclasses are
increased through this random sampling process. The preferential
selection of cars driven more miles into the recent claim subclasses
also concurrently lowers (slightly) the average miles per car of the
large remaining population of cars without accidents. Because of
their greater average number of miles of exposure, therefore, the
recent claim subclasses average more claims in a subsequent year than
does the claim free subclass. All of the recent claim subclasses, however, also contain cars driven less than the class average.

8 Price-to-Cost Accuracy for Individual Risk Transfer
The miles-driven interpretation of the Bailey and Simon model
provides a cost measure in car-miles for the three individual amounts
of risk transferred. A price-to-cost relationship can be established for
the three risk transfer amounts (I, II, and III) in the undivided class
and in each of the four driver-record subclasses, a total of 15 relationships applied to the 15 groupings of cars in Table 2. (An equivalent
15 price-to-cost ratios would result from dividing the model's average
claim rates per year at the five class and subclass prices by the three
defined annual claim rates at the individual costs. Without being
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referenced to an objective standard such as odometer miles for measuring individual cost, however, the ratios would be without practical
significance. )
To picture the price-to-cost transfer comparisons, assume a classaverage cost of $10,000 per claim. This claim cost (severity) multiplied by the assumed model rate of 0.00001 claims per mile produces
a cost of 10 cents per mile pure premium for the class. Because the
average amount driven per year for the class is 10,000 miles, the 10
cents-per-mile cost makes the class cost (pure premium) $1,000 per caryear.
Despite the range in miles driven, it is assumed that all of the
cars stay in the same dollars-per-year class (as the Bailey and Simon
model implicitly assumes). This would have been the case for the
Canadian experience under the class plans of the time and is true now
for a large number of cars. Current discounts for estimated future
mileage less than 7,500 or 8,000 miles in some company class plans
are not used or have been discontinued by other automobile insurers as
intrinsically lacking in objectivity. (Because the discount difference
between 5,000 and 20,000 estimated future miles is usually about 15
percent, the adjustment would not affect the results of the analysis
significantly.)
Significantly.)
Without claim-record pricing, all individuals pay the $1,000 per
year pure premium for the class, the same premium that Amount II
cars would pay at 10 cents a mile. At a $1,000 annual rate, however,
the 20,000 mile Amount III cars pay 5 cents a mile, while the 5,000
mile Amount I cars pay 20 cents a mile, as shown by Figure 2.
When the model class is subdivided on the basis of claim records,
the proportions of cars at the three mile amounts are changed in the
four subclasses created. These new mile averages multiplied by the
assumed rate of 0.00001 claims per mile produce four new pure premiums for the claim-record subclasses: $917 for the claim free subclass
and $1,212, $1,247, and $1,282 for the progressively more recent
claims subclasses. These four annual premiums divided by the three
mile amounts in each subclass produce the 12 new prices per mile for
the model cars shown in Figure 2. The effects on the cars at the three
mile amounts are different.
The effect of claim-record pricing on the risk transfer Amount II
cars, which are individually driven 10,000 miles per year, is most
telling. Without subclassification, all Amount II cars pay 10 cents a
mile for insurance. With subclassification, most of them receive a 1
cent reduction in the cost per mile. Some cars in the class which have
had a recent claim, however, pay 2 cents to 3 cents more per mile
(Figure 2). Claim-record subclassification transforms pricing that is
61

Patrick Butler

Cost-Based Pricing of Auto Risk Transfer

cost-based by definition for all Amount II individual cars to pricing
that is not accurate for any cars.
It could be argued that improved price-to-cost accuracy is needed
most for the model car risk transfer amounts that differ most from
the class average. Without claim-record subclassification, the cars at
the 5,000 mile amount pay 20 cents a mile, 10 cents a mile more than
the class average price. In the claim free subclass such cars receive a
2 cent per mile reduction in price. This reduction, however, is much
smaller than the 4 cents to 5 cents a mile below the class average
price that the cars at Amount III (20,000 miles) pay regardless of
their claim-record subclass. Furthermore, provision of this 2-cents-permile downward adjustment for the cars at Amount I is gained at great
cost to the Amount I cars with recent claims. For these individuals,
the 20-cent-a-mile amount they pay without claim-recency pricing is
increased 4 cents to 6 cents a mile in the recent claims subclasses. This
increase equals the entire per mile price paid by the cars at Amount
III regardless of their claim-record subclass. The only negative effect
for Amount III cars of pricing on claim record is that some lose a
small part of their per mile subsidy (Figure 2).
Statistically, a decrease in the average cost per mile paid by
Amount I cars from 20 cents to 19.3 cents coupled with an increase in
the average cost per mile paid by Amount III cars from 5 cents to 5.3
cents is evidenced in a 6 percent decrease in variance of price-to-cost
ratios from the three ratios of the undivided class to the twelve
ratios of the driver-record subclasses. The reduced variance, however,
should not mask the disparate cost of the improved statistics on
individuals that is evident in Figure 2. Driver-record pricing
increases the range in price-to-cost ratios paid by individuals in the
same class 40 percent, from a spread of 15 cents a mile before driverrecord pricing to 21 cents a mile between the lowest value for Amount
III cars and the highest for Amount I cars. Operating at random on
individuals, the so-called improvement increases the underpricing of
risk transfer for some cars already underpriced and the overpricing of
risk transfer for some cars already overpriced.
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Figure 2
Effect of Model Annual Premiums on Car-Mile Prices
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If the pricing unit were converted from car-year to car-mile so
that all of the car-owners in the model class paid the same 10 cents
per mile rate, however, each owner would pay only for the on-theroad protection the car consumed, while total premium received by
insurers would remain the same. A car driven the model class average of 10,000 miles would experience no change in the $1,000 premium
with insurance charged at car-mile rates, provided its mile amount
did not change. A car driven 4,780 miles would pay $478, while a car
driven 21,240 miles would pay $2,124.

9 Variation In Claim Rates Per Mile
The large differences in the type of risk environment that cars
can encounter are indicated by comparing statistics for accident severities and per mile accident rates between interstate highways and
city streets or between day and night driving on the same road. For
example, the injury rates per million vehicle-miles of travel ranged
from 0.36 on rural interstates to 3.0 on local urban roads in 1991; see
Federal Highway Administration (1992). In principle, therefore, the
diverse individual mixtures of car use and driving environment make
it inevitable that changes in class definition would result in different
claim costs per mile for new classes.
Accident rates per vehicle mile depend not only on traffic engineering classification of accidents experienced under roadway or other
relevant conditions during some time period, but also on determination of the number of vehicle-miles of exposure to risk that produced
the classified accidents. The same relationship holds for automobile
insurance. Only if car-miles of exposure are determined can the number and cost of claims incurred within a certain time period by a certain class of cars provide any quantitative information on the
expected risk transfer cost of each mile that cars in the class will
travel in a subsequent rating period.
As an example of the effect of classifiable per mile differences
within a business-use class of cars with adult drivers, assume two
types of car use by sales representatives. With reference to the government injury rates given above, assume that one type of use covers
the whole state and averages 0.25 claims per million car-miles
(statewide cars), while the other covers only a metropolitan area
and averages one claim per million car-miles (metro cars). Any lower
average cost per claim by the metro cars resulting from lower speed
urban accidents would narrow the effect on the claim cost per mile of
the 4:1 claim-rate difference. Separately classifying the statewide
and metro cars, provided there were enough car-miles of each usage
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type for statistical reliability, would show the differences in carmile cost.

10 Accidents as Biased Random Sampling
The analogy used above for viewing accidents as a process of sampling car-miles on the road can be extended to presumed variations
within classes in per mile accident rates. To the extent that cars are
not classified by driver age and experience according to the known
per mile differences in accident involvement for these categories, the
accident random sampling of class car-mile populations would be
biased toward the cars driven by inexperienced drivers and by
drivers near the beginning and end of the driver age range. Further,
owing to differences in driving conditions by time and place, the
accident random sample of car-miles would be biased to the cars used
more under conditions of higher risk per mile. The accident samples,
however, also will contain cars used on average under conditions of
lower risk per mile. For example, with a Poisson distribution of
claims at the rates given for the hypothetical business use cars, 18
percent of the metro cars will incur claims in 200,000 miles of driving,
but so will 4.9 percent of the statewide cars.

11 Driver-Record Pricing on a Car-Mile Basis
Like the current driver-record pricing on a car-year basis, driverrecord pricing under a car-mile exposure unit system would have an
apparent justification in cost. The inevitable bias in an accident sample assures that the subclass of cars defined as incurring a claim in
the most-recent-miles-traveled interval-within the most recent
50,000 miles, for example-will average more accidents per mile in a
following miles-traveled interval than the class average. Applying a
recent claim surcharge to the cents-per-mile class price, however,
would constitute a deliberate, random, and unjustifiable increase in
what is paid per mile by the recent claim cars with lower than
average claim rates compared to what they would pay if they were
classified separately. Furthermore, the higher per mile charges for
the recent claim cars with significantly higher than average claim
rates per mile still would be less than what they would pay if they
were classified separately.
Because both the claim free and recent claim subclasses of a class
are mixtures of cars with above average and below average claim
rates per mile, any action to separate them must be through class
redefinition applied to the whole class.
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12 Conclusion
CAS introduces its ratemaking principles with the specification
"[r latemaking is prospective because the property and casualty
that "[rlatemaking
insurance rate must be developed prior to the transfer of risk." In a
car-mile system, evaluation of the cost per mile to be used in a
prospective class rate can be done only on the basis of claim experience for a group of cars referenced to the group's total measured carmiles of exposure that produced the claims.
What cannot be known prospectively, because it is controlled by
individual car owners, is the amount of risk that will be transferred
through operation of each car. Although risk transfer is paid in
advance at a class rate per mile, protection is not consumed (premium
is not earned by the insurer) until the risk is transferred, mile after
mile, by driving. Conversely, premiums charged at car-year rates
invert this cost-based relationship by charging less per mile for each
mile of protection consumed, a contradiction of cost-based pricing. The
assumption that this contradiction is unavoidable on practical
grounds is not neutral. It favors all owners of cars driven more miles
per year than the average for their class.
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Discussion of Patrick Butler's
"Cost-Based Pricing of Individual Automobile Risk
Transfer: Car-Mile Exposure Unit Analysis"
Ruy A. Cardoso*

Aside from its hyperacademic title, Patrick Butler's paper on
mileage and merit rating of automobile insurance policies provides a
nice twist to an old model and a reasonably compelling theoretical
argument for the use of mileage as a rating variable. Yet one basic
real world truth runs counter to Dr. Butler's view: automobile insurance companies generally do not use mileage as a rating variable,
except in the broadest of categories. This is despite the fact that
Dorweiler's justification for the use of mileage has been around for
more than 60 years.
Because it generally is conceded that classification schemes have
become more refined over time in response to competition, why
haven't insurers already gone down the path to which Dr. Butler
points? I can suppose two reasons: (1) competition doesn't really work;
or (2) competition does work and the competitive market finds the
use of mileage to be wanting in some respect. In my opinion, the second reason is more likely to be true.
Assuming this second reason is correct, then either the demand for
or the supply of mileage rating is too low for it to be used more than
it is. On the demand side, it is possible that insurance company customers don't like the notion of having their odometers inspected or of
adding an uncertain level of premiums to their already complicated
lives; after all, the purpose of insurance is to replace uncertain losses
with certain, not uncertain, premiums. On the supply side, the costs
of administering a system such as that proposed by Dr. Butler simply

* Ruy Cardoso, FCA5,
FCAS, MAAA, currently is vice president and chief actuary of the
Automobile Insurers Bureau of Massachusetts where he represents the Massachusetts
automobile insurance industry in regulatory hearings concerning insurance rates. Mr.
Cardoso previously has heId consulting and insurance company positions whose
primary focus was the analysis of casualty insurance loss reserves. He graduated from
S.B. in management science.
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1983 with an 5.B.
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may outweigh the benefits; I am unaware of any administrative cost
studies that would illuminate the answer to this particular question.
Beyond pointing out this basic conflict between theory and practice, I would like to make the following observations on Dr. Butler's
analysis:

•

•

•

•

While there is likely to be at least some correlation between
variation in mileage and variation in claim frequency within a
class, the Butler analysis essentially assumes a perfect correlation, disregarding the legion of unmeasurable factors that could
account for as much variation as does mileage; Dr. Butler's numerical results should be tempered considerably, therefore, before
being used in the real world;
Dr. Butler is clearly in the right when he notes that the per mile
expected risk transfer cost only can be determined if real carmiles of exposure are determined. Any study based on mileage
mnes
data reported by either insurers or insureds is subject to question.
In the former case, this may be due to insurer indifference in
reporting correct statistical data when no premium effect is
involved. In the latter case, this may be due to insureds' incentive to cheat. Here in Massachusetts, where I currently am
employed, we have found that nearly 30% of policies have estimated future annual mileage of zero recorded; on the other hand,
nearly 50% of policies have estimated future annual mileage of
magnitudes too high to qualify for any rate discount, making it
like1y that these estimates are unaffected by cheating;
Again, here in Massachusetts, we have found some evidence of a
relationship between annual mileage estimates (which are based
on questionable data, as explained above) and merit rating classification under the merit rating scheme used here; in particular,
the higher rated (worse) drivers do tend to have higher mileage
estimates, in keeping with Dr. Butler's thesis; and
Finally, Dr. Butler's point (in his section 11) that "Applying a
recent claim surcharge to the cents-per-mile class price, however,
would constitute a deliberate, random, and unjustifiable increase"
seems to argue for the complete elimination of merit rating,
which the paper does not justify. As anyone who has listened to
a radio talk show can attest, at least some part of the driving
public demands merit rating as a way of punishing those perceived as offenders (unless, of course, the caner is one of those on
the receiving end of a surcharge, in which case he or she would
look on Dr. Butler's article quite favorably). Talk show callers
aside, the potential relationship between merit rating classification and other unmeasured vanables (aside from mileage) cannot
be dismissed based solely on this article, nor can the virtuallyimpossible-to-measure deterrence effects of a merit rating scheme.

In summary, Dr. Butler's article, while not quite supportive of all
of his conclusions, does make plain the problem of random incidence.
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The principle that "cars driven more than class-average miles are
over represented in the accident sample" is one that I expect many
practicing actuaries frequently forget. I recall an analogous phenomenon from an undergraduate probability class; if one surveys subway riders at random and asks how many days per month they ride
the subway, the average answer will be too high an estimate of the
population mean because the survey-taker more likely will encounter
persons who are frequently on the subway. Of course, if we all rode
the subway every day, the incidence problem would go away, as
would much of the need for cars and the corresponding mileage and
merit rating issues. If Dr. Butler is not starting his own insurance
company soon, perhaps he can devote some time to the advocacy of
better public transportation systems, thereby reducing the problem he
has illustrated so nicely.

Ruy A. Cardoso
Auto Insurers Bureau of MA
Seventh Floor
101 Arch Street
Boston, MA 02110

Richard G. WolI*
The purpose of this paper, according to Patrick Butler, is to
"demonstrate that the car-mile exposure unit is essential to costbased pricing of individual risk transfer." On the basis of his demonstration, Dr. Butler advocates changing the exposure basis for private
passenger automobile insurance from a car-year basis to a per mile
basis. Current auto insurance prices are based on a contract that runs
for a fixed period of time, usually a half year. He argues that the
basis for the insurance contract for most coverages should be changed
to miles driven.
Dr. Butler's demonstration consists of creating a simplified model
where there are three types of insurance customers. The first type: of
customer drives 5,000 miles per year. The second drives 10,000 miles
per year, and the third drives 20,000 miles per year. He assumes
that the risk process for each customer is Poisson with a frequency of

* Richard

G. Woll is research actuary for the Allstate Research and Planning Center
at Menlo Park, California. He is a Fellow of the Casualty Actuarial Society, a
member of the American Academy of Actuaries and a member of the Risk Theory
Seminar of the American Risk and Insurance Association (ARIA). His work in
connection with the implementation of a new auto classification plan in California
included analysis of insurance results by miles driven.
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one accident per 100,000 miles. For illustrative purposes, he assumes
that each claim costs $10,000. He then uses this information to generate the dollars of loss experienced by each customer. This allows
him to evaluate the effect of what he calls claim record pricing. This
means establishing prices on the basis of prior claim records. He concludes that claim record pricing does not match prices to costs as well
as charging on the basis of miles driven. He also concludes from this
that "the car-mile exposure unit is essential to cost-based pricing of
individual risk transfer."
Insurance companies currently recognize differences in miles
driven by the use of class factors. Or. Butler argues, however, that:
Modern class plans continue to show very narrow distributions
of cars by base price multiplier in contrast to the range in the
miles driven (Butler, Butler, and Williams, 1988).
Basing insurance prices on the number of miles driven makes intuitive
sense. It is obvious that the difference in rates between two drivers,
other things being equal, should be proportional to the difference in
the miles they drive. The cost of insuring different auto customers,
however, depends not only on how much they drive, but on other factors such as how well they drive, where they drive, and what kind of
car they drive.
In addition, the relationship between the number of miles a customers drives and insurance claims is complex. Or. Butler seems to
assume that customers who drive more than other customers have
proportionately more losses. That is, he expects a customer who
drives 10,000 miles to have twice the losses of a customer who drives
5,000 miles. Allstate's data, however, present a more complicated
picture. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the number of POl
claims per mile and the number of miles driven annually by a cus'tomer. It uses information about the 1991 PO claim experience of
Allstate customers in California. 2
Figure 1 shows the number of PO claims per mile going from 3.5
claims per 100,000 miles for persons who drive about 1,000 miles per
year down to 0.3 claims per 100,000 miles for persons driving 30,000
miles or more. This is in sharp contrast to the constant number of
1 PD (property damage liability) claim frequency is used because it generally has been
found to be the best indicator of underlying accident frequency.
2 Because of the passage of Proposition 103 in California which mandated the use of
mileage in rating automobile policies,
poIlcies, Allstate sent questionnaires to all its customers
to get mileage data. Allstate already had collected mileage information on its
customers, but the questionnaire helped to confirm the information.
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claims per 100,000 miles assumed in Dr. Butler's analysis. This results
in customers who drive about 1,000 miles per year having a claim
frequency of 3.5 claims per year per 100 insured cars while those who
drive over 30,000 miles have a claim frequency
frequency· of about 8.0-a relationship of 2.25 to one, rather than the 30+ to one under Dr. Butler's
assumptions.
When we turn our attention to other risk factors, we find that
mileage is a relatively unimportant source of difference between customers compared to territory and years of driving experience.
Figure 1
PO Claims per Mile by Annual Mileage
Allstate 1991 California Experience
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The effectiveness of any auto insurance risk assessment system
depends on the extent to which it matches insurance prices to insurance costs. Dr. Butler has demonstrated that the use of mileage as an
exposure base in a theoretical world, where all differences in loss
experience come from differences in the number of miles driven, is
more effective than the use of claim record pricing. He has not
demonstrated anything with respect to actual insurance experience.
The effectiveness of automobile insurance risk assessments systems
was discussed extensively many years ago. A study by the Stanford
Research Institute (SRI) in 1976 entitled The Role of Risk
Classifications in Property and Casualty Insurance: A Study of the Risk
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Assessment Process developed a means for evaluating risk assessment
systems by measuring the variance of expected losses of the partitions
each system produces. 3
The most efficient risk assessment system is the one that divides
insurance customers into groups ,with the largest variance in expected
losses. We also can evaluate the relative importance of various risk
classification factors by measuring the percentage of the total variance each factor explains.
Dr. Butler seems to argue that the primary contributor to the
variance of expected losses in the real world is the difference in the
number of miles that each customer drives. There is no evidence presented by Dr. Butler, or by anyone else, to show that this is the case.
The major case made for mileage in the paper is the repeated observation that insurance risk is transferred, mile after mile, by driving.
Using the SRI approach, the Allstate Research and Planning
Center recently conducted a study of risk classification factors in
California. The study covered most of the factors customarily used by
most companies with the exception of vehicle characteristics.
Allstate has collected data on the mileage driven by each customer
since 1981, so the study was able to include mileage. Mileage, years
licensed, and territory explained over 90 percent of the variance of
the classification data included in the study for liability coverages
(bodily injury liability, property damage liability, medical payments, and uninsured motorists). Over 55 percent of the total variance, however, was explained by territorial differences. Years
licensed explained almost 23 percent of the variance, and mileage
explained about 14 percent.
The picture was somewhat different for collision coverage.
Territory, mileage, and years licensed again explained over 90 percent of the variance, but mileage explained over 33 percent of the
total variance, years licensed explained about 30 percent, and territory explained about 26 percent.

3 The SRI report states "First, we define a measure of efficiency. Our probabilistic
model for actual losses separates the random element of actual losses from the
predictable element, the expected loss, that is, claim likelihood and expected claim
severity. A perfectly efficient risk assessment process would be one that estimates
exactly individuals' expected losses. A process with zero efficiency would not resolve
any of the initial expected loss uncertainty. A process with intermediate efficiency
will be characterized by the average fraction of the initial expected loss uncertainty It
resolves" (emphasis added).
The report continues that: "We find it convenient to use variance to measure
uncertainty because of [its) additive property ... In words, the expected loss variance in
an entire population is equal to the sum of the average expected loss variance within
each class and of the variance of the rates (average expected losses) among classes"
(SRI, Supplement, p. 200).
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Insurance customers with less than one year of experience have
the highest losses per car. Losses per car decline each subsequent
year. Thus, persons with more years of driving experience have
improved loss experience. This, in turn, suggests that an important
element in the transfer of insurance risk is how the customer drives.
Territory rates, of course, depend on where insurance customers drive.
The Allstate study indicates clearly that how much its customers
drive is only part of the overall variance of systematic risk. It is
more important than the other two factors for collision insurance, but
still accounts for only about one third of the total variance. It plays
even a smaller role in liability insurance, the major part of auto
insurance costs.
Thus, we do not believe that Dr. Butler has been able "to demonstrate that the car-mile exposure unit is essential to cost-based pricing of individual risk transfer."

Richard G. Wall
Allstate Insurance Co.
Allstate R & P Center
321 Middlefield Road
Menlo Park CA 94025-9765

Author's Reply to Discussion
The discussions by Messrs. Ruy A. Cardoso and Richard G. Woll
question different points in the paper and raise other important
issues concerning automobile insurance exposure units that are outside
the immediate scope of the paper. Responding to these questions not
only calls for expanded consideration of points discussed in the paper,
but also requires examination of further consequences of conversion to
the car-mile exposure unit and of retaining the car-year unit. The
efforts of Mr. Cardoso and Mr. Woll in providing this opportunity
and challenge are appreciated greatly.

Reply to Discussion By Ruy A. Cardoso
Mr. Cardoso's major argument against conversion to the car-mile
exposure unit can be paraphrased as follows: if the car-mile were
judged superior to the car-year by Dorweiler in 1929 and has not been
adopted or even studied since then (over 60 years), then the car-mile
unit must have some unidentified fatal flaw. Specific flaws suggested
by Mr. Cardoso are (1) the technical failure of future mileage as a
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classification variable, (2) the irrelevancy of exposure measurement
because competition prevents overpricing, and (3) customer resistance
to odometer auditing. Upon examining these suggested flaws, however, one finds evidence that the true fatal flaw that has prevented
the use of the car-mile unit is seen only from the perspective of automobile insurers. Adoption of the car-mile unit as an objective standard for measuring transfer of on-the-road risk would curtail price
competition severely for larger-premium consumers with broad insurance needs. It also would end the subsidy for this competition currently paid by consumers transferring less than class average risk per
car-year.
Mr. Cardoso's criticism of mileage as a flawed classification
variable-Le., usable only in broadest categories, insurer indifference
to integrity of data, incentive to cheat-agrees with company rate
hearing testimony previously published; see Butler, Butler, and
Williams (1988, p. 388). The problem with this critique is that it
misses the point: the subject discussed by the current paper, as well as
by the 1929 Dorweiler study, is not classification variables but exposure
units. It is necessary, therefore, to clarify the difference between
variables chosen to define price classes and the price unit chosen as
the unit of purchase to which prices refer.
Gasoline purchase provides a ready analogy to distinguish classification variables from the price unit. Gasoline usually is available
in twelve different price classes. The pricing variables that distinguish these classes are three octane levels, self service or full service,
and cash or credit payment; thus, 3 x 2 x 2 = 12 prices. Yet the gasoline gallon is the unit of purchase common to all of the price classes.
In auto insurance, price classes are defined by variables such as territory, driver characteristics, and use of car. Distinct from such class
definition variables is the price unit; currently the car-year, but
which would be the car-mile after conversion to the car-mile exposure
unit. Although classification variables and the price unit have distinct functions, the choices of which to use for assessing the cost of
risk transfer are influenced strongly by auto insurance price competition.
In suggesting that competition currently prevents insurance overpricing of cars driven less than average, Mr. Cardoso apparently is
taking the well-known fact that competition lowers auto insurance
prices for marketing targets and extrapolating it to the public relations dictum that competition precludes overpricing. There is plentiful evidence, however, that insurers' price competition for customers
with more risk to insure has, as its complementary effect, the overpricing of customers with less risk to insure (what Bailey (1960) calls
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"skimming the cream"). This effect was described in 1911 by the
New York State Legislature's Merritt Committee Report (p. 41) in its
examination of the need for regulation of fire insurance pricing:
In a state of open competition the rates adjust themselves not
to the hazards but largely to the strength of the insured so
that the man of influence, whose patronage is desired, will
get his insurance too cheaply, as against the small man who
is not in a position to drive a sharp bargain. That is, competition results in discrimination.
Automobile rate hearing records contain admissions that costs are
shifted from higher mileage customers to lower mileage customers
and from men to women in response to price competition; see Butler,
Butler, and Williams (1988, p. 405). For example, in 1982 State Farm
testified to the Pennsylvania Insurance Department that in order to
keep the price down for its higher mileage customers, the company
keeps its low mileage discount to about half the size it should be.
State Farm stated:
We're already very competitive on the [lower mileage] class,
and we're generally tight on a competitive standpoint on [the
higher mileage] class, and if we widen the differential,
we're going to hurt ourselves very substantially on the
[higher mileage] class of business.
Later in the hearing the State Farm actuary explained:
We like to follow the statistics where we can. The rating
law talks about rates which are not excessive, inadequate or
unfairly discriminatory, but your rating [law] also talks about
doing nothing to prohibit competition in the marketplace,
and as a matter of fact, we simpfy can't-we just can't always
follow the statistical indications.
Auto insurers not only keep price differences between risk classes
smaller than cost differences to compete for members of the more
costly class, but also merge higher and lower risk classes or do not
divide classes where such groups are distinguishable. In the latter
case, for example, competition for adult men's business explains why
nearly all cars in the adult driver classes are unisex-rated despite
government mileage statistics, backed by accident involvement data,
that show that men's average risk per year is about twice women's
average risk per year. The same accident involvement data are said
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to require sex-divided prices for youth classes. Rate-hearing testimony also shows that men's prices may be lowered contrary to experienced cost to allow agents to establish good relations with young
men who are desirable as future sales targets.
Just as competition works to flatten rather than sharpen class differences, resistance to any real measure of exposure differences within
classes also expresses competitive concern for the "man of influence"
at the expense of the "small man." The capacity for miles of driving
is dependent on income level, which generally determines the ability
to buy gasoline and own reliable cars. Because the car-year price unit
is the status quo for insurance, the result of choosing this price unit as
opposed to one that responds to individual cost can be examined by
analogous conversion of the price unit for gasoline from the gallon to
the car-year. That is, what would the consequences be for customers if
gasoline were sold like auto insurance?
With gasoline sold by the car-year, everybody with cars in the
same class would pay a dollars per car-year price based on the cost
per car of supplying gasoline for that class in previous years and
adjusted for expected change in gasoline cost and, as currently done
for auto insurance, any trend toward increased or decreased driving.
Payment in advance for a car-year's worth of gasoline would allow
customers to draw gasoline as needed from the class pool. Sale of
gasoline by the car-year, however, would lead to problems analogous
to the affordability breakdown that occurs in areas where the caryear price of auto insurance is high.
With gasoline prices set to cover the anticipated car-year average cost of each class, above average users of gasoline would experience a decrease in their gasoline expense paid by an increase in gasoline expense for below average users. Once accustomed to the benefits
of unmetered gasoline, the above average user would object to any
expense and accountability that using meters on gasoline pumps would
entail, as Mr. Cardoso observed would occur with the use of odometers to earn insurance premiums. If the increase in annual gasoline cost
per car were to force some below average users to give up cars, however, class average gallons per car-year would rise. A rise in average
consumption would raise the cost of gasoline per car-year and would
force still more below average users to give up their cars, causing the
gasoline cost per car-year to rise even more. This death spiral effect
that results when prices are not tied to a unit of individual consumption first would become apparent where the annual prices are highest, as is happening currently with auto insurance in some urban
areas.
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Surcharging the yearly gasoline bill of every tenth customer in a
class so that the other nine can receive a customer retention discount
would be analogous to the randomness of auto insurance merit rating.
(Although Mr. Cardoso defends merit rating as having possible deterrence effects, customer retention is an obvious purpose. If discounts for
claim free years were really risk-related, eligibility would transfer
between companies. Customers generally are puzzled to discover that
it does not.) With gasoline sold by the gallon instead of the car-year,
however, the classification variables that set prices are certain,
objective, obviously related to a cost that can be evaluated by customers, and not easily manipulated to price discriminate between customers. From the auto insurers' viewpoint, the real fatal flaw in carmile pricing is that it would inhibit cost shifting within classes by
making the cost of individual risk transfer as understandable and
controllable as the gasoline cost of automobile operation.
The public demand for driver-record pricing voiced on call-in
radio talk shows to which Mr. Cardoso refers is a political response
based on the only information available to consumers. Charged by
the car-year, auto insurance is experienced as a flat tax on car ownership at prices based on group characteristics. By appearing to take
the individual into account, driver-record pricing competes, as the
paper notes, with the idea of making the car-mile the price unit for
individual risk transfer.

Reply to Discussion By Richard G. Woll
Two sentences early in Mr. Woll's discussion transform what purports to be a critique of the paper's subject-the car-mile as the price
unit for individual risk transfer-into a critique of a topic that the
paper does not address-the problematic estimated future mileage
discount classes with the car-year as the price unit. (These discounts
are used by some insurers, but were rejected as inherently unenforceable by other insurers after several decades' use; see Butler, Butler,
and Williams (1988, p. 388». "It is obvious," Mr. Woll states, "that
the difference in rates between any two drivers, other things being
equal, should be proportional to the difference in the miles they
drive. The cost of insuring different auto customers, however, depends
not only on how much they drive but on other factors such as how well
they drive, where they drive, and what kind of car they drive."
While the qualifying phrase "other things being equal" in the
first sentence could refer to the purpose of classifications such as
those cited in the second sentence, the word "however" in the second
sentence suggests a rebuttal of the first. Together they seem to imply
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that the amount driven is not a measurement but a factor, i.e. a classification variable arguably related to risk, as are driver experience,
garaging territory, and car type. For the remainder of the discussion,
Mr. Woll criticizes the car-mile exposure unit as if it were a mileage
classification variable (which it is not) to be compared with other
car-year classification variables as has been done in his research at
Allstate.
The basic premise of the paper is that the car-mile must work in
conjunction with risk classification as the exposure unit to measure
the cost of individual risk transfer. The abstract states that odometer
miles multiply "a cents-per-mile rate based on class experience" and
that the "per mile cost of individual risk transfer is a class property." The essential relationship of individual exposure measurement
to risk classification is emphasized in every section. It is from this
perspective that the main issues raised by Mr. Woll will be
addressed. These issues are within-class proportionality of cost to
miles driven; observed decreasing claim rates per mile with increasing annual mileage; and car-mile costs by territory classification.
The question of proportionality of cost to miles driven is raised
by Mr. Woll's observation that Dr. Butler "expects a customer who
drives 10,000 miles to have twice the losses of a customer who drives
5,000 miles." This correctly represents how the car-mile unit works if
the cars driven different distances are classified identically (and
have the same coverage).
The proportionality assumed by the current car-year system,
ostensibly for administrative convenience, is that within-class cost is
proportional to the time period the car is insured in units of caryears. This assumption produces widely divergent per mile costs for
cars identically classified. Table 1 illustrates this using Mr. Woll's
5,000 and 10,000 miles per car-year example. The cars driven the two
distances per year are garaged in the same territory and are classified identically by driver (adult unisex) and use (pleasure with limited commuting to work). The premium and per mile costs of 10,000
miles of coverage driven at 5,000 miles per car-year under two
arrangements are compared with the cost of driving 10,000 miles in
one car-year. Three different premiums are paid for 10,000 car-miles
of exposure.
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TABLE 1
Within-Class Variation in Cost of 10,000 Miles Coverage

How 10,000 Miles
are Driven

Territorial
Base
Price per
Car-Year'

1 Car in 2 Years
2 Cars in 1 Year

$500
$500

1 Car in 1 Year

$500

Discount"
Mileage
Mileage
Multicar
None

DiscountAdjusted
Class
Multiplier

Car-Miles

1.00
0.85

$1000
$850

10.0t
B.5t

1.15

$575

5.Bt

Premium
Paid for

10,000

Cost per
Mile
for
Owner

, Assumed value
" Deductions from the class multiplier: -0.15 for estimated future mileage less than 7500 miles;
-0.15 for two or more cars on policy. From the Pennsylvania manual of State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance, effective 5/15/92

Table 1 shows that factors not directly related to risk, such as
number of cars in a household and how intensively they are used
within time periods, determine large differences in what is charged
per mile of exposure to risk of loss for cars in the same territory and
driver risk class.
The requirement endorsed by Mr. Woll that the number of price
units should be proportional to expected losses, other risk factors
being equal, leads to the absurd conclusion that insurers currently
expect a customer who drives 10,000 miles over two years or in two
cars in one year to have approximately twice the losses as a customer
driving one car the same distance in one year.
Mr. Woll raises the issue of decreasing claims per mile with
increasing annual mileage by presenting Allstate study data in his
Figure 1. By raising this relationship as an objection to the car-mile
as a price unit, Mr. Woll implies that the same cents-per-mile price
would be applied to all cars and therefore would overcharge the
owners of cars driven more intensively in a year relative to owners of
cars driven much less in a year. This objection, however, ignores the
fact that cents-per-mile prices would depend on each car's risk classification.
As in prior studies with similar results, the results shown in Mr.
Woll's Figure 1 are obtained with data that either are unclassified
or are classified only by driver sex; see Butler, Butler, and Williams
(1988, p. 266). As a consequence, drivers at the extremes of the age
range, who have considerably higher than average accident rates per
mile and also average much less driving, would be over represented
at lower mileages without classification by driver age. (The paper
points out that car-miles of exposure randomly sampled by accidents
would be biased toward the cars of such driver groups.) Concurrently,
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the higher mileage data would be biased to cars used predominantly
on limited access highways with lower accident rates per mile. As
Mr. Woll points out, it is not just miles driven that determine risk
transfer cost, but territory, driver, and use of car, all of which require
risk classification for evaluation. Conversion of class prices from dollars-per-year to cents-per-mile demonstrates this essential relationship.
Table 2 compares the conversions of two existing car-use classes to
cents-per-mile prices. All that is necessary for the conversion is an
average mileage value for the class. At averages assumed for the two
classes, the difference in the cents-per-mile class prices shown in the
table approximate the threefold decrease in per mile claim rates
with the fivefold increase in intensity of car use from 5,000 miles to
25,000 miles per year shown by the Allstate data in Mr. Woll's
Figure 1.
TABLE 2

Car-Mile Prices For Two Use Classes

Class
Pleasure
Business

Territory
Car-Year
Base Price*

$500
$500

Multiplier**
.95

1.40

CarYear
Price

Average
Miles per
Car-Year*

Calculated
Price per
Car-Mile

$475
$700

5,000
25,000

9.5t
2.8t

* Assumed values
** Adult unisex driver class. Multipliers from the California manual of State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance, effective 1/15/91

What determines per-mile risk for a car is not the number of
miles it is driven within an arbitrary time period (one year), but the
average conditions under which the driving is done. Although intensity of car use may correlate with driver age and car use, classification is essential to determine the cost of insurance coverage per carmile for any set of driving conditions. The car-mile unit for measuring
the cost of risk transfer is also essential to meaningful territorial
classifica tion.
As though the car-mile were a classification variable, Mr. Woll
states that "[W]e find that mileage is a relativel} unimportant
source of difference between customers compared to territory." An
example shows, however, that classification by territory depends on
the car-mile exposure unit-as distinct from mileage classificationto have meaning for individual risk transfer. Table 3 shows the
dollars per car-year prices for a high priced territory and a low
priced territory in California for cars in the same driver and use
82

Journal of Actuarial Practice

Vol. 1, No.1, 1993

class. The ratio of high to low prices per car-year is 4.4, presumably
representing the greater traffic density in Los Angeles and other
differences in conditions and costs. The cents-per-mile costs for car
owners also is shown in both territories at three mileage amounts.
TABLE 3
Car-Mile Costs by Territory and Miles Driven

California
Territory
13 Northern Counties
Los Angeles City

Car-Year
Price for
High Annual
Mileage*

Car-Mile Cost to Owner by
Miles Car is Driven in Year
3,000**
12,000
20,000

$265

7.6ft

2.U

1.3ft

$1172

33.7ft

9.8ft

5.9ft

* State Farm manual effective 1-15-91. Minimum coverage, adult unisex driver and car use profile from California Insurance Dept.'s 1990 Auto Premium Survey
** Discount for estimated future mileage less than 7,500 miles applied

If it is assumed that the average exposure for the class in both
territories in Table 3 is 12,000 miles per car-year, conversion to the
car-mile unit means that all of the northern counties cars would be
paying 2.2 cents a mile and all of the Los Angeles cars in the class
would be paying nearly 10 cents a mile, thus preserving the difference in territorial risk transfer costs.
In contrast to the differences between territories in cents-per-mile
costs at class average mileages, the northern counties owners of cars
driven 3,000 miles in a year pay more than seven cents a mile while
owners of Los Angeles cars driven 20,000 miles in a year pay less than
six cents a mile. The meaning of difference in risk by territory is lost
if more is paid per mile for individual cars in territories with low
traffic densities than is paid per mile for individual cars in territories with the highest traffic densities.
Mr. Woll devotes a considerable portion of his critique to discussing his study of statistical measures for comparing classifications
of car-year data, citing evaluation methods developed by the
Stanford Research Institute (SRI). Although the SRI study (1976) did
not evaluate the car-mile unit as an alternative to the car-year unit,
a major finding from its empirical study of nine years of individual
driver accident records establishes strong limitations on the ability
of classification by year to distinguish the cost of individual driving
risk. The study corroborates that the most powerful class separation
is driver sex, with men's average accident likelihood per year about
twice the women's average. Despite this large class difference, how-
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ever, the distributions of individual accident likelihoods per year for
men and women completely overlapped, with 13% of women having
likelihoods greater than men's average and 28% of men having likelihoods less than women's average. These overlapping distributions
and averages show characteristics that are similar to the distributions of men's and women's annual mileages in relation to the approximately 2:1 difference in their average miles driven. Eleven percent
of women exceed men's average mileage, and 24% of men drive less
than women's average mileage; see Butler, Butler, and Williams
(1988, p. 396). Individual miles of driving cannot be predicted from
experienced class averages, by driver sex, or in any other way. (See
the paper for the characteristics of individual mileage listed by
Bailey and Simon.) The miles that individual cars are driven, however, are recorded on their odometers as the measure of individual
risk transferred. The expected cents-per-mile cost of risk transfer
depends on statistically reliable actual class experience.
Mr. Woll's discussion of the car-mile price unit as if it were a
classification variable has provided an opportunity to show why the
car-mile exposure unit is essential to meaningful classification for
individual risk transfer. Dollars-per-year prices for example risk
classes that purport to distinguish differences in risk by territory,
driver, and car use show large individual variability in cents-per-carmile costs for reasons not directly related to risk. Therefore, not only
is the car-mile exposure unit essential for cost-based pricing of individual risk transfer, but its use is essential in order for risk classification variables (factors) to have meaning for individual risk.
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A New Approach to Modeling Excess Mortality
Peter D. England1 and Steven Haberman 2

Abstract
This paper describes a complete framework for the statistical modeling of excess
mortality, with particular reference to the experience of insured, impaired lives. The
principal measure of excess mortality considered is the standardized mortality ratio.
The modeling approach, based on the theory of generalized linear models, allows us to
build models containing several explanatory variables. The statistical significance of
these variables can be tested, and the effect of interactions between the variables can
be assessed rigorously. The paper uses data drawn from the extensive, continuing investigation into the mortality of insured, impaired lives conducted by the Prudential
Assurance Company (UK). The methodology has close connections with the traditional
actuarial approach to the measurement of excess mortality and can be regarded as a
generalization of this traditional approach.
Key words and phrases: impaired lives, generalized linear models, multiplicative hazard

1 Introduction
1.1 Background
In 1947, the Prudential Assurance Company decided to institute
an inquiry into the mortality experience of medically impaired,
insured lives. The investigation was designed to be both medical and
actuarial. The data were drawn from holders of life insurance policies effected since July 1947 in the ordinary branch of the Prudential
Assurance Company. Policies were included if the life insured exhibited one of a long list of impairments. Lives exhibiting two or more
1 Peter D. England obtained his Bachelors degree in Actuarial Science in 1988 and then
stayed at City University, London, to assist in the research activities of the
Department of Actuarial Science and Statistics. In 1993 he completed his Ph.D. in
statistical modeling of excess mortality. He current is working for Commercial Union
pic and specializes in non-life insurance.

2 Steven Haberman is Professor of Actuarial Science and head of the Department of
Actuarial Science and Statistics at City University. He received a degree in
mathematics from Cambridge University. He joined the Prudential Assurance Company
as an actuarial trainee and then City University as a lecturer, qualifying as an FIA in
1975. He has published widely in actuarial and related fields. His current research
interests include mortality, morbidity, premium rating, and pension funding.
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major impairments were excluded from the investigation, where an
impairment was regarded as major if it would warrant a surcharge in
its own right.
It was not considered practical to extend the scope of the investigation to include every impairment encountered in the course of
underwriting. For impairments that occur comparatively infrequently,
sufficient data would not have accumulated to provide useful results.
Accordingly, the rarer conditions generally have been excluded. At
the outset it was not possible to foretell the quantity of data that
would be forthcoming, however, and certain groups were included
where experience has shown that the data have proved insufficient.
Since 1961, several authors have reported results based on the
Prudential impaired lives data set. 3 A comparison of the diverse
reports is informative and provides insight into the changes in excess
mortality over the 40 years that the investigation has been
operative. It is worth considering the difference in the scope of the
studies and the approach adopted by the various authors (Table 1).
TABLE 1
Previous Studies Based on the Prudential Impaired Lives Data Set
Author
Clarke
Preston & Clarke
Clarke
Leighton
Papaconstantinou
Renshaw
Haberman and Renshaw

Publication Date

Calendar Years of Study

1961

1947 to 1958 (Allimpairmentsl
1947 to 1963 (All Impairments
1964 to 1973 (All Impairments)
1974 to 1983 (All Impairments)
1947 to 1981 (All Impairments)
1947 to 1981 (Hypertension)
1947 to 1981 (Peptic Ulcer)

1966
1979
1987

1988
1988
1990

The studies by Clarke (1961), Preston and Clarke (1966), Clark~
(1979), and Leighton (1987) form a series in which the authors use
the same approach in their analyses. Traditional methods were used
to produce standard actual! expected (A/E) ratios only. The differences between the reports lies in the exposure-to-risk periods considered (Table 1) and in the control experiences used in the calculation
of expected deaths. These authors briefly comment on the excess mortality of female lives where there are sufficient data to provide useful results.

3 The Prudential data set is not freely available. Readers interested in obtaining this
data set should direct inquiries to Prudential Assurance, Holborn Bars, London, "ECIN
2NH, England.
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Papaconstantinou (1988) uses the entire data set (as available at
the time) in his analysis and uses conventional exposure-to-risk theory in the calculation of mortality rates. He uses the data available
to provide a comprehensive set of excess mortality measures including
not only the familiar AlE ratios, however, but also excess death
rates and measures based on cumulative mortality. He considers all
impairments (male and female combined) for which there are more
than 100 entrants.
The Prudential impaired lives data set first was used in the statistical modeling of excess mortality by Renshaw (1988) who adopts
the multiplicative hazards approach. Renshaw (1988) and
Haberman and Renshaw (1990) use the same data as
Papaconstantinou (Le., data for 1947 to 1981) and provide results for
two impairments, hypertension and peptic ulcer (male lives only),
respectively.

1.2 Summary
This paper concerns the measurement of excess mortality experienced by impaired, insured lives. The approach adopted here is to
use a multiplicative hazards model for the force of mortality. This is
similar to that used by Renshaw, but additionally includes data for
the period 1982 to 1987. The methodology is described and illustrated
with examples drawn from the Prudential impaired lives data set. It
must be mentioned that this approach has been applied systematically to all of the major impairment groups in the Prudential study,
and the full results are given in England (1993).
The methodology used in this paper can be applied to any investigation of excess mortality if the data requirements can be satisfied.
Such investigations would include studies based on the experience of
a single company or comprising the pooled experience across a number
of companies. An example of such an investigation is the Medical
Impairment Study 1983 of the Society of Actuaries and Association of
Life Insurance Medical Directors. We feel that, given the power and
versatility of the methodology, its potential should be recognized
outside the United Kingdom (where it has been applied so far).
Given their ready access to fast personal computers, workstations,
and mainframe computers, we feel that this method will be of interest to North American actuaries.
The results of this study support and supplement the results published in earlier investigations. The results relating to the subsidiary
impairment codes are new-this information has been ignored in earlier investigations based on the Prudential data set. These latest
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analyses identify some anomalous results emerging from the earlier
studies, in particular some of the indices given by Papaconstantinou
(1988).

1.3 A Note of Caution
When comparing results of the various studies, differences in the
mortality ratios obtained may be due to combinations of the following four factors:
•
•

•

•

The Period Under Study;
The Control Experience Used in the Calculation of Expected
Deaths: It should be noted that when expected deaths are low, a
small difference in the value of expected deaths may change the
value of the mortality ratio significantly, as expected deaths
appear in the denominator;
The Method Used in the Calculation of Expected Deaths:
Using traditional methods, expected deaths are given by an
expression of the form Eq* (or L Eq*) i.e., the exposure to risk
multiplied by the standard mortality rate. Using the multiplicative hazards approach, expected deaths (ej) are given by a different expression based on the aggregate integrated standard force
of mortality. Differences may arise in the values of expected
deaths given by these methods. When expected deaths are low,
these differences may cause a significant change in the value of a
mortality ratio, as expected deaths appear in the denominator;
and
Errors: Despite the efforts taken to eliminate any source of error,
it is possible that errors occur that affect the results obtained,
especially in a study the scale of an impaired lives investigation. Errors may be due to incorrect recording of data, mistakes in
data manipulation, programming mistakes, incorrect calculation's
using results, and typographical errors in reports. Major errors
usually are immediately noticeable; minor errors, however, may
pass undetected.

2 The Data Set
The 1947 Prudential impaired lives study uses a coding scheme
for impairments devised by the company's principal medical officer
at the time, T.W. Preston. The impairments considered are divided
into nine broad categories (e.g., circulatory impairments, respiratory
disorders), each subdivided into its constituent impairments. Since
1947, some impairments that originally were included have been
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dropped and some impairments that were not have been added. A
few impairments have had their associated codings changed. By the
end of 1987, data were available on over 650,000 policies effected on
impaired lives (where the impairment was present at the outset).
Those involved in planning the study showed considerable foresight and adopted a classification of impairments that was criticized
in its day for being too detailed. To this criticism the powerful
riposte was made that "once the data have been tabulated, groups
can always be combined but they can never be further subdivided." It
is only now, with sufficient data and statistical software packages,
that full advantage of the detailed classification can be made.
For each policy in the investigation, the following information
was recorded: policy number, impairment code (plus subsidiary code),
date of entry (year and month), age at entry (next birthday), date of
exit (year and month), age at exit (next birthday), curtate duration
at exit, mode of exit (still in force, withdrawal, death), cause of
death, joint life marker, and sex.
Information that would be of interest, but which is not available,
concerns the terms of acceptance (accepted as standard, reducing debt
etc.), duration since onset of impairment, sum insured, type of policy,
experience of lives declined for insurance, and smoking status.

3 Statistical Methodology
3.1 Traditional Methods
The traditional actuarial approach to the measurement of mortality is based on the comparison of actual and expected deaths. The
history of this process has been investigated by Keiding (1987).4 This
approach also has been applied to the measurement of excess mortality associated with an extra risk in the comparison of actual and
expected deaths for a group of policyholders exhibiting the particular risk under consideration. Examples of possible types of risk are
medical impairments, occupational hazards, hazardous pursuits, geographical location of residence, and ethnic origin. Combinations of
the above risks may be of interest (e.g., the effect of a particular disease within different ethnic communities).
Using exposure-to-risk theory, the expected numbers of deaths are
calculated using a set of suitable standard mortality rates, controlling
4 One of the earliest descriptions of the method is attributable to William Dale, an
English actuary living in the 18th century who was investigating the adequacy of
contemporary annuity rates.
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as closely as possible for factors such as sex and age (and possibly
other characteristics). Let dt, qt, Et be the observed number of deaths,
the observed mortality rate, and the initial exposure-to-risk, respectively, for the group under consideration for the interval of follow-up
for curtate duration t (i.e., [t, t+l)) where t is an integer (say, measured in years). Note that d t and qt are random variables. Let q'{
q't be
the standard mortality rate and define d,{,
d't, to be the expected number
of deaths, i.e., d'{
d't = EEt q't.
The interval mortality ratio for the interval of follow-up [t, t+l)
is denoted by kt, and is given by:

Clearly, if kt > I, the mortality rate in the study group (for curtate
duration t) is higher than the standard rate. If kt < I, the mortality
rate in the study group is lower than the standard rate.
When the numbers of deaths (or expected deaths) are low, neighboring intervals of follow-up sometimes may be grouped together to
give:

where neighboring intervals are grouped over an n year period. Thus,
nko is the ratio of deaths observed in an n year period and deaths
expected over the same period.
The properties of this ratio have been described in detail by
Haberman (1988). For example, it is straightforward to show that
the index /J ko may be regarded as a weighted average of the k t over
the first n years of observation with weights Wt equal to the number
of deaths expected on the basis of the standard population mortality
rates at duration t. The index clearly does not treat all the k t terms
equally; it places most weight or emphasis on those k t at the durations where the Wt are highest. This may not be unreasonable; these
durations are likely to be those where the underlying data are
largest. Any resulting indices are subject to the least statistical variability and, hence, are most reliable in statistical terms. The quantiko commonly are known as the AlE ratios; see Clarke
ties k t and nnko
(1979).
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This conventional approach (based on AlE ratios) does not provide any guidance on how we decide which factors or combinations
thereof have a significant bearing on excess mortality, nor how we
should construct the best possible model representing excess mortality.
For such refinements, we need a more statistically sound structure.

3.2 The Multiplicative Hazards/Generalized Linear Model
Approach
3.2.1 Introducing the Multiplicative Hazards Model
Following the notation used in the literature on survival analysis
(induding Elandt-Johnson and Johnson, 1980; London, 1988), we let the
random variable T denote the lifetime of a living organism or an
inanimate object (e.g., a light bulb). The instantaneous failure rate at
time point t is A(t) and is called the hazard rate or intensity rate.
Strictly,
A )_
(t -

lim

L1t~O+

Prob(t < T < t+L1t IT> t)
L1t

where this limit is assumed to exist. Hence, the probability of failure in (t, t + At) given survival to time t is approximately equal to
A(t) At, for very small .At.
Now consider the hazard rate of a study group with certain
characteristics (z) and denote this hazard rate by A(t,Z). Note that z
is a vector of information on the characteristics of the study group. If
the important characteristics are age, sex, weight, height, and
impairment, for example, then the vector z may be as follows: z = (50
years, male, 250 pounds, 5'10", hypertension).
The multiplicative hazards model is said to hold when A(t,Z) can
be factored as
A(t,Z)

= A*(t) x 8z

(1)

where A*(t) is some known standard hazard rate, independent of z,
and the proportionality factor 8z (independent of t) measures the
effect of the characteristic z on the study group's hazard rate relative to the known standard hazard rate A*(t). If 8z > 1, the failure
rate in the study group is greater than the standard failure rate, and
if 8z < 1, the failure rate in the study group is less than the standard
failure rate.
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In the field of actuarial science, failure is (typically) death,
time of failure is age at death, and the hazard rate is called the
force of mortality. Thus, equation (1) can be rewritten by replacing the
symbol for the hazard rate (A,) by the standard symbol for the force
of mortality (/1) and rearranged to give:
8z =

/1(t,Z)
/1*(t) .

In this context the 8z's
(}z's can be viewed as instantaneous mortality
ratios. These ratios can be compared with the interval mortality
ratio, ki' which is a ratio of annual mortality rates.
Cox (1972) proposes writing the proportionality parameter {}8 as
an exponential function of the vector of covariates z with unknown
regression parameters f3 such that:
(2)

giving
/1(t,z)

= /1*(t) e

pTZ

.

(3)

This representation of the mortality ratio 8{}zz is a mathematical construct. It uses only those factors that are considered to influence the
mortality ratio to a significant extent. These factors may be qualitative, such as severity of disease, or quantitative, such as age at entry
or level of blood pressure. Both f3 and z, however, must be real-valued
vectors. To accomplish this, nominal and ordinal characteristics are
usually coded using real numbers.
Equation (1) is called the multiplicative hazards model or the loglinear model because the linear combination of factors acts multiplicatively on the mortality ratio. This equation provides a specific case
of a more general model:

where h is a function to be specified. Detailed experiments with different choices for h have shown that the exponential function provides the most satisfactory choice in terms of the goodness of fit, its
simplicity, and its implicit avoidance of negative values for {}.
8.
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3.2.2 Estimating the Parameters f3
Consider a study consisting of N mutually independent individuals. For the ith individual, i = 1, 2, ... ,N, let the entry and exit
times from the study be denoted by 'ri and ti, respectively. Let Zi be
the vector of characteristics associated with i, and let the indicator
variable, ~i, denote the mode of exit, i.e., ~i = 1 if the ith person died
in the study and ~i = 0 otherwise. This results in the following likelihood function:

where:

S(t,z)

Jtl1(s,z) ds]

= exp[ -

is the survival function. The log likelihood function may be written
as:
N

log L = k (~i log l1(ti,Zi) + log S(ti,Zi) - log S( 'ri,Zi) )
1=1

j

t
N ( ~i log l1(ti,Zi) -111(u,Zi)
=~
du ) .

(4)

Substituting Cox's multiplicative hazard function (represented by
equation (3» into equation (4) gives the following result:
N (
IJTz. tj
)
log L(f3) = constant + ~ ~i WZi - e '111*(U) du

(5)

where we identify specifically the dependence of log L on the
unknown regression parameters, 13.
For convenience, the individuals in the study are grouped into M
cohorts, denoted by j (j = 1, 2, ... ,M), which represent particular
combinations of the characteristics under consideration-for example,
age at entry, policy duration, and severity of the impairment.
Renshaw (1988) shows that, in this case, the log likelihood function
may be written as:
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(6)

where:
c

a constant independent of f3;
M

l

Nj

= number of individuals in cohort j so that N =

tjk
'Cjk
dj
e'J

= age at which individual k from cohort j was last observed;
= age at which individual k from cohort j entered the study;

J=1

N·;
J

number of deaths observed in cohort j;
the aggregate integrated force of mortality,
N·

ej ="Y.

k=1

r
t

f.l*(u) duo

(7)

Tjk

In the appendix, it is proved that ej is an unbiased estimate
of the expected number of deaths from cohort j given standard rates had applied. The interpretation of ej is discussed
in the appendix; and
mj is given by:

(8)

so that
(9)
Note that equation (6) has the same form as the log likelihood for
independent Poisson random variables dj with respective means mj'
given by equation (8).
The vector of parameters f3 can be estimated by maximizing the
log likelihood function. This has been performed using the software
package GUM, which relies on the presence of a generalized linear
model. The above description can be recast in the form of a generalized linear model, as discussed by Dobson (1989).
Equation (9) is used as the estimation equation in the GUM package. The term {3TZj is called the linear predictor in generalized linear
model terminology. The log (ej) term is called an offset and is considered as an extra term in the linear predictor with a coefficient of 1.
GUM calculates the parameter estimates using maximum likelihood
techniques.
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3.3 Practical Implementation
pTZj

To establish a connection between the factors e
and traditional
actuarial mortality ratios, recall equation (8) (rewritten in the form):
(lO)

Following the methods used in the appendix, it easily can be proved
that mj is an unbiased estimate of E[djl. It thus seems reasonable to
replace f3, mj' and ej by [3, dj' and dj, respectively, where dj is the
expected number of deaths in cohort j had standard mortality rates
applied. This gives
~TZ'

e

_

!!i _

] - dj -

Actual Deaths
Expected Deaths '

(11)

which is identical to the traditional actuarial AlE mortality ratio.
In practice, the application of this statistically-based methodology is straight forward. For a mortality study involving N participants, the first step is to partition the sample into homogeneous
cohorts (indexed by the suffix j), ensuring that there are sufficient
data in each cohort to make the construction of mortality ratios
meaningful. For each individual, the information needed for the statistical calculations is age at entry (r), age at exit (t), and mode of
exit. The second step is to use this information to calculate the
observed number of deaths (dj) and the expected number of deaths (ej)
for each cohort. The third step is to· develop the coding scheme used
to identify the covariate structure to be modeled. It should be
emphasized that the covariates must be expressed as real-valued
variables. The fourth step is to enter the values of dj and ej and the
covariate structure into a statistical modeling software package, such
as GUM, for model fitting and the calculation of the parameter
.
/\
estimates, p.
Using GUM, various models may be fitted from the null model
(no covariates) to more complex models involving interaction terms,
giving different parametric representations for the mortality factor.
Statistical analysis of the significance of covariates and their possible interactions is based on a goodness-of-fit statistic called the
deviance. (GUM automatically provides the deviance when fitting
models). The deviance is based on the likelihood ratio principle
rather than on the (possibly more familiar) Pearson goodness-of-fit
statistic. It is essential that inferences should be based on differences
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between model deviances, as their absolute values are conditional on
the total number of covariates under simultaneous investigation. The
differences in model deviances are assumed to follow the X2 distribution with the appropriate degrees of freedom (an approximate
result). This can be used to assess the significance of factors included
in (or excluded from) the model. Furthermore, residual plots may be
used as an informal diagnostic tool to highlight the source of unexpected effects.
If a model provides a good fit, the histogram of deviance residuals should be approximately bell-shaped (Le., approximately normal). Also, a scatter plot of deviance residuals against linear predictor should show a corridor of values.
Any other patterns would be indicative of a lack of fit. In such a
case, a transformation of the data may be necessary, or account may
need to be taken of factors other than those included in the current
model. Outliers also would be detected by plotting residuals and
would be identified as isolated points on these plots far from the
remaining residuals.
This methodology is similar to that used in cohort studies in epidemiology, which are concerned with the follow-up of large population groups over many years (for example, to ascertain the effects of
environmental exposures on the outbreak of illness). A full description
is given by Breslow (1985). One of the main differences between the
two approaches is that in this paper we are modeling the relative
mortality experience, whereas in epidemiological studies the mortality rate itself often is modeled.

3.4 Basis for Expected Deaths-The Standard Experience
Used
Choosing a suitable control experience for the calculation of
expected deaths is a difficult task. The ensuing discussions of papers
presented to the Institute of Actuaries concerning the mortality of
impaired lives indicate that criticism often rests with the choice of
the control experience.
One of the principal problems is with the length of the investigation, presently 41 years. In his analysis, Papaconstantinou (1988)
modifies the A67-70 (2) select table using linear relationships proposed by the Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau5 to produce a
5 The A67-70 (2) select table is a standard life table with a two year select period
based on data (male endowment and whole life policyholders) collected by the
Institute and Faculty of Actuaries Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau (CMIB)
from contributing insurance companies (Joint Mortality Investigation Committee, 1974).
The CMIB is a permanent research organization established by the Institute and
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different set of mortality rates for each quadrennium between 1949
and 1978. By a process of interpolation and extrapolation, he produces a different set of rates for male lives for each year of entry
1947 to 1981. For female lives, he uses the rates thus produced with a
four year age deduction. Renshaw (1988), in his turn, feels that the
method adopted by Papaconstantinou is unnecessarily detailed and
condenses Papaconstantinou's rates into five year intervals commencing with 1947 to 1951 and ending in 1977 to 1981.
In the analysis covered by this report, it was decided to use the
A67-70 (2) select table unmodified for all years of entry for male
lives. The period used in forming this table (1967 to 1970) is roughly
mid-way through the period for which the Prudential data are
available (1947 to 1987). The expected deaths calculated for the earlier part of the study will tend to be understated (resulting in an
overstatement of the excess mortality). Similarly, the expected
deaths calculated for the later part of the study will tend to be overstated (resulting in an understatement of the excess mortality). A
comparison of Renshaw's results, in respect to hypertension, with the
results included in this report, however, reveals that the differences
in the standard forces of mortality used, on the whole, make little
difference to derived measures of excess mortality.
Nevertheless, the basis for expected deaths used here is not
ideal. A more satisfactory approach would be to obtain the
Continuous Mortality Investigation Bureau's data for whole life and
endowment insurances (for standard lives), grouping into suitable time
intervals (e.g., four or five years), and graduating to form a smooth
set of mortality rates for each time interval.
The use of a fixed control experience does not mean that time
trends are being ignored. Any significant trends would be identified
through the presence of calendar year of death as one of the covariates in the vector z.

4 Illustrating the Methodology
To illustrate the methodology and highlight some of the advantages of the multiplicative hazards/generalized linear model
approach, a summary of the results from preliminary analyses of two
impairment groups (impairment of coronary arteries and hypertension) will be considered (male lives only).
First, consider the data set. Of the data available for each policyholder, the information needed is medical impairment (including
Faculty of Actuaries to collect and analyze mortality and morbidity statistics and
prepare standard tables. The continuous collection of such data began in 1924.
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further subclassification), date of entry, age next birthday at entry,
date of exit, mode of exit (withdrawal, death), and sex. Medical
impairment and sex provide the necessary information for breaking
the sample into reasonably homogeneous cohorts. The age on next
birthday at entry provides the necessary values 'rjk. Date of entry,
age next birthday at entry, and date of exit together provide the
values of tjk needed for the calculation of ej (using equation (7)). The
values of dj depend on the mode of exit.

4.1 Impairment of Coronary Arteries
The initial selection and sorting of data were carried out using
the SPSSx statistical software package. For both male lives and
female lives separately, a subset of the full data set was created
that includes only those lives identified as suffering from impairment of coronary arteries. This category includes thrombosis, occlusion, ischaemia, infarction, and angina.
The data are partitioned according to:

•

•
•

Age at Entry: taking four levels
(1) 16 to 39
(3) 50 to 59
(2) 40 to 49
(4) 60 to 79;
Policy Duration: taking three levels
(1) 0 to 2 years
(2) 2 to 5 years
(3) 5 to 8 years; and
Whether Complications are Present (complications defined as
subsequent chest pain on exertion): taking two levels
(1) Without complications
(2) With complications.

This gives a total of 24 cohorts (4x2x3). For each of these cohorts,
the number of deaths observed (dj) and expected deaths (ej) are calculated (using Fortran 77 programs specially written for this purpose).
Age at entry and policy duration are taken as discrete variables.
It would be possible to use age and duration in continuous form and
represent their effect on excess mortality through the use of an appropriate (regression) model. In the results reported here, this
approach is not adopted.
Once the data are partitioned according to the covariate classification chosen and the number of deaths observed ana expected (the
aggregate integrated standard force of mortality) are calculated for
each cross-classified cohort, the data are suitable for feeding into the
GUM software package for model fitting and statistical analysis.
Here equation (9) is used as the estimating equation. The method of
model fitting adopted is forward stepwise, i.e., start with the simplest model (the null model) and include parameters one by one.
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4.1.1 The Null Model
The null model has the simplest form of structure in which the
linear predictor is represented by a single parameter, i.e.,

fJTz = b.
This is equivalent to combining age at entry, duration, and complication groups to give an overall mortality ratio equivalent to

Total Deaths in Study Group
Total Expected Deaths
which is an estimate of the mortality ratio associated with impairments of the coronary arteries as a whole.
Fitting this model with GUM gives a parameter estimate

&= 0.9076.
1\
AT

elJTzi,
From equation (11), the mortality ratio is given by ef3
zi, giving
eO.9076 =

2.48.

Thus, the overall mortality ratio for life insurance policyholders
with impairments of the coronary arteries at entry is 248% (i.e.,
extra mortality of +148%).

4.1.2 Main Effects Models
More information can be obtained by fitting models that allow for
inclusion of the principal factors believed to influence excess mortality (i.e.,
(Le., age at entry, duration, complications). These factors are
called main effects to distinguish them from the interaction terms
that relate to interdependence between factors. In this section, we
shall consider models that include these main effects, fitted separately.

4.1.2.1 Age at Entry
Recall that only the age at entry data are partitioned into four
levels. We denote the parameter values associated with the level of
age at entry as ai. Therefore, the parametric representation of the
linear predictor for the ith cohort is:
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i = 1, 2, 3, 4.

Fitting the age at entry main effects model in GUM gives the following parameter estimates:
~2 = 1.236,

/\

B= 2.912,

a 1 = 0,

a3
~3
/\

= -1.679,

/\

a4 =

-2.471

(For technical reasons, the first parameter estimate for any factor
included in a model is assigned the value zero).
Calculating

iJTz for each i gives:
i

MR%
1839
534
343
155

Age at Entry
16 to 39
40 to 49
50 to 59
60 to 79

These results indicate that proposers for life insurance under 40
year of age suffering from impairments of the coronary arteries constitute a substantial extra risk. Excess mortality decreases as age at
entry increases. Lew and Gajewski (1990), in their review of excess
mortality experience, note that for most medical impairments, relative mortality is highest at ages under 40 and decreases with
advances in age to relatively low mortality indices at ages 60 and
over.

4.1.2.2 Policy Duration
Recall that the policy duration data are partitioned into three
levels. We denote the parameter values associated with the jfh level
of policy duration as oj- Therefore, the parametric representation of
the linear predictor for the jfh cohort is:

j = 1, 2, 3
Fitting the policy duration main effects model in GUM gives the
following parameter estimates:

B= 1.205,

~1

= 0,

~2

= -0.4727,

resulting in the following mortality ratios:
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Duration
o to 2
2 to 5
5 to 8

MR%
334

208
222

These results show that the mortality ratio in the first two years
after entry is higher than subsequently. Such results also are not
unexpected. Lew and Gajewski (1990) also comment that indices of
excess mortality tend to decrease with increasing policy duration.

4.1.2.3 Complications
Similarly, we denote the parameter values associated with the
n. Therefore, the parametric representation of the linear predictor is:

kth level of the presence of complications as

k = 1, 2.
Fitting the complications main effects model in GUM gives the
following parameter estimates:

t = 0.7893,

/I.

Yl = 0,

Y2Y2 = 0.2771

/I.

resulting in the following mortality ratios:
MR%

Without Complications
With Complications

220
290

As expected, there is a higher risk associated with the presence of
complications.

4.1.3 Significance of Main Effects
The results according to the main effects fitted separately could
have been obtained using the traditional actuarial methods, based on
AlE ratios. One of the advantages of the modeling approach used in
this paper, however, is that it is now possible to assess the statistical significance of the main effects. That is, it is possible to answer
such questions as "Is age at entry a significant rating factor?" and
"What about the presence or absence of complications?" These questions are answered with recourse to the model deviances. The null
model is a simpler model than the main effects models, and it can be
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shown that the difference in deviances between the null model and
the main effect models approximately follows a X2 distribution; see
Dobson (1989).
Using the deviances provided by GUM when fitting the particular models, a deviance table for the main effects models may be produced as in Table 2 below. The differences in model deviances are
referred to the appropriate X2 distribution to assess the significance
of the main effects.
Notation
The null model is denoted by H 0, the age at entry model by A,
the policy duration model by D, and the complications model by C.
TABLE 2

Impairment of Coronary Arteries: Significance of Main Effects
Model

HO

A
D
C

Deviance

116.56
33.75
102.27
110.95

Degrees of
Freedom

---jDifferences-----Differences--Deviance
Degrees of Freedom

Tail Area

23

a:>

21
22

82.81

14.29
5.61

3
2
1

<.05%
.75%
1.75%

Analysis of the differences in model deviances indicates that all
three main effects are highly statistically significant (tail area less
than 5% in all cases).

4.1.4 More Complex Models
Because all three main effects are significant, we may be interested in more complex models, looking at age at entry and policy
duration combined or including all three factors. We also may be
interested in the effect of interdependence of rating factors, assessed
by the inclusion of interaction terms.

4.1.4.1 Main Effects Fitted Together, No Interaction
Because all three rating factors are statistically significant, they
will need to be included together in a model in order to assess, as
accurately as possible, the rating required for a given combination of
factor levels. The simplest type of model structure accounting for all
three rating factors is fitted by including the main effects without
interaction terms. The GUM notation for this model is A+D+C. The
parametric representation of the linear predictor for cell (i, j, k)
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where i represents age at entry, j represents policy duration, and k
represents presence of complications, is given by:

The associated mortality ratios are found by exponentiating the
linear predictor, thus:
ef3TZjik
ef3TZjik = exp(b + ai + Oi + Yk)

that is, the effects are multiplicative.
The mortality ratio of 18.39 for the age at entry group 16 to 39
was based on only nine deaths. Therefore, it was decided to combine
ages at entry 16 to 39 and 40 to 49 when considering more complex
models, resulting in only three levels for the age at entry factor (i =
1, 2, 3).
The parameter estimates obtained by fitting model A+D+C are as
follows:

~ 3 = -0.3354,

1\

Yl = 0,

1\

Y2 = 0.3359.

The mortality ratios calculated for each combination of i, j, and k are
shown in Table 3. A direct result of using the multiplicative model,
without interaction terms, is that there is an underlying pattern in
the mortality ratios in Table 3. Close inspection reveals that:
•
•
•

Entries for "with complications" are 1.4 times larger than entries
for "without complications";
Entries in the second row are 0.66 times entries in the first row,
and entries in the third row are 0.72 times entries in the first
row; and
Entries in the second column are 0.57 times entries in the first column, and entries in the third column are 0.26 times entries in the
first column.

There is no conflict between the results shown here and the
(Le., figures are of the same order
results for the main effects models (i.e.,
and changes are in the same direction). The advantage is that more
information is conveyed using simple mathematical relationships.
Furthermore, the 18 entries in the tables of mortality ratios are
derived from just six parameter estimates.
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TABLE 3
Impairment of Coronary Arteries: Mortality Ratios, Model A+D+C
(Multiplicative Structure)

Without Complications

Duration
Ot02
2t05
5t08

MR(%)
Age at Entry
501059

16 to 49
675
446
486

385

254
'ZT7

60 to 79
176
116
126

With Complications

Duration
Ot02
2t05
5t08

MR (%)
Age at Entry
50 to 59

161049
945
624

539

356
388

680

601079
246
162
177

Whereas results for the main effects models fitted separately can
be reproduced using traditional methods, the above results, based on
the main effects fitted together, cannot be so reproduced.

4.1.4.2 Interaction Terms
The significance of interdependence between rating factors can be
assessed by fitting models including interaction terms. In GUM notation, a model includes interaction terms if an asterisk (*) appears
between the symbols for model factors. For example, A *C+D represents a model including all three factors and the interaction between
age at entry and the presence or absence of complications. In this
example (concerning impairment of coronary arteries), the models
that need to be investigated are:
•
•
•

A *C+D with parametric representation
{JTzijk = b + ai + Oi + Yk + (aY)ik;
C*D+A with parametric representation
{JTzijk = b + ai + 0i + Yk + (OY)jk;
A *D+C with parametric representation
{JTzijk = b + ai + 0i + Yk + (a8)ij-

These models can be fitted in GUM and the difference in deviances
between model A+D+C and these models referred to the appropriate
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distribution to assess the statistical significance of the interaction
terms, as shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4
Impairment of Coronary Arteries: Significance of Interaction Terms
Model

A+D+C
A*C+D
C*D+A
A*D+C

Deviance

Degrees of
Freedom

--~Differences---

Deviances

23.647
21.718
21.973

18
16
16

1.93
1.67

20.050

14

3.60

Degrees of Freedom

2
2
4

Tail
Area
35%
45%
47%

The results indicate that none of the first order interaction terms
is statistically significant.
The only other model that can be fitted is model A *D*C, the
saturated model. This model reproduces the crude mortality ratios for
each combination of i, j, and k and will have a deviance of zero
because it gives a perfect fit, but no model simplification. The saturated model is the only other model that can be obtained from traditional actuarial methods, but it is unnecessarily complex because
interaction terms are not statistically significant. This leaves the
model A+D+C as the optimal model in that it is parsimonious and
conveys the salient features of the data available. An examination
of the associated residual plots supports this conclusion. (These plots
are not shown here).

4.2 Hypertension
4.2.1 Classification
It is customary to classify hypertension as primary (essential),
constituting the vast majority, or secondary to a long list of diseases
(some pathological process). In the Prudential study, the hypertension group refers to primary hypertension only.
As Singer and Levinson (1976) point out, "blood pressure may be
considered elevated only in terms of some normal standard." The New
York Heart Association (1955) proposes that "Any blood pressure
combination up to and including 139/89 (139 mm Hg systolic and 89
mm Hg diastolic) is regarded as normotensive. Any combination
including a systolic pressure of 160 and up, or a diastolic pressure of
95 and up, or both, is classified as definitely hypertensive. Any com-

105

England and Haberman

Excess Mortality

bination below 160/95 is classified as borderline hypertensive provided it is not within the normotensive limit."
Singer and Levinson (1976) and Brackenridge (1985) report that
the above definition "has been widely accepted," and both use it in
their analyses. Furthermore, it generally is accepted that blood pressure rises gradually as age increases, and increased levels in older
age groups still may be compatible with average mortality. Also,
significant differences in mortality with blood pressure level are
observed in the normal or normotensive range.
The data were partitioned according to:

•

•
•
•

•

•

Age at Entry: taking four levels as defined earlier;
Policy Duration: taking six levels
(1) 0 to 2 years
(3) 5 to 10 years
(5) 15 to 20 years
(2) 2 to 5 years
(4) 10 to 15 years (6) Over 20 years;
takin~ two levels
Family History: taking
hIstory of cardiovascular disease
(1) Good family history
(2) Poor family history of cardiovascular disease;
Blood Pressure: taking nine levels, classified simultaneously
according to diastolic blood pressure taking three levels
(1) Under 95 mm mercury
(2) 95 to 105 mm mercury
(3) Over 105 mm mercury and
systolic blood pressure taking three levels
(1) Under 150 mm mercury
(2) 150 to 165 mm mercury
(3) Over 165 mm mercury;
Weight Levels: taking two levels
(1) Within 20% of standard weight
(2) More than 20% above standard weight; and
Calendar Year of Entry: taking eight levels
(1) 1947 to 1951
(5) 1967 to 1971
(2) 1952 to 1956
(6) 1972 to 1976
(3) 1957 to 1961
(7) 1977 to 1981
(4) 1962 to 1966
(8) 1982 to 1986.

4.2.2 Results for Male Lives: Null and Main Effects Models
Taken as a group, the overall mortality ratio for male hypertensive is found to be 154% (based on 3,548 deaths).
We now will consider the main effects fitted separately.

4.2.2.1 Age at Entry (Factor A)
The estimated mortality ratios are:
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MR%
177 (450)
210 (1029)
139 (1127)
126 (942)

Age at Entry
16 to 39
40 to 49
50 to 59
60 to 79

The underlying numbers of observed deaths (dj) are shown in
parentheses.
Excess mortality is higher for ages at entry below age 50, as
would be expected. A surprising feature here, however, is the rise in
excess mortality (from +77% to +110%) for the age at entry group 40
to 49 compared with age at entry 16 to 39.

4.2.2.2 Policy Duration (Factor D)
The estimated mortality ratios are:
MR%
155 (279)
135 (584)
164 (1120)
175 (765)
155 (443)
128 (357)

Policy Duration
o to 2 years
2 to 5 years
5 to 10 years
10 to 15 years
15 to 20 years
over 20 years

Excess mortality falls after the first two years duration then
rises steadily to a peak at 15 years duration, after which excess mortality falls again.

4.2.2.3 Family History (Factor H)
MR%
148 (2645)
177 (903)

Good

Poor

These results dearly show a rise in excess mortality associated with
a family history of cardiovascular disease.

4.2.2.4 Blood Pressure (Factor B)
The estimated mortality ratios are:
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Excess
Diastolic Pressure (mm Hg)
< 95
95 to 105
~

<150

Mortality

>105

145

-7

(591)
Systolic Pressure
(mmHg)

150 to 165

133
(1237)

>165

159
(202)

166

(833)

185
(293)

180

(132)

257
(260)

As expected, the mortality ratios increase with increasing blood
pressure (from top left to bottom right). The pressure levels shown
here are consistent with the definitions of hypertension as given earlier. None of the associated mortality ratios are below 125%; therefore we clearly are dealing with blood pressure levels outside the
normal (or normotensive) range.

4.2.2.5 Weight Levels (Factor W)
The estimated ratios are:
Standard ± 19%
Standard + 20% or over

MR%
153 (2914)
162 (634)

Although there is a slight increase in extra mortality associated
with overweight, this increase is not as large as might have been
expected.

4.2.2.6 Calendar Year of Entry (Factor Y)
The estimated mortality ratios are:
Calendar Year of Entry
1947 to 1951
1952 to 1956
1957 to 1961
1962 to 1966
1967 to 1971
1972 to 1976
1977 to 1981
1982 to 1986

MR%
157 (694)
154 (842)
156 (655)
170 (639)
186 (274)
157 (167)
105 (205)
104 (72)

The mortality ratios for calendar years of entry 1947 to 1961 are
surprisingly stable (approximately 155%). Beyond 1961, the mortal108
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ity ratios rise, reaching a peak for calendar years of entry 1967 to
1971. Beyond 1971, the mortality ratios fall until there is almost no
excess mortality. These trends are difficult to interpret and may
reflect changes in underwriting standards within the Prudential
Assurance Company. Also, it would be problematic to extrapolate
this pattern of ratios beyond 1982 to 1986.

4.2.2.7 Significance of Main Effects
Referring differences in model deviances (Table 5) to the appropriate X2 distribution reveals that all the main effects are highly
significant with the exception of weight, which is nonsignificant
(although there is some evidence of a higher mortality ratio with
higher weight levels). Consequently, the weight factor is dropped
from subsequent model fitting.
This result that overweight in conjunction with hypertension does
not add significantly to the excess mortality risk may be a surprise,
but such a feature has been noted by earlier investigators; see Clarke
(1961), Preston and Clarke (1966), Clarke (1979), and Leighton (1987).
This may be explained by considering that the effect of an individual with hypertension also being overweight may have been allowed
for in their elevated levels of blood pressure.
TABLE 5

Hypertension: Significance of Main Effects

Model

HO

A
B
D
H

W
Y

Deviance
3615.7
3464.7
3509.6
3575.3
3594.5
3614.0
3553.2

Degrees of
Freedom
3808
3805
3802
3803
3607
3607
3601

---IDifferences----~Differences--Deviance
Degrees of Freedom

151.0
106.1
40.4
21.2
1.7
62.5

3
6
5
1
1
7

Tail Area

.05%
.05%
.05%
.05%
20%
.05%

More complicated models (other than main effects fitted separately) may be fitted and the significance of interaction terms
assessed. The results from the more important of these models will be
reported. In presenting the results, it is useful to think in terms of a
parametric representation of the GUM models.
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Factor
A Age at Entry
B Blood Pressure at Entry
Y Calendar Year of Entry
D Policy Duration
F Family History

Parameter
i = I, ... ,4
11: j
j = I, ... ,7
Yk
k = I, ... ,8
0/
1 = I, ... ,6
Pm
m = 1,2
ai

An additional parameter, b, is involved. similar to the constant coefficient in conventional linear regression.

4.2.3 Main Effects Fitted Together, No Interaction
The GUM notation for this model is A+B+Y+D+H, with parametric representation of the mortality ratio given by:
ef3

Tz

ijklm

= exp(b + ai + 1I:j + J1c + 0/ + Pm)

and, as noted before, the effects are multiplicative.
TABLE 6

Hypertension: Parameter Estimates for the
Main Effects Model With No Interactions
A

exp(b) = 1.95
Age at Entry

16-39
1.00

A

exp(ai)

40-49

50-59
0.70

1.09

60-79
0.65

Pressure
A

exp(lr j)
Diastolic Pressure (mm Hg)
<95
95-105
>105
Systolic Pressure
(mm Hg)

f-0.96

<150150 -165
>165

1.00
1.35

1.18
1.47

~

1.22
1.95

Calendar Year of Entry
A

exp(Yk)

47-51
1.00

52-56
0.98

57-61
0.94

62-66
0.94

67-71
0.99

72-76
0.81

n-81
0.60

Duration
A

exp(.5 I)

0-2
1.00

2-5
0.90

5-10
1.01

Family History
A

eXP(Pm)

Good
1.00

Poor

1.20

110

10-15
0.96

15-20
0.80

>20
0.72

82-86
0.63
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This model caters for all five (significant) factors simultaneously.
The parameter estimates resulting from fitting this model are shown
in Table 6. Mortality ratios then may be deduced from Table 6 by
forming the product of relevant entries (and multiplying by 100 to
express the ratio as a percentage).
Consider a hypothetical example;
example: A man took out a whole life
policy in 1977 at age 45. Upon medical examination his blood pressure was recorded as 155/100. From the proposal form it was found
that his family history of cardiovascular disease could be classified
as good. The policy now has been in existence for ten years, and an
estimate of the excess mortality associated with this risk is required
for the remainder of the policy.
Mortality
Policy Duration
10 to 15 years 1.95 x 1.09 x 1.18 x 0.60
15 to 20 years 1.95 x 1.09 x 1.18 x 0.60
> 20 years 1.95 x 1.09 x 1.18 x 0.60

Ratio
x 1.00 x 0.96 =
x 1.00 x 0.80 =
x 1.00 x 0.72 =

Excess
1.44
1.20
1.08

Mortality
+44%
+20%
+8%

4.2.3.1 Residual Plots
If a model provides a good fit, a histogram of deviance residuals
should be approximately bell-shaped (Le., approximately normal).
Also, a scatter plot of deviance residuals against linear predictor
should show a corridor of values. Any other patterns would be indicative of lack of fit. (These plots are not shown.)

4.2.4 First Order Interactions
Models including first order interaction terms have been fitted
and their deviances analyzed to assess the significance of the first
order interaction terms. The results are not given here, but are
reported in detail in England (1993). The results indicate that the
interaction between blood pressure and policy duration is statistically
highly significant.

5 Extensions and Further Applications
The resulting approach can be extended to incorporate different
choices for the function hO appearing in the relationship:
Oz

= h(fJTz).
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Two other choices have been explored in detail by England
(1993).
ADDITIVE
POWER
The additive model is essentially the basis underlying the numerical
rating system, which is widely-used for the risk evaluation of
impaired insured lives as part of the underwriting process. The mortality ratio is represented by a series of parameter estimates (which
may be positive or negative) that are summed. The estimates are
analogous to the debits and credits used in the numerical rating system. Interdependence of the rating factors may be accommodated by
including interaction terms in the definition of z.
The power model represents a family of models because the
parameter y may take any real value. When y = I, the additive
model is obtained, whereas in the limit as y ~ 0, the multiplicative
model is obtained; see McCullagh and NeIder (1989). For values of y
between 0 and I, the power model may be regarded as being intermediate between the additive and multiplicative cases. The value of y
giving the optimum fit, however, may lie outside the range (0,1).
This modeling approach can be extended with the inclusion of
approximate confidence intervals for the mortality ratios. Given the
form of the mortality ratio

in the more general case, this procedure is not completely straightforward. England (1993) provides further details.
The approach of generalized linear modeling has been used more
widely than modeling excess mortality. In particular, in the field of
graduation these techniques have been used to deal with the:
•
•
•
•

Graduation of mortality rates (Renshaw, 1991);
Graduation in the presence of duplicate policies (Renshaw, 1992);
Graduation of select mortality rates (Currie and Waters, 1991);
and
Graduation of transition intensities in a multiple state model
(Renshaw and Haberman, 1992).

112

Journal of Actuarial Practice

Vol. 1, No.1, 1993

These techniques could be used for the graduation of mortality rates
where it is intended to use a modification of a given standard life
table.

6 Conclusions
This article attempts to highlight the benefits and power of the
multiplicative hazards/generalized linear model approach. The
principal advantages of this approach over traditional methods are:

•
•

It enables comprehensive statistical analysis, including significance testing, model building, and residual analysis; and
It allows the effect on excess mortality experience of complex
interactions between the covariates to be assessed.

The approach described in this article provides a more dynamic
method of constructing and testing models than the traditional
approach. The current approach allows an assessment to be made of
the relationship between individual factors and their interactions
and their impact on excess mortality. The models of this paper do not
require extensive assumptions and, with the aid of modern statistical
software packages such as GUM, can be implemented easily. As we
have noted, these models can be seen to be a direct generalization of
traditional actuarial mortality ratios.
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Appendix-The Aggregate Integrated Standard Force of
Mortality
Recall the definition of ej given in equation (7), i.e.,
(7)

We will now show that ej can be interpreted as the expected number
of deaths in cohort j had standard mortality rates applied. This
interpretation can be justified because the expected value of ej is
equal to the expected number of deaths had standard mortality rates
applied. This is proved briefly by Berry (1983). A more complete
proof is shown below.
Consider a complete follow-up study, i.e., one where there are no
withdrawals or losses. This assumption is being made to simplify the
presentation. For cohort j, let us assume that individual k (k = 1, 2,
... , Nj):

•

•
•
•

Enters the study at time 0 (so 'rjk = 0). This can be done by a simple change of origin;
Has a maximum follow-up time of Tpo
Tjlo
Exits the study at time T/ic (which is tjk in equation (7)); and
Has an indicator random variable Ijk'
Ijk , where Ijk = 0 if individual
k leaves the study alive (T}ic > Tjk) and Ijk = 1 1f individual k dies
during the study (T/ic ::; Tjk).

The probability distribution function for T/ic
T/ic is f*(t) (assuming that
standard mortality applies) and F*(t) is its cumulative distribution
function. The force of mortality is J1*(t) where
*
f*(t)
J1 (t) =
=1 - F*(t)

(AI)

Let
ejk

=

Tl

J

J1*(t) dt.

Clearly ejk is a random variable because T/ic is a random variable. To
calculate the expected value of ejkt it is necessary to consider the
possibility of death before Tjk or after Tjk. This leads to:
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The first part of equation (AI) relates to the contribution to the
expected value made by the possibility of death occurring at time s,
integrated over all possible values of s from 0 to Tjk. The second part
is the contribution made by the possibility of survival to time Tjk'
the maximum follow-up time.
Integrating the first component of equation (AI) by parts gives:

JF*(s) J1*(s)
/1*(s) ds

]Tlk

S

E[ejk] = [ F*(s)J f..l*(t)
J.l*(t) dt

Tjk

0 -

Tlk

J

Tlk

= F*(Tjk)J J1*(t)
/1*(t)

dt +

Tlk

f..l*(s)
J.l*(s) [1 - F*(s)] ds - F*(Tjk)J f..l*(t)
J.l*(t) dt

Tjk

=

Jf..l*(s)[l
/1*(s)[l - F*(s)] ds
(A3)

The right side of equation (A3) follows from equation (AI). Next
we will prove that E[ejkl
E[ejk] = E[Ijkl. The contribution that individual k
makes to the number of deaths is 0 if the individual survives to Tjk
(with probability 1 - F*(Tjk)), and it is I if the individual dies
before Tjk (with probability F*(Tjk))' Hence,
E[Ijk]

=

0 x Prob(survival to Tjk) + 1 x Prob(death before Tjk)

= 0

x (1 - F*(Tjk)) + 1 x F*(Tjk) = F*(Tjk)'

Therefore E[ejkl = E[Ijk]'
Now for the entire cohort j, the term ej is defined as
N·

ej = V
Vejk
ejk

ftl
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and the expected number of deaths (had standard mortality applied
in this cohort), dj, is given by
(AS)

dJ. Therefore,
Equation (AS) shows that ej is an unbiased estimate of dj.
the statement that the aggregate integrated standard force of
mortality in cohort j can be interpreted as the expected number of
deaths in cohort j had standard mortality rates is justified.
Peter D. England
Commercial Union Assurance pIc
6 Broadgate (Level 7)
London, England EC2M 2QS
Steven Haberman
Department of Actuarial Science and Statistics
The City University
Northampton Square
London, England ECl V OHB
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The Small Plan Audit Program:
The Opinions of the Court
Arnold F. Shapiro*

Abstract
One of the most important issues of recent years from the perspective of many pension actuaries is the IRS's small plan audit program. The program initially was
expected to raise two-thirds of a billion dollars by targeting well-funded defined benefit plans with five or fewer participants. The focus of the audit was the assumed
interest rate and the normal retirement age, both of which the IRS generally regarded
as too low.
While the focus of the audit was relatively narrow, the issue it raised was a
funda mental one. The basic question was the extent to which the IRS could impose its
fundamental
unilateral interpretation of actuarial principles on pension actuaries.
Not surprising, many small plan audit cases ended in the tax courts. In due course
decisions and opinions have been rendered in three lead cases. This article presents the
opinions of these cases as they relate to actuarial practice and discusses some of their
implications.
Key words and phrases: defined benefit plans, actuarial assumptions, unit credit method,
IRS

1 Introduction
One of the most important issues of recent years from the perspective of many pension actuaries is the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS)
small plan audit program. 1 The program began in November 1989,
when the IRS2 initiated a nationwide plan to audit the actuarial
assumptions of approximately 18,000 small well-funded defined bene* Arnold Shapiro, Ph.D., F.5.A.,
F.s.A., is Professor of Actuarial Science and Insurance, Robert
G. Schwartz Faculty Fellow, and director of the Risk Management Research Center at
Penn State University. He serves as editor of Actuarial Research Clearing House and
associate editor of Insurance: Mathematics and Economics.
1 Even though this paper deals only with court cases in the United States, the opinion
of the court may have implications in any country where actuarial assumptions are at
issue.
2 Throughout this paper, the abbreviation IRC means the Internal Revenue Code and
the abbreviation IRS refers to the Internal Revenue Service of the U.s.
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fit pension plans. The program initially was expected to raise twothirds of a billion dollars in additional tax revenue.
The specific plans to be audited shared several characteristics:

• The plan year ended in 1986, 1987, or 1988;3
• The plan covered one to five participants;

•

••
•

The plan annual contribution generally, but not always, was
$100,000 or more;
The plan was valued with an interest assumption of less than 8
percent (IRS memo, November 29, 1989); and
The normal retirement age of the plan was less than age 65.

It was estimated that deductions would be disallowed retroactively

in 85 percent of the plans to be examined.
The program fell considerably short of its expectations. Although
all the audits under the program were concluded by July 31, 1992,
only $38 million in revenue had been produced by December 1992, and
the program appeared to be floundering; see the BNA Pension
Reporter (1992). In retrospect this is not surprising because the effort
immediately met intense and unrelenting resistance from small plan
actuaries, their associations, and their advocates.
It was not long after the small plan audit program was instituted
before several of the ensuing cases reached the tax court. These cases
were assigned to Judge Charles E. Clapp II, who, after observing that
there were likely to be many more such cases, selected some representative ones for trial. His stated intent was to develop judicial precedence and guidance so that subsequent cases could be resolved without
costly litigation.
The suits comprise two institutional and eight noninstitutional
cases. The two institutional cases, the first to be tried, involved large
successful law firm partnerships that had adopted individmll
defined benefit (IDB) plans for their partners. 4 The firms were the
Texas-based firm of Vinson & Elkins and the New York firm of
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz (Wachtell Lipton). In both
instances, assumptions used for valuing their plans were deemed
3 These plan years were chosen because the statute of limitations was ended for plan
years pnor to 1986 (IRe §6S01) and the tax law changed for plan years that ended
after 1988. The primary relevant changes in the tax law were the revision of the fullfunding limitation to include current liability (IRe §412(b)(S),(c)(7) and (1)(7» and the
amendment to IRe §412(c)(3), which requires that each actuarial assumption (rather
than actuarial assumptions in the aggregate) be reasonable.
4 In view of IRe §401(a)(26), individual defined benefit plans of this type no longer
are allowed, and these plans have been terminated.
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unreasonable by the IRS, which sought to disallow their deductions.
These cases were tried in January 1992, and a decision was handed
down the following July.
The remainder of the cases involved a variety of small businesses, each of which had a small defined benefit pension plan for
one or two key employees. Because the cases arose under an audit
program in Phoenix, they came to be known as the Phoenix cases, but
subsequently were referred to as Citrus Valley because they were consolidated and tried as Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. et a1. 5 These cases
involved frontloading of the contribution under the unit credit funding
method in addition to actuarial assumption challenges. The cases
were tried in February 1992, and a decision was handed down the following September.
This article presents the opinions of the court as they relate to
the actuarial practice associated with small defined benefit plans
and discusses some of their implications. First, the actuarial issues
contested by the IRS are summarized. Then the opinions of the court
relating to these issues are discussed. The paper ends with a comment
on the implications of the court's opinions.

2 The Actuarial Issues Contested by the IRS
The general actuarial issue raised by the IRS was whether actuarial assumptions used by the enrolled actuary to determine the
plans' costs were reasonable in the aggregate and represented the
actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience under the plans as
required by IRe §412(c)(3). The specific issues contested by the IRS
are summarized in Table 1. 6 For example, for the Vinson & Elkins
plans the IRS contested the 5 percent preretirement and postretirement interest rate assumption, the normal retirement age of 62,
the 5 percent postretirement expense load, and the preretirement mortality assumption. Moreover, the IRS contended that these assumptions were not offset by any other assumptions that would make the
assumptions reasonable in the aggregate.

5 Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. , Robert J. and Janice A. Davis, Old Frontier Investment,
Inc., Lear Eye Clinic, Ltd., Robert Stephan, Jr., Ltd., Boren Steel Consultants, Inc.,
Arizona Orthopedic Institute of Traumatic and Reconstructive Surgery, Jonathan R. and
Renee K. Fox, and Brody Enterprises, Inc. Although separately docketed, Arizona
~rthopedic is a successor to Jonathan Fox.
This paper does not deal with the nonactuarial issues of these cases, which included
timing of amendments, automatic approval of a cost method change, and validation of
hours worked.
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Most of the issues of Table 1 are self-evident,7 but those related
to the mortality tables and the cost methods need clarification. For
the institutional cases, the lOB plans that contained life insurance
used the 1958 Commissioners Standard Ordinary (CSO) mortality
table for the preretirement mortality assumption and the 1971
Individual Annuity Mortality (lAM) table for the postretirement
mortality assumption. While the IRS agreed that such plans may
provide a preretirement death benefit and may fund these benefits
using envelope funding,S it contested the use of the 1958 CSO table on
the grounds that it grossly overstated the expected actual mortality
experience.
TABLE 1

Actuarial Issues Contested by the IRS
Interest Rate
Expenses
Pre
Post

Mortality
Table
Pre Post

Cost
Method

Pre

Post

NRA

Vinson & Elkins

5%

5%

62

Wachtell Lipton

5%

5%

55

Citrus Valley

5%

5%

Davis

5%

5%

Old Frontier

5%

5%

Lear Eye Clinic

5%

5%

55

..J

Robert Stephan

5%

5%

55

..J

Boren Steel

5%

5%

Arizona Orthopedic

5%

5%

55

..J

..J

Fox

5%

5%

55

..J

..J

Brody Enterprises

5%

5%

55

..J

..J

7.5%

5%

..J

5/7.5%

..J

Citrus Valley et a/.

55

6/4.5%

7 Some of these plans could be differentiated only on the basis of their credible experience. It had been anticipated that the court's decision would be affected materially by
plan experience, but this turned out not to be the case.
S The envelope method may be used with any cost method and with any type of
insurance policy. It is the method that generally is used with the unit credIt funding
method or with insurance policies that do not have guaranteed projected cash values
at retirement. Under the envelope method, assets are adjusted by adding the cash
value of the insurance as of the valuation date. The normal cost and accrued liability
are calculated using the adjusted assets.
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The situation in Citrus Valley was somewhat different. In one
instance, an insurance company's guaranteed female annuity table was
used for a plan with a single male participant; in another, a female
mortality table with a seven year age setback was used for a plan
with a single male participant; and in another, an age setback was
used for a participant with a substandard family medical history.
The IRS contested the mortality assumption in each instance.
The IRS contested the actuarial cost method in a significant number of the Citrus Valley cases. The issue was straightforward. These
plans provided for the accrual of all, or a significant portion, of the
benefits provided under the plan in a very few years, a procedure
commonly referred to as frontloading. Using the unit credit funding
method, the benefits then were funded as they accrued with the contribution currently deductible. The IRS contended that while frontloading of benefit accruals is permissible from a qualification standpoint, an equivalent frontloading of the deductible contribution is not
permitted and that no more than 10 percent of the maximum benefit
may be allocated to a given year's normal cost, just as the maximum
benefit that can be provided to a participant with one year of service
is 10 percent of the overall IRC §415 limit.

3 The Experts
Before proceeding to the findings of the court, it is worth noting
the credentials of the experts chosen by each side and the focus of
their testimony or report.

3.1 The Institutional Cases
The experts for institutional cases included James F. Rabenhorst,
managing partner at Price Waterhouse, who testified regarding the
retirement age assumption; Richard R. Joss, Ph.D., F.S.A., M.A.A.A,
E.A., resource actuary for the Wyatt Company, who testified regarding the actuarial assumptions; Mary S. Riebold, F.S.A., M.A.A.A.,
E.A., F.C.A., managing director for Mercer and then-president of the
Conference of Consulting Actuaries, who testified regarding the actuarial assumptions; Steven H. Schechter, director of management
information systems at Wolper Ross, who testified regarding interest
rate assumptions based on an analysis of Form 5500 data; and John W.
Peavy III, Ph.D., C.F.A., professor of finance at Southern Methodist
University, who served to rebut the contentions of Shapiro and
Haneberg regarding the interest rate assumption.
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The experts for the IRS in these cases included Ronald L.
Haneberg, J.D., F.S.A., M.A.A.A., F.CA., previously a consulting
actuary with Buck Consultants, who testified regarding the actuarial
assumptions; Claude Poulin, F.S.A., M.A.A.A., E.A., president of
Poulin Associates, Inc., who testified regarding the actuarial assumptions; Alan C Shapiro, Ph.D., professor of banking and finance at the
University of Southern California, who testified regarding the interest rate; William S. Borden, Ph.D., senior program analyst at
Mathematica Policy Research, who testified regarding the investment return and in rebuttal to Joss; and Jeffrey F. Jaffe, M.B.A., Ph.D.,
associate professor of finance at the Wharton School, who provided
an expert report on the validity of the interest rate assumption.

3.2 Citrus Valley Estates, Inc. et al.
The experts for Citrus Valley included Kenneth D. Klingler,
F.s.A., M.A.A.A., E.A., a consulting actuary with the Wyatt
Company, who testified regarding the assumptions; and Arthur W.
Anderson, A.S.A., M.A.A.A., E.A., who previously had been a consultant for William M. Mercer, Johnson & Higgins, and the Wyatt
Company and was the author of Pension Mathematics for Actuaries,
testified as an expert with respect to the unit credit funding method.
The experts for the IRS included J. Ruben Rigel, J.D., F.S.A.,
F.CA., M.A.A.A., E.A., who testified with respect to the assumptions and the unit credit funding method; Roger Ibbotson, M.B.A.,
Ph.D., president and chief executive officer of Ibbotson & Associates,
Inc., who testified with respect to the interest rate assumption;
William S. Borden, PhD.,
Ph.D., who testified with respect to the interest
rate and retirement age assumption; and James E. Holland, A.S.A.,
E.A., chief of the Pension Actuarial Branch of the Service, who provided an expert report dealing with the unit credit funding method.

4 The Findings of the Tax Court
The court generally found against the IRS on most of the issues. In
the institutional cases, for example, the court held that "[t]he actuarial assumptions made by the plans' enrolled actuary were reasonable in the aggregate and represented the actuary's best estimate of
anticipated experience under the plans, as required by §412(c)(3);
accordingly, as the assumptions used were not substantially unreasonable, [the IRS] is precluded from requiring a retroactive change of
assumptions.
assumptions.""
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The court held similarly for the noninstitutional cases that all of
the challenged actuarial assumptions for each of the plans at issue
were reasonable. Further, the certifying actuaries for the plans using
the unit credit funding method funded within allowable limits and
made reasonable allocations of costs, except for one plan that was
complicated because of an amendment issue (Citrus Valley, p. 101).
Accordingly, the actuarial assumptions and methods used for the
plans were reasonable in the aggregate. A fortiori, these assumptions
were not substantially unreasonable in order to permit retroactive
changes of assumptions for years prior to the year in which the audit
was made.
The outcomes of the cases were not obvious prior to the decisions.
It is interesting and informative to read how an unbiased legal
authority interprets the actuarial issues involved. The following is a
recapitulation of how the court reached its conclusions.

4.1 Deference to the Enrolled Actuary
A major conclusion was that deference must be given to the
assumptions chosen by the enrolled actuary who certifies the funding
of the plan. In this regard, Judge Clapp gave his interpretation of
Congressional intent the full weight of legal authority.
Judge Clapp emphasized that Congress was aware in enacting
ERISA that actuaries would playa major role in ensuring that retirement plans would be sufficiently able to provide retirement income
when due. He observed that Congress recognized the importance of
the actuarial assumptions and the cost methods chosen by actuaries
in determining plan funding amounts and that Congress explicitly
noted that such determinations by actuaries would involve making
predictions and would be a matter of judgment involving many factors
and producing a range of results. He also commented that Congress
decided that accepting a range of reasonableness for funding amounts
for retirement plans would be more desirable and more effective than
imposing an inflexible legislative standard on actuaries and, therefore, rejected imposing mandatory funding assumptions and methods
(Wachtell Lipton, pp. 10-11).

4.2 The Interest Rate Assumption
In reaching his decision on the interest rate assumption, Judge
Clapp identified what he regarded as particularly important factors. He noted that the combination of these factors weighed heavily
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in favor of concluding that 5 percent was reasonable. For the institutional plans these factors were (Vinson & Elkins, p. 46):

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

The nature of the responsibility Congress entrusted to enrolled
actuaries in the statutory scheme enacted for defined benefit pension plans;
The conservative nature of the actuarial assumption selection process;
The fact that IDB plans were long-term plans, with funding to
occur over a 30 year to 50 year period;
The fact that IDB plans were self-directed, with each participant being a co-acfministrator,9 especially because most of the
IDB plans did not employ a professional manager;
The fact that IDB plans lacked credible experience with respect
to earnings, investment strategies, and otherwise;
The risk of losing compounded earnings in a tax-exempt trust associated with using overly optimistic assumptions and the resulting
requirement for unanticipated higher contributions in later years;
The relative closeness of all the actuarial experts' reasonable
ranges;lO and
The fact that most actuaries used interest rate assumptions of
between 5 percent and 6 percent for small plans during the years
at issue. l l

He listed the same factors, except for the relative closeness of the
reasonable ranges, for the noninstitutional plans (Citrus Valley, p. 69).
Judge Clapp also clarified the role of a prudent actuary in the
selection of the interest assumption. He noted that the actuary's primary duty to plan participants under ERISA is to establish a realistic contribution pattern over the long term so that the plan sponsor
will provide adequate funding for the ultimate pension obligation.
Thus, prudent actuaries maintain a long-term conservative view that
9 It is relevant that each partner/participant served as a coadministrator because that
meant that the plan assets of the IDB prans were not commingled for the purpose of
investment and, therefore, could not realize the rates of return earned by larger plans.
10 Not all the experts agreed that their reasonable ranges were close. See, for
example, Ronald 1. Haneberg, "Not All Experts Agree," Enrolled Actuaries Report
(November, 1992), p. 3.

11 This conclusion follows from Schechter's testimony that actuaries established
interest rate assumptions between 5 percent and 6 percent for 1986 plans with fewer
than 100 participants for 76.6 percent of the preretirement assumptions and 82.5 percent
of the postretirement assumptions. Schechter's conclusions were based on his analysis
of data obtained from the Department of Labor.
The court was not swayed by the IRS's contention that rates in general use during
the time were irrelevant.
126

Vol. 1, No.1, 1993

Journal of Actuarial Practice

will ensure benefit security for plan participants in selecting actuarial assumptions (Vinson & Elkins, p. 27)
Rejecting the IRS's contention that 8 percent would have been a
reasonable interest rate assumption because that amount could have
been earned during the years at issue, the court commented that
"Congress did not entrust the nation's tax-advantaged retirement savings system to hypothetical returns that the markets 'should' bear"
(Vinson & Elkins, p. 49).
Particularly noteworthy is the fact that the court attached only
minor importance to the testimony and reports of nonactuaries, in
spite of the fact that they were experts in the field of investment.
This was true, for example, even with the testimony of the wellknown Roger Ibbotson. 12 The rationale was that these persons were
not actuaries and that conclusions they drew would have limited
application in the determination of the reasonableness of actuarial
assumptions (Vinson & Elkins, p. 47). The court reasoned that if a
financial analyst's predicted rate is higher than the actual rate
earned, the investor simply earns less than expected, whereas if an
actuary makes the same mistake, there is a significant risk that the
plan will become underfunded and the pensioners' full benefits will
be unpaid (Citrus Valley, p. 71).

4.3 Retirement Age Assumption
The court seemed willing to accept a normal retirement age
(NRA) assumption that was less than age 65 as long as it was based
on reasons that were "sincere, credible, and reasonable." It explicitly
rejected the IRS's argument that statements by the participant in a
one person plan were merely self-serving, even when there was no
evidence that the underlying reasons had been explained to the plan
actuary. (See, for example, Citrus Valley, p. 83.)
The IRS took the position that failure of a key participant to
retire at the assumed normal retirement age was clear evidence that
the assumption was unreasonable. In rejecting this position, the court
noted that" ... the certifying actuary is not charged with the responsibility of determining when a plan participant will actually begin
to receive the plan benefits. That would be an impossible task.
Further, the fact that a plan participant might choose to, or actually
does, delay receipt of the plan benefits beyond the assumed retire12 Ibbotson & Associates, Inc. sells financial software and data and provides consulting
services to investment management firms. Roger Ibbotson is an often-quoted authority on
stocks, bonds, Treasury bills, and inflation.
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ment age does not make the retirement age assumption unreasonable.
An actuary is charged with looking into the future and making a
determination as to, among other things, when benefits under the
plan could begin" (Vinson & Elkins, p. 58).
Some of the Citrus Valley plans contained a segregated account
provision, which meant that at the normal retirement age benefits
were segregated into a separate account even if the participant chose
to continue working beyond that age. The present value of accrued
benefits at the normal retirement age is treated in effect as an
account balance in a defined contribution plan. The experts of both
parties agreed that the inclusion of a segregated account provision in
a plan rendered the date of a participant's actual retirement irrelevant (Citrus Valley, p. 75).
Given that the experts agreed, the court concluded that the segregation provision justified the finding that it was reasonable for the
assumed retirement age to be the normal retirement age stated in the
plan, because that would be the age at which the participant would
elect to segregate the accrued benefits. This obviated the retirement
issue for a number of plans that had a normal retirement age of 55.

4.4 Expense Loadings
The court held for the taxpayer in each instance where the IRS
challenged the expense loading. While Judge Clapp had some misgivings about the 7.5 percent expense loading in the institutional
cases, he found it not to be substantially unreasonable and acceptable
on the basis of reasonable in the aggregate.
He rejected the IRS's argument in the noninstitutional cases that
expense loading is merely a device to increase deductions. His opinion
observed that "[the IRS] offered a rather perfunctory rebuttal, stating simply that [the] addition of postretirement expense load
assumptions would further increase the funding goal and the amount
of the deduction ... This is not, however, unreasonable per se, as [the
IRS] seems to believe ... A postretirement expense load is a reasonable manner in which to fund the postretirement administrative
fees" (Citrus Valley, p. 91).

4.5 Mortality Assumptions
The court found that it was reasonable in the institutional cases
to use the 1958 CSO mortality table to compute the cost of the preretirement death benefit. It explicitly rejected the IRS's arguments
that a preretirement mortality assumption was unreasonable in a one
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person plan and that even if it were appropriate to use a preretirement mortality assumption, it was unreasonable to assume the 1958
CSO mortality table for the preretirement mortality and the 1971
lAM table for the postretirement mortality for the same person
because the tables are incompatible. As the court pointed out, the
probability of the participant's preretirement death was not at issue.
The issue was to estimate the life insurance premium expense, and
this could be done best by using the same type of mortality table as
would be used by the insurance company (Vinson & Elkins, p. 67).
In the noninstitutional cases, while the court was "not entirely
convinced that the mortality assumption ... is completely reasonable,
it is not substantially unreasonable so as to justify a retroactive
adjustment" (Citrus Valley, p. 87). Thus, even in situations as extreme
as the case involving a male participant that used the 1983 lAM
table for females with a seven year age setback, the mortality
assumption implicitly was approved by the court in its approval of
the funding assumptions in the aggregate.

4.6 The Unit Credit Funding Method
One of the surprises to emerge from the Citrus Valley cases was
the court finding against the IRS on the frontloading issue under the
unit credit funding method. The IRS previously had won the wellpublicized Mirza case (Jerome Mirza & Associates, Ltd. v. United
States, 882 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1989)), where the same issue was in
question and the same argument was used. In Mirza, the court agreed
with the IRS's interpretation that IRC §404(a)(1)(A)(iii) provides
that the maximum that can be deducted in any year is the "normal
cost" plus an amount necessary to amortize "past service" and other
supplementary cost over ten years, as determined under regulations
prescribed by the Secretary. It reasoned that "[i]t is simply inconceivable that Congress would take pains to provide for the amortization of past service credits but intended to allow taxpayers to circumvent this requirement by the device of structuring their plans to
accrue benefits in a single year" (Mirza, p. 232)
Judge Clapp enumerated three reasons for rejecting the Mirza conclusion (Citrus Valley, pp. 104-105). First, "[t]he language of
§404(a)(1)(A)(iii) setting forth the limit on deductible contributions
used the conditional phrase 'if *** provided by the plan' when setting forth the treatment for past service cost." Thus, there would be
only a past service liability if it were provided by the plan. Second,
"[d]espite [the IRS's] assertions to the contrary, there is no
express[ed] or implied connection between the limitations of §415 and
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any allocation under §1.412(c)(3)-1(e)(3)" (Citrus Valley, p. 99). That
is, there is no requirement that the allocation between normal cost
and past service liability be consistent with the limitations on benefit accruals. Third, "the Unit Credit Funding Method-in connection
with a career-average pay plan-inherently allocates benefits in a
reasonable manner to the past and future years of service for which
benefits accrued and will accrue."
This finding is only relevant for plan years beginning prior to
1987, as the approach discussed is not possible for plan years beginning after December 31, 1986. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 amended
§415(b)(5)
§415(b )(5) so that the dollar limitation is phased in over the first
ten years of participation in a plan rather than ten years of service
with the plan sponsor.

4.7 Evidentiary Matters
The IRS consistently has objected to actuaries' use of its training
manuals, audit guidelines, internal and external correspondence, and
transcripts of speeches made by Service employees regarding the matters at issue in these cases. The court concluded (Vinson & Elkins, pp.
75-77), however, that actuaries can take into account IRS documents
that have been disseminated publicly because "they are part of the
actuarial universe within which all actuaries must live, think, and
work in arriving at their conclusions as to reasonableness and their
best estimates regarding appropriate contributions." Moreover, actuaries can be guided by the speeches of high-ranking Service employees.
One specific comment that had been referenced by many pension
actuaries is the highly publicized transcript of the Ira Cohen speech
at the 1986 Enrolled Actuaries meeting, wherein he stated that a 4
percentage point corridor on either side of the prevailing long-term
Treasury bond rate was within the reasonable range of interest rate
assumptions. In spite of the fact that Cohen was the director of the
Actuarial and Technical Division of the Service at the time of the
speech, the IRS claimed that he had not spoken for the Service and,
moreover, the speech was merely hearsay. The court disagreed with
the IRS's position, and asserted that such a speech, heard by many
actuaries and disseminated by publication to many more, is not
hearsay, as long as the transcript is "true and correct."
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5 Implications
There seems to be a consensus among small plan attorneys that
the opinions rendered in these cases are likely to be afforded considerable credibility.13 Not only are they "lengthy, studious, and thoroughly analyzed," but they are based to a large extent on "factual
conclusions," which makes them difficult to overturn; see Reish and
Ashton (1992). Moreover, 14 of 15 participating tax court judges in the
Phoenix cases concurred with the opinions.
It is difficult to anticipate how the courts will react in future
cases where the issues are similar, but the facts and circumstances are
materially different. The following basic principles, however, seem
to have emerged:

•
•
•

The intent of Congress is that deference should be given to the
assumptions chosen by the enrolled actuary;
While assumptions are required to be reasonable and Con~ress did
not permit actuaries unfettered liberty,14 the pragmatIc test is
that assumptions are not "substantially unreasonable;"15 and
When formulating assumptions, it is appropriate for the actuary
to be guided by the "sincere, credible, and reasonable" expectations of the plan sponsor and IRS documents and insights that
have been publicly disseminated.

In the past actuaries have struggled to formulate a workable
interpretation of pension laws and regulations for small plans. In
most cases, actuaries are not attorneys, however-while their interpretation of these laws and regulations may have seemed reasonable
to them, there has been a need for an authoritative unbiased interpretation. These cases, with their scholarly exposition of the rules
and regulations, have done much to help put things into perspective.
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Options and the Management of Financial Risk, Phelim P. Boyle
(Society of Actuaries, 1992), 210 pp.
Reviewer: A. Hoque Sharit
Option pricing has been an active area of research in the field of
finance during the past 20 years. There are several textbooks that
cover options pricing theory in great detail (including texts by Cox
and Rubenstein (1985), Bookstaber (1991), Hull (1993), Jarrow and
Rudd (1983), and Ritchken (1987». Do we need another textbook?
Yes, for actuaries there is a need for a book that explains the management of financial risk at an introductory level. There is no similar
text written for actuaries.
In recent years, actuaries have become more involved in various
aspects of corporate finance. In fact, the Society of Actuaries has
already incorporated some courses on investment and finance in its
education program and has opened a finance track (fall of 1993) for
its Fellowship examination process. One expects Professor Boyle'S
Boyle's
Options and the Management of Financial Risk to play an important
role in this process and in the education of a new generation of actuaries.
There are two major topics covered in this text: (1) models of the
term structure of interest rates, and (2) the analysis and valuation of
derivative securities. Only a few basic concepts in finance are introduced, and they are dealt with at an introductory level with
numerical examples. Unfortunately, Professor Boyle does not refer the
reader to any introductory level text. The only other textbooks
referenced are by Malliaris (1982), Merton (1990), and Van Horne
(1970). None of these can be considered as an introductory text. It
* A. Hoque Sharif ASA (1984) is a Ph.D. student in actuarial science in the
Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo,
Canada. He received his undergraduate education at the Dhaka University,
Bangladesh, M.Sc. (Statistics) in 1979 from the University of Saskatchewan, and
M.Math (Actuarial Science) in 1988 from the University of Waterloo. Prior to enrolling
at the University of Waterloo, he was employed by the Dhaka University, the
University of Saskatchewan, Reed Stenhouse AssocIates, Sovereign Life Insurance
Company, and Wright Mogg & Associates. His current research interest is in multistate
life table modeling and its applications.
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should be pointed out that the actual reference to Malliaris should
be Malliaris and Brock (1982). In addition, a more recent edition to
Van Horne's text was published in 1990.
My only criticism of Options and the Management of Financial Risk
is that it lacks exercises, graphs, and a subject index. None of the
chapters has any exercises for readers. This is inconsistent with the
philosophy of learning in the mathematical sciences, where doing
actual problems is of vital importance. I hope that Professor Boyle
corrects this by developing a companion text consisting of worked
examples and exercises. Graphs are an efficient means of quickly
communicating information, but they are used infrequently in this
book. For example, inclusion of the two figures above (drawn using
tables 2.2 and 2.6 on pages 28 and 35, respectively, of Professor
Boyle's text) would have conveyed the essential information at a
glance and would have helped to buttress his excellent points. There
are several other places where graphs would have expedited communication with the reader. A subject index would have benefited readers.
Options and the Management of Financial Risk covers a sufficiently
broad range of topics to provide a sound introduction to the management of financial risks. The book is well written and can be covered
easily in a one semester university or college course. An elementary
knowledge of interest theory and probability theory is sufficient
background for understanding the material presented.
The book consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the subjects of insurable risk, finanCial securities, financial
risk, and financial risk management. It also provides an overview of
the text. Chapter 2 introduces the framework for analyzing the term
structure of interest rates in a deterministic setting. Classical definitions of duration and convexity are covered in Chapter 3. Derivative
securities (options, forwards, futures, and options futures) are discussed at the grassroots level in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 several
relationships that option prices must obey (namely, put-call parity)
are derived using the no-arbitrage principle. Chapter 6 assembles
several results from probability and statistics, including the central
limit theorem, normal and lognormal distribution, and a simple random walk model, all of which are useful in option pricing. The
famous Black-Scholes formula for pricing European call options is
analyzed in great detail in Chapter 7. The concluding chapter deals
with stochastic interest rate models and their applications.
There are several existing textbooks on option pricing, but
Professor Boyle'S Options and the Management of Finance Risk provides
an excellent starting point for actuaries, especially those unfamiliar
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with modern finance theory. This book will be welcomed by actuaries.
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Group Insurance, W.F. Bluhm, principal editor (Winsted, CT:
ACTEX Publications, 1992), 784 pp.
Reviewer: Charles Fuhrer *
This 784 page book includes 34 chapters by different authors. The
chapters are assigned to eight sections, each with a section editor.
The principal editor is William F. Bluhm. I will comment about the
book as a whole and then cover each section briefly.
The book is comprehensive and well-written. The authors and
editors are to be commended for the high quality of the text. This is
particularly impressive, given the difficulties associated with
preparing such a large volume with so many different contributors.
The dust cover states that "Group Insurance is intended to serve
as both an educational text for beginners in the field, and as a reference text for experienced practitioners." It is difficult for any text,
however, to serve both beginners and experienced practitioners well.
Group Insurance is an excellent text for beginners. It covers a vast
amount of material (most of it in summary form) at a level appropriate for beginners. Unfortunately, this may detract from its usefulness
to experienced practitioners who usually need detailed information.
It is interesting to compare this book with Group Insurance Handbook
(1965) which could be considered its precursor. Group Insurance
Handbook contains much more detail than does Group Insurance.
Group Insurance has very few references to other articles and
books. There are only 30 endnotes: 12 cite court cases or government
rulings, eight are tables, two are current pamphlets, one is a current
events bulletin, one is an investment-ratings publication, two are
accounting standards opinions, and only four are original articles.
Even the venerable Group Insurance Handbook is not mentioned anywhere.
This lack of references is unfortunate for several reasons:
•
•

References would allow the reader to verify the accuracy of the
facts that are used. Group Insurance includes many facts and figures without mentioning their sources;
References enhance an educational work because they give the
beginner (and even the experienced practitioner) a guide for further study; and

* Charles S. Fuhrer, FSA (1977) of the Washington National Insurance Co. in

Lincolnshire, IL has been a group insurance actuary since 1973. He is co-editor of
Actuarial Research Clearing House and has given numerous presentations at actuarial
meetings. Mr. Fuhrer has written many parers and has been awarded the 1988
Practitioner's Prize by the AERF and the 199 Health Section Research Papers Prize.
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•

Discussion of other works gives the reader a sense of the historical development of the subject matter and how the current material fits wIth other thoughts about the subject. For example, the
reader will be able to determine if the current work is consistent
with standard or classical thinking in a particular diScipline or
if the current work is new and origmal.

Chapter 25, "Bayesian Statistics and Credibility" by Thomas N.
Herzog, is a notable exception. This chapter contains 24 endnotes,
with other works mentioned throughout the chapter (particularly on
page 516). The reader can understand how the author's thoughts fit
into the total work on the subject.
Comments about specific sections follow. Also included are references for some of the subjects.
•

•

Section l-"Introduction," Robert B Cumming, editor. For a
more detailed history of group insurance through 1965, see
"Development and Significance of Group Life Insurance" by C.
Manton Eddy and "Development and Significance of Group
Health Insurance" by J.F. Follmann, Jr. in Group Insurance
Handbook (1965). Several statements by Richard S. Bilisoly in
the current Chapter 1 are very similar to those made by Eddy
and by Follmann in Group Insurance Handbook.
In Chapter 2, David F. Ogden tells us what the 1990 market
shares of the players are. The author should state the sources of
this information.
A more detailed (but somewhat outdated) version of Chapter
3, "Overview of Sales and Marketing," by Gary K. Swager is
given in Chapters 26 and 27 of Group Insurance Handbook (1965).
Also, see the
tne publications of the Life Insurance Marketing
Association (UMRA).
Section 2-"Group Coverages, Benefits, and Plan Provisions,"
Alan D. Ford, editor. The reader interested in Chapter 4, "Group
Life Insurance Benefits," by Michael J. Thompson, should see
Chapters 7, 8, and 9 of the Group Insurance Handbook (1965).
In Chapter 5, "Group Disability Income Benefits," David W.
Simbro does not mention that under most long-term disabilit)'
(LTD) plans the benefit is not reduced further by any Social
Security cost of living increases that occur after the disabled
individual becomes eligible to receive benefits.
Chapter 6, "Medical Benefits in the United States," by
Darrell D. Knapp, defines medical benefits by the dimensions of
services and conaitions, the degree to which the insured shares in
the cost, and the degree to which the provider participates in
the cost. This is an original and clever way of organizing a complicated subject. For historical purposes (and because many still
exist today), base plus supplementary (or superimposed) major
medical and comprehensive major medical plans should be
defined. See the Group Insurance Handbook (1965), Chapter 18.

138

Vol. 1, No.1, 1993

Journal of Actuarial Practice

•

•

•

Chapter 7, by Bruno Gagnon, examines medical benefits in
Canada, while David R. Nelson analyzes miscellaneous coverages in Chapter 8.
In Chapter 9, Bruce D. Schobel studies government plans in
the United States. Robert J. Myers' Social Security (1985 and previous editions) generally has been considered to be the Bible of
Social Security for actuaries. Of course, there have been many
other works and numerous u.s. government publications on social
insurance.
Section 3-"The Legal and Regulatory Environment," Charlotte
A. Furman, editor. This section contains only a brief discussion of
the legal environment; the regulatory environment is covered in
much greater detail. See, for example, W.F. Meyer's Life and
Health Insurance Law, A Summary (1976).
Keith M. Andrews looks at regulation in the United States in
Chapter 10, while David B. Martin studies the Canadian situation in Chapter 11. Chapter 12, by Edward P. Po tanka, is devoted
to regulation of HMOs, PPOs, and managed care in the United
States.
Section 4-"Underwriting and Managing the Risk," W. Duane
Kidwell, editor. There is a gap in this section between the large
groufs of Chapter 13 (as few as 50 or 100 employees) and tFte
smal groups of Chapter 15 (under 25 employees). The group
underwriter traditionally has made decisions based on qualitative opinions. Given the advances in actuarial modeling, software, computer technology, and data gathering, however, it is
time for group insurance underwriting to be based on quantitative
data. Neither these chapters nor a later chapter (Chapter 26)
devoted to data sources and structure discusses this issue.
Chapter 13 covers large group underwriting. The authors are
James T. Lundberg and Jean C. McFadden.
The introduction to Chapter 14, "Underwriting Small
Groups," by Barbara Niehus, includes some statistics on the
extent of insurance in small employers. These statistics appear
without citation of source.
Chapter IS, "Managing Multiple-Choice Situations," by Scott
M. Snow, can be supplemented with Fuhrer and Shapiro (1992)
and Gifford and Seltz (1988).
Raymond F. McCaskey covers claim administration and management in Chapter 16.
Section 5-"Funding and Rating," Francis T. O'Grady, editor.
One section of Chapter 17, "Estimating Claim Costs for Life
Benefits," by Stephen T. Carter, deals with the effective date
adjustment. This adjustment factor is used to adjust for the fact
that the manual claim table is set to be correct for rates effective
on July 1 based on calendar year of birth ages. If the rates are
effective on another date, all employees wifl be a few months
older or younger. The adjustment factor is set at approximately
0.5 percent per month. This, of course, is equal to tne weighted
average of monthly increases in mortality weighted over the
ages of a typical employee group. With the avairability of mod139
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ern data processing equipment, there is no reason to use this
weighted average. Instead, an effective date interpolation can be
done for each age. The extra accuracy may not be of the utmost
importance, but it costs almost nothing because the basic age/sex
rating usually is done by computer.
The book (Chapters 17, 22, or 25) contains a brief treatment of
credibility for group life insurance. If the standard assumption is
made that all of tIi.e
tfie experience is equally relevant, then credibility can be shown to equal efl(ef+K). Here e is the expected
number of claims in the experience period, f is an adjustment factor to reduce the credibility for variation in the size of benefits
so that f = 1/(1 +v/b2 ), and v and b are the variance and expectation of the benefits given a claim has occurred. Note that J = 1 if
all benefits are the same; otherwise, f < 1. This formula assumes,
as is usually done, that credibility is applied against total dollars of incurred claims. A better way would be to apply credibility to the number of claims, in which case f = 1. Here K is a constant whose value is probably in the 3 to 12 range. This is the
constant k in formula (4) on page 525. Herzog explains how K
could be estimated on page 530.
Chapter 18, "Estimating Claim Costs for Traditional Health
Benefits," by Susan J. Comstock, contains almost no discussion of
the experience rating of health benefit claim costs. The method
of using claim (charge) experience to build a probability distribution for determining the cost-sharing impact (Le., deductibles,
coinsurance, out-of-pocket maximum, and plan maximum) on pages
333-336 is not optimal. Unfortunately, this method is used by
most health insurance actuaries. In this method the charge data
are put into size ranges. The probability distribution is defined as
a dIscrete distribution with points set at the average of the
charges in each range. The probability is set equal to the number
of charges that fall into the ranl$.e divided by the total number of
claims. A simple calculation will show that this method understates the cost for all deductibles except those that fall exactly
at a range boundary. For deductibles at a range boundary (or for
deductibles
deductioles that fall in a range with zero or one charge in it) the
cost matches the data. Another method is suggested in another
context by Gerber and Jones (1976). A better method might be to
use the full charge data. The methods of Hogg and Klugman
(1984) could be used. Also see Lowrie and Lipsky (1990).
Lee E. Launer details in Chapter 19 various ways to calculate
premiums for managed care plans.
Readers interested in reading further about the topics covered
in Chapter 20, "Estimating Claim Costs for Disability Benefits,"
by John C. Antliff and Roy Goldman, should see the discussions of
Roy Goldman's paper (1990) for more detail on credibility calculations for LTD.
There is considerable literature on the general business problem of pricing products based on internal expenses and market
conditions. There should be some information in Chapter 21,
"Calculating Gross Premium and Contribution Rates," by Richard
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S. Wolf, on the problem of determining item expenses from
expense studies in the field of cost accounting.
Chapter 22, "Experience Rating and Funding Methods," by
William F. Bluhm, is similar to his (Bluhm, 1989) study note of
the same name. I will discuss a few of the points he raises in this
chapter. For example, Bluhm states (pages 410-411) that one of
the theoretical considerations entering the choice of credibility
levels is the confidence interval chosen by the insurer. Modern
least squares credibility (see Chapter 25) does not use confidence
intervals, even implicitly. On page 414 Bluhm correctly states
that pooling methods are used in order to dampen random statistical fluctuations to make the rates charged as attractive as possible. Pooling methods, however, also are used in prospective
experience rating to make the claim projections more accurate. See
Fuluer (1988a) for a method of setting individual claim pooling
levels to optimize the calculation of claim cost levels.
For more information on group credibility see Fuhrer (1988a)
and compare this to Margolin (1971). For a good method of calculating deficit risk charges, see Panjer and Mereu (1980). Bowers,
Gerber, Hickman, Jones, and Nesbitt (1986), Fuhrer (1988b), and
Panjer (1980) are good sources for more on calculating ag~regate
stop loss premiums. There have been some papers on indIvidual
stop loss type insurance (casualty) in some of the other actuarial
journals. Lowrie and Lipsky (1990) deal with specific stop loss.
Section 6-" Economics and Statistics," Jerry E. Lusk, editor.
There has been considerable work done by economists on the problem of estimating trends and analyzing business cycles. Chapter
23, "Medical Claim Cost Trend Analysis and Underwriting
Gain/Loss Cycles," by John P. Cookson, continues this body of
work.
It would have been useful to include times series extrapolation in Chapter 24, "Forecasting," by Bruce C. MacLeish.
Chapter 25, "Bayesian Statistics and Credibility," by
Thomas N. Herzog, is similar to the Transactions of the Society of
Actuaries (TSA) paper by the author (Herzog, 1989 with discussion). The TSA dIScussions of the paper contain valuable info and
are quite insightful. The chapter concerns credibility, especially
as it relates to Bayesian statistics. There are many books on
Bayesian statistics; see, for example, Berger (1985).
Section 7-"Information and Its Uses," William F. Bluhm, editor. Chapter 26 is devoted to the topic "Data Sources and
Structures." It was written by Randalf P. Herman. Chapter 27,
"Management Information Systems," was authored by William
R. Lane.
Many books and pal?ers (including Chapter 28, "Claim
Reserves," by Mark E. Lttow) have been written on insurance
claim reserves. I include a bibliography with over 60 entries on
this subject in my discussion of the author's paper (Litow, 1989).
The development method described by the author has many
variations and is only one of myriad methods.
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Chapter 29, "Group Insurance Financial Accounting," by James
T. Blackledge, J. Harvey Campbell, and Pierre Saddik, is one of
a number of books and articles on insurance accounting. The interested reader should see Saunders (1986).
Section 8-"Management," Bertram N. Pike, editor. Chapter
3D, "Strategic Issues," was contributed by Donald M. Charsky.
Pike discusses the strategic issues facing corporations in general,
not the group insurance industry in particular. There are many
references to these issues in the genera1 business literature.
For more on the issues raised in Chapter 31, "Measuring
Capital, Profit, Growth, and their Relationships," see Brender
(1984) and Peterson, Fuhrer, Snook, and Weller (1991).
Chapter 32, by Irwin J. Stricker, is devoted to product development.
Chapter 33, "Organization Structures" by James P. Galasso
could be supplemented with references in the general business section of any lIbrary related to this subject.
In Chapter 34, Francis G. Morewood details planning and control issues.

In summary, Group Insurance includes many chapters that provide an excellent pedagogy. I hope that future editions will contain a
more complete list of references.
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